•  15
    Author Q & A
    The Philosophers' Magazine 60 125-126. 2013.
  •  86
    The Oxford handbook of rationality (edited book)
    with Alfred R. Mele and Piers Rawling
    Oxford University Press. 2004.
    Rationality has long been a central topic in philosophy, crossing standard divisions and categories. It continues to attract much attention in published research and teaching by philosophers as well as scholars in other disciplines, including economics, psychology, and law. The Oxford Handbook of Rationality is an indispensable reference to the current state of play in this vital and interdisciplinary area of study. Twenty-two newly commissioned chapters by a roster of distinguished philosophers…Read more
  •  191
    Moral responsibility and history revisited
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (5). 2008.
    Compatibilists about determinism and moral responsibility disagree with one another about the bearing of agents’ histories on whether or not they are morally responsible for some of their actions. Some stories about manipulated agents prompt such disagreements. In this article, I call attention to some of the main features of my own “history-sensitive” compatibilist proposal about moral responsibility, and I argue that arguments advanced by Michael McKenna and Manuel Vargas leave that proposal u…Read more
  •  122
    Intentional action : two-and-a-half folk concepts?
    In Joshua Michael Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Experimental Philosophy, Oxford University Press. pp. 171. 2008.
    What are the criteria people use when they judge that other people did something intentionally? This question has motivated a large and growing literature both in philosophy and in psychology. It has become a topic of particular concern to the nascent field of experimental philosophy, which uses empirical techniques to understand folk concepts. We present new data that hint at some of the underly- ing psychological complexities of folk ascriptions of intentional action and at dis- tinctions both…Read more
  •  55
    Rational Intentions and the Toxin Puzzle
    ProtoSociology 8 39-52. 1996.
    Gregory Kavka’s toxin puzzle has spawned a lively literature about the nature of intention and of rational intention in particular. This paper is largely a critique of a pair of recent responses to the puzzle that focus on the connection between rationally forming an intention to A and rationally A-ing, one by David Gauthier and the other by Edward McClennen. It also critically assesses the two main morals Kavka takes reflection on the puzzle to support, morals about the nature of intention and …Read more
  •  89
    Aristotle on Akrasia and Knowledge
    Modern Schoolman 58 (3): 137-157. 1981.
    In this paper I shall argue that there is good reason to doubt a traditional supposition about this pair of distinctions between types of knowledge used to address worries about Aristotle's account of akrasia, and I shall develop an interpretation on which the supposition is not made. It will be seen that the interpretation to be advanced - on which the entire chapter expresses Aristotle's own position on akrasia - resolves the apparent internal and external inconsistencies; and I hope to show a…Read more
  •  11
    Liberation from Self (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4): 995-996. 1998.
  •  48
    Strength of motivation and being in control - learning from Libet
    American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (3): 319-32. 1997.
    It is sometimes suggested that if, whenever we act intentionally, we do, or try to do, what we are most strongly motivated to do at the time, then we are at the mercy of whatever desire happens to be strongest at the time. I have argued elsewhere that this is false (Mele 1987, ch. 5; 1992, ch. 4; 1995, ch. 3; 1996). This essay provides another route to that conclusion, but that is not my primary aim. The goal of this paper is to display the bearing of some well-known experiments by physiologist …Read more
  •  75
    Crimes of Negligence: Attempting and Succeeding (review)
    Criminal Law and Philosophy 6 (3): 387-398. 2012.
    In chapter 6 of Attempts , Gideon Yaffe defends the thesis that it is “possible to attempt crimes of negligence” ( 2010 , p. 173). I am persuaded that he is right about this, provided that “attempt crimes of negligence” is read as (potentially misleading) shorthand for “attempt to bring it about that we commit crimes of negligence.” But I find certain parts of his defense unpersuasive. My discussion of those parts of his argument motivates the following thesis: Not only can one attempt to bring …Read more
  •  343
    Manipulation, Compatibilism, and Moral Responsibility
    The Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4): 263-286. 2008.
    This article distinguishes among and examines three different kinds of argument for the thesis that moral responsibility and free action are each incompatible with the truth of determinism: straight manipulation arguments; manipulation arguments to the best explanation; and original-design arguments. Structural and methodological matters are the primary focus
  •  55
    Chisholm on freedom
    Metaphilosophy 34 (5): 630-648. 2003.
    This critical examination of Roderick Chisholm's agent causal brand of libertarianism develops a problem about luck that undermines his earlier and later libertarian views on free will and moral responsibility and defends the thesis that a modest libertarian alternative considerably softens the problem. The alternative calls for an indeterministic connection in the action-producing process that is further removed from action than Chisholm demands. The article also explores the implications of a …Read more
  •  254
    Free: Why Science Hasn't Disproved Free Will
    Oxford University Press USA. 2014.
    Does free will exist? The question has fueled heated debates spanning from philosophy to psychology and religion. The answer has major implications, and the stakes are high. To put it in the simple terms that have come to dominate these debates, if we are free to make our own decisions, we are accountable for what we do, and if we aren't free, we're off the hook.There are neuroscientists who claim that our decisions are made unconsciously and are therefore outside of our control and social psych…Read more
  •  41
    Pears on akrasia, and defeated intentions
    Philosophia 14 (1-2): 145-152. 1984.
