-
213Value and Agent-Relative ReasonsUtilitas 7 (1): 31. 1995.In recent years the distinction between agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons has been taken by many to play a key role in distinguishing deontology from consequentialism. It is central to all universalist consequentialist theories that value is determined impersonally; the real value of any state of affairs does not depend on the point of view of the agent. No reference, therefore, to the agent or to his or her position in the world need enter into a consequentialist understanding of what ma…Read more
-
IntuitionismIn Hugh LaFollette - (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory, Blackwell. pp. 268--87. 2000.
-
2The problem of evil: A deontological perspectiveIn Richard Swinburne & Alan G. Padgett (eds.), Reason and the Christian Religion: Essays in Honour of Richard Swinburne, Oxford University Press. pp. 329--351. 1994.
-
278Achievement, welfare and consequentialismAnalysis 61 (2). 2001.significant role for accomplishment thereby admits a ‘Trojan Horse’ (267).1 To abandon hedonism in favour of a conception of well-being that incorporates achievement is to take the first step down a slippery slope toward the collapse of the other two pillars of utilitarian morality: welfarism and consequentialism. We shall argue that Crisp’s arguments do not support these conclusions. We begin with welfarism. Crisp defines it thus: ‘Well-being is the only value. Everything good must be good for …Read more
-
498On defending deontologyRatio 11 (1). 1998.This paper comprises three sections. First, we offer a traditional defence of deontology, in the manner of, for example, W.D. Ross (1965). The leading idea of such a defence is that the right is independent of the good. Second, we modify the now standard account of the distinction, in terms of the agent-relative/agentneutral divide, between deontology and consequentialism. (This modification is necessary if indirect consequentialism is to count as a form of consequentialism.) Third, we challenge…Read more
-
96Forgiving for goodThe Philosophers' Magazine 52 (52): 43-48. 2011.The repentant offender has placed himself on the side of right, so to speak – he now stands with the victim against his own previous bad behaviour, which he now rejects. He’s a proper recipient for the gift of forgiveness. It can be morally appropriate to wipe the slate clean for him. But the unrepentant offender has undergone no such change. Why should we wipe the slate clean for such a person?
-
20Morality and Universality: Essays on Ethical UniversalizabilityPhilosophical Books 28 (2): 99-102. 1987.
-
Forgiveness and forgivingnessIn S. van Hooft, N. Athanassoulis, J. Kawall, J. Oakley & L. van Zyl (eds.), The handbook of virtue ethics, Acumen Publishing. 2014.
-
5Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant's Practical PhilosophyPhilosophical Books 32 (3): 150-151. 1991.
Tallahassee, Florida, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Religion |
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Religion |
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |