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247Ontological Vagueness, Existence Monism and Metaphysical RealismMetaphysica 14 (2): 265-274. 2013.Recently, Terry Horgan and Matjaž Potrč have defended the thesis of ‘existence monism’, according to which the whole cosmos is the only concrete object. Their arguments appeal largely to considerations concerning vagueness. Crucially, they claim that ontological vagueness is impossible, and one key assumption in their defence of this claim is that vagueness always involves ‘sorites-susceptibility’. I aim to challenge both the claim and this assumption. As a consequence, I seek to undermine their…Read more
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711The rationality of metaphysicsSynthese 178 (1): 99-109. 2011.In this paper, it is argued that metaphysics, conceived as an inquiry into the ultimate nature of mind-independent reality, is a rationally indispensable intellectual discipline, with the a priori science of formal ontology at its heart. It is maintained that formal ontology, properly understood, is not a mere exercise in conceptual analysis, because its primary objective is a normative one, being nothing less than the attempt to grasp adequately the essences of things, both actual and possible,…Read more
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137Form without matterRatio 11 (3). 1998.Three different concepts of matter are identified: matter as what a thing is immediately made of, matter as stuff of a certain kind, and matter in the (dubious) sense of material ‘substratum’. The doctrine of hylomorphism, which regards every individual concrete thing as being ‘combination’ of matter and form, is challenged. Instead it is urged that we do well to identify an individual concrete thing with its own particular ‘substantial form’. The notions of form and matter, far from being corre…Read more
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167Routledge philosophy guidebook to Locke on human understandingRoutledge. 1995.Locke on Human Understanding, is a comprehensive introduction to John Locke's major work, Essay Concerning Human Understanding . Locke's Essay remains a key work in many philosophical fields, notably in epistemology, metaphysics and the philosophies of mind and language. In addition, Locke is often referred to as the first English empiricist. Knowledge of this influential work and figure is essential to Enlightenment thought. E. J. Lowe's approach enables students to effectively study the Essay …Read more
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55Locke, Martin and substance (contributions to metaphysics)Philosophical Quarterly 50 (201): 498--514. 2000.
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196Abstraction, Properties, and Immanent RealismThe Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 2 195-205. 1999.Objects which philosophers have traditionally categorized as abstract are standardly referred to by complex noun phrases of certain canonical forms, such as ‘the set of Fs’, ‘the number of Fs’, ‘the proposition that P’, and ‘the property of being F’. It is no accident that such noun phrases are well-suited to appear in ‘Fregean’ identity-criteria, or ‘abstraction’ principles, for which Frege’s criterion of identity for cardinal numbers provides the paradigm. Notoriously, such principlesare apt t…Read more
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184The Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, Identity, and TimeClarendon Press. 1998.Jonathan Lowe argues that metaphysics should be restored to a central position in philosophy, as the most fundamental form of inquiry, whose findings underpin those of all other disciplines. He portrays metaphysics as charting the possibilities of existence, by identifying the categories of being and the relations between them. He sets out his own original metaphysical system, within which he seeks to answer many of the deepest questions in philosophy. 'a very rich book... deserves to be read ca…Read more
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139Entity, identity and unityErkenntnis 48 (2-3): 191-208. 1998.I propose a fourfold categorisation of entities according to whether or not they possess determinate identity-conditions and whether or not they are determinately countable. Some entities – which I call ‘individual objects’ – have both determinate identity and determinate countability: for example, persons and animals. In the case of entities of a kind K belonging to this category, we are in principle always entitled to expect there to be determinate answers to such questions as ‘Is x the same K…Read more
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77Review of John Hawthorne, Metaphysical Essays (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (1). 2007.
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443
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3DualismIn Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind, Oxford University Press. 2007.
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61Wright versus Lewis on the Transitivity of CounterfactualsAnalysis 44 (4). 1984.E. J. Lowe; Wright versus Lewis on the transitivity of counterfactuals, Analysis, Volume 44, Issue 4, 1 October 1984, Pages 180–183, https://doi.org/10.1093/ana.
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74In defense of moderate-sized specimens of dry goods (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3). 2003.
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70Substance and SelfhoodPhilosophy 66 (255): 81-99. 1991.How could the self be a substance? There are various ways in which it could be, some familiar from the history of philosophy. I shall be rejecting these more familiar substantivalist approaches, but also the non-substantival theories traditionally opposed to them. I believe that the self is indeed a substance—in fact, that it is a simple or noncomposite substance—and, perhaps more remarkably still, that selves are, in a sense, self-creating substances. Of course, if one thinks of the notion of s…Read more
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103Another dubious counter-example to conditional transitivityAnalysis 70 (2): 286-289. 2010.(No abstract is available for this citation)
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155Coinciding Objects: In Defence of the 'Standard Account'Analysis 55 (3). 1995.E. J. Lowe; Coinciding objects: in defence of the ‘standard account’, Analysis, Volume 55, Issue 3, 1 July 1995, Pages 171–178, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/5.
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46Illusions and Hallucinations as Evidence for Sense DataIn Edmond Wright (ed.), The Case for Qualia, Mit Press. pp. 59--72. 2008.
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34Substance and SelfhoodPhilosophy 66 (255). 1991.How could the self be a substance? There are various ways in which it could be, some familiar from the history of philosophy. I shall be rejecting these more familiar substantivalist approaches, but also the non-substantival theories traditionally opposed to them. I believe that the self is indeed a substance—in fact, that it is a simple or noncomposite substance—and, perhaps more remarkably still, that selves are, in a sense, self-creating substances. Of course, if one thinks of the notion of s…Read more
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187Mumford and Anjum on causal necessitarianism and antecedent strengtheningAnalysis 72 (4): 731-735. 2012.Stephen Mumford and Rani Lill Anjum have recently attacked causal necessitarianism – the doctrine that causes necessitate their effects – on the grounds that causation does not survive what they describe as the test of antecedent strengthening. This article shows that there are credible conditional logics which do not sanction this test, thereby providing an escape route for proponents of causal necessitarianism from Mumford and Anjum's argument
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117There are no easy problems of consciousnessJournal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3): 266-71. 1995.This paper challenges David Chalmers' proposed division of the problems of consciousness into the `easy' ones and the `hard' one, the former allegedly being susceptible to explanation in terms of computational or neural mechanisms and the latter supposedly turning on the fact that experiential `qualia' resist any sort of functional definition. Such a division, it is argued, rests upon a misrepresention of the nature of human cognition and experience and their intimate interrelationship, thereby …Read more
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Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |
Philosophy of Physical Science |