    David Pears's recent essay, "How Easy is Akrasia?, '' is, in significant part, a refutation of an argument against the possibility of a certain sort of incontinent action. The kind of incontinent action in question is, in Pears's words, "underivative brazen akrasia, which is commonly taken to be akrasia with the fault located between the last line of an agent's reasoning and his action" (p. 40). The argument which he attacks is attributed to Donald Davidson. The purpose of this note is, not to q…Read more
  •  142
    A Dialogue on Free Will and Science is a brief and intriguing book discussing the scientific challenges of free will. Presented through a dialogue, the format allows ideas to emerge and be clarified and then evaluated in a natural way. Engaging and accessible, it offers students a compelling look at free will and science
  •  70
    My concern here with the possibility of an acceptable intention-involving explication of intentional action is, specifically, a concern with the possibility of such an explication that treats intentions as attitudes.
  •  60
    This cutting-edge volume showcases work supported by a four-year, 4.4 million dollar project on free will and science. In fourteen new articles and an introduction, contributors explore the subject of free will from the perspectives of neuroscience; social, cognitive, and developmental psychology; and philosophy
  •  43
    Conscious Deciding and the Science of Free Will
    In Roy Baumeister, Alfred Mele & Kathleen Vohs (eds.), Free will and consciousness: how might they work?, Oxford University Press. pp. 43. 2010.
    Mele's chapter addresses two primary aims. The first is to develop an experimentally useful conception of conscious deciding. The second is to challenge a certain source of skepticism about free will: the belief that conscious decisions and intentions are never involved in producing corresponding overt actions. The challenge Mele develops has a positive dimension that accords with the aims of this volume: It sheds light on a way in which some conscious decisions and intentions do seem to be effi…Read more
  •  243
    Motivation and agency
    Oxford University Press. 2003.
    What place does motivation have in the lives of intelligent agents? Mele's answer is sensitive to the concerns of philosophers of mind and moral philosophers and informed by empirical work. He offers a distinctive, comprehensive, attractive view of human agency. This book stands boldly at the intersection of philosophy of mind, moral philosophy, and metaphysics.
  •  16
    Passive Action
    In Ghita Holmström-Hintikka & Raimo Tuomela (eds.), Contemporary Action Theory, Volume 1, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1997.
    Peter was placed — face down and head first — on a sled, and pushed from the top of a high, snow-covered hill. The brisk wind and flying snow swiftly awoke him. In moments, he had his wits about him and surmised that this early morning trip down the hill was part of his initiation into the SAE fraternity. Peter quickly surveyed his options. He could put an end to his trip by sliding off the sled, or by turning it sharply. He could grasp the steering handles and guide the sled down the slope. Or,…Read more
  •  50
    Literary Theory After Davidson (review) (review)
    Philosophy and Literature 18 (1): 165-167. 1994.
    A book review of Literary Theory After Davidson edited by Reed Way Dasenbrock.
  •  101
    Free Will and Science
    In Robert Kane (ed.), Oxford Handbook on Free Will, 2nd Edition, Oxford University Press. 2011.
    This article examines the work of two figures in fields whose work has had a significant impact on recent free-will debates, neuroscientist Benjamin Libet and psychologist Daniel Wegner. Libet's groundbreaking experimental studies on human subjects relating brain activities to the appearance or production of conscious experience, volition, and willed action have been much discussed by philosophers and scientists over the past few decades and have influenced subsequent scientific research on thes…Read more
  •  32
    Incontinent Belief
    Journal of Philosophical Research 16 197-212. 1991.
    Brian McLaughlin, in “Incontinent Belief” (Journal of Philosophical Research 15 [1989-90], pp. 115-26), takes issue with my investigation, in lrrationality (Oxford University Press, 1987), of a doxastic analogue of akratic action. He deems what I term “strict akratic belief” philosophically uninteresting. In the present paper, I explain that this assessment rests on a serious confusion about the sort of possibility that is at issue in my chapter on the topic, correct a variety of misimpressions,…Read more
  •  29
    Self-Control, Action, and Belief
    American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (2). 1985.
    This paper is an attempt to characterize self-control and to make evident the bearing of this trait of character on our actions, evaluative thinking, and non-evaluative beliefs. In Section I, I focus on action and practical reasoning and advance an account of self-control which applies to both. In Section II, I turn to the bearing of self-control upon our beliefs. I argue there that "doxastic" self-control is properly conceived in accordance with the account developed in Section I.
  • Contents
    In Self-Deception Unmasked, Princeton University Press. 2001.
  •  29
    Intentions and Interpretations
    with Paisley Nathan Livingston
    MLN 107 (5): 931-949. 1992.
    Even if everything is up for grabs in philosophy, some things are very difficult to doubt. It is hard to believe, for example, that no one ever acts intentionally. Even the most powerful arguments for the unreality of intentional action could do no more, we believe, than place one in roughly the position in which pre-Aristotelian Greeks found themselves when presented with one of Zeno's arguments that nothing can move from any given point A to any other point B. One argument has it, for example,…Read more
  •  111
    Ultimate Responsibility and Dumb Luck*: ALFRED R. MELE
    Social Philosophy and Policy 16 (2): 274-293. 1999.
    My topic lies on conceptual terrain that is quite familiar to philosophers. For others, a bit of background may be in order. In light of what has filtered down from quantum mechanics, few philosophers today believe that the universe is causally deterministic. That is, to use Peter van Inwagen's succinct definition of “determinism,” few philosophers believe that “there is at any instant exactly one physically possible future.” Even so, partly for obvious historical reasons, philosophers continue …Read more
  •  70
    Against a belief/desire analysis of intention
    Philosophia 18 (2-3): 239-242. 1988.
    An influential belief/desire analysis of intention proposed by robert audi does not provide sufficient conditions for intention. Intending to "a" entails being settled upon "a"-Ing (or upon trying to "a"), And it entails being willing to "a". But an agent can satisfy audi's conditions for intending to "a" and yet be neither settled upon "a"-Ing (or trying to "a") nor willing to "a". The objection raised poses a serious problem for belief/desire analyses of intention in general