-
107Elements, compounds and other chemical kindsPhilosophy of Science 73 (5): 864--875. 2006.In this article I assess the problems and prospects of a microstructural approach to chemical substances. Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam famously claimed that to be gold is to have atomic number 79 and to be water is to be H2O. I relate the first claim to the concept of element in the history of chemistry, arguing that the reference of element names is determined by atomic number. Compounds are more difficult: water is so complex and heterogeneous at the molecular level that `water is H2O’ seems …Read more
-
186Two conceptions of the chemical bondPhilosophy of Science 75 (5): 909-920. 2008.In this article I sketch G. N. Lewis’s views on chemical bonding and Linus Pauling’s attempt to preserve Lewis’s insights within a quantum‐mechanical theory of the bond. I then set out two broad conceptions of the chemical bond, the structural and the energetic views, which differ on the extent in which they preserve anything like the classical chemical bond in the modern quantum‐mechanical understanding of molecular structure. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, D…Read more
-
85Are realism and instrumentalism methodologically indifferent?Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2001 (3). 2001.Arthur Fine and André Kukla have argued that realism and instrumentalism are indifferent with respect to scientific practice. I argue that this claim is ambiguous. One interpretation is that for any practice, the fact that that practice yields predictively successful theories is evidentially indifferent between scientific realism and instrumentalism. On the second construal, the claim is that for any practice, adoption of that practice by a scientist is indifferent between their being a realist …Read more
-
118Review. Realism rescued: How scientific progress is possible. Jerrold L Aronson, R harré, Eileen Cornell wayBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (1): 175-179. 1999.
-
153Elements, Compounds, and Other Chemical KindsPhilosophy of Science 73 (5): 864-875. 2006.In this article I assess the problems and prospects of a microstructural approach to chemical substances. Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam famously claimed that to be gold is to have atomic number 79 and to be water is to be H2O. I relate the first claim to the concept of element in the history of chemistry, arguing that the reference of element names is determined by atomic number. Compounds are more difficult: water is so complex and heterogeneous at the molecular level that `water is H2O' seems …Read more
-
82Lavoisier and mendeleev on the elementsFoundations of Chemistry 7 (1): 31-48. 2004.Lavoisier defined an element as a chemicalsubstance that cannot be decomposed usingcurrent analytical methods. Mendeleev saw anelement as a substance composed of atoms of thesame atomic weight. These `definitions' doquite different things: Lavoisier'sdistinguishes the elements from the compounds,so that the elements may form the basis of acompositional nomenclature; Mendeleev's offersa criterion of sameness and difference forelemental substances, while Lavoisier's doesnot. In this paper I explor…Read more
-
65Introduction: Historiography and the philosophy of the sciencesStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 55 1-2. 2016.The history of science and the philosophy of science have a long and tangled relationship. On the one hand, philosophical reflection on science can be guided, shaped, and challenged by historical scholarship—a process begun by Thomas Kuhn and continued by successive generations of ‘post-positivist’ historians and philosophers of science. On the other hand, the activity of writing the history of science raises methodological questions concerning, for instance, progress in science, realism and ant…Read more
-
546Dispositional essentialism and the necessity of lawsAnalysis 69 (4): 668-677. 2009.We argue that the inference from dispositional essentialism about a property (in the broadest sense) to the metaphysical necessity of laws involving it is invalid. Let strict dispositional essentialism be any view according to which any given property’s dispositional character is precisely the same across all possible worlds. Clearly, any version of strict dispositional essentialism rules out worlds with different laws involving that property. Permissive dispositional essentialism is committed t…Read more
-
The elements and conceptual changeIn Helen Beebee & Nigel Sabbarton-Leary (eds.), The Semantics and Metaphysics of Natural Kinds, Routledge. 2010.
-
15Book Review: Jaap van Brakel: Philosophy of Chemistry: Between the Manifest and the Scientific Image Leuven University Press, Leuven, 2000, xiv + 246 pp., ISBN 90-5867-063-5 (review)Foundations of Chemistry 7 (2): 187-197. 2005.
-
7Review. The creation of scientific effects. Jed Z BuchwaldBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (1): 109-112. 1997.
-
14Substantial confusionStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (2): 322-336. 2006.In this paper I defend, against Eric Scerri’s objections, the following theses: that Lavoisier and Mendeleev shared a ‘core conception’ of chemical element, and that this core conception underwrites referential continuity in the names of particular elements.Keywords: Antoine Lavoisier; Dmitri Mendeleev; Chemical elements; Substance; Natural kinds; Reference.
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Physical Science |
General Philosophy of Science |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Physical Science |
General Philosophy of Science |