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82Benefits, holism, and the aggregation of valueSocial Philosophy and Policy 26 (1): 354-374. 2009.We reject Moorean holism about value—the view that the value of the whole does not equal the sum of the values of its parts. We propose an alternative aggregative holism according to which the value of a state of affairs is the sum of the values of its constituent states. But these constituents must be evaluated in situ
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1Steven Rappaport, Models and Reality in Economics Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 20 (4): 279-281. 2000.
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28Rationality, Allocation, and Reproduction, Vivian Walsh. Clarendon Press, 1996, x + 304 pages (review)Economics and Philosophy 14 (2): 342. 1998.
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504On defending deontologyRatio 11 (1). 1998.This paper comprises three sections. First, we offer a traditional defence of deontology, in the manner of, for example, W.D. Ross (1965). The leading idea of such a defence is that the right is independent of the good. Second, we modify the now standard account of the distinction, in terms of the agent-relative/agentneutral divide, between deontology and consequentialism. (This modification is necessary if indirect consequentialism is to count as a form of consequentialism.) Third, we challenge…Read more
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141DeontologyIn David Copp (ed.), The Oxford handbook of ethical theory, Oxford University Press. 2006.
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72Perspectives on a Pair of EnvelopesTheory and Decision 43 (3): 253-277. 1997.The two envelopes problem has generated a significant number of publications (I have benefitted from reading many of them, only some of which I cite; see the epilogue for a historical note). Part of my purpose here is to provide a review of previous results (with somewhat simpler demonstrations). In addition, I hope to clear up what I see as some misconceptions concerning the problem. Within a countably additive probability framework, the problem illustrates a breakdown of dominance with respect…Read more
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114Introduction: Aspects of RationalityIn Alfred R. Mele & Piers Rawling (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Rationality, Oxford University Press. 2004.This article examines the nature of rationality. The domain of rationality is customarily divided into the theoretical and the practical. Whereas theoretical or epistemic rationality is concerned with what it is rational to believe, and sometimes with rational degrees of belief, practical rationality is concerned with what it is rational to do, or intend or desire to do. This article raises some of the main issues relevant to philosophical discussion of the nature of rationality. Discussions of …Read more
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70I—David McNaughton and Piers Rawling: Descriptivism, Normativity and the Metaphysics of ReasonsAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1): 23-45. 2003.
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119Contours of the PracticalIn David Bakhurst, Margaret Olivia Little & Brad Hooker (eds.), Thinking about reasons: themes from the philosophy of Jonathan Dancy, Oxford University Press. pp. 240. 2013.
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24Robust Realisms and RealitiesInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 42 (1): 103-114. 1999.
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52ParticularismIn Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Blackwell. 2013.
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Vaughn R. McKim and Stephen P. Turner, eds., Causality in Crisis? Statistical Methods and the Search for Causal Knowledge in the Social Sciences Reviewed by (review)Philosophy in Review 19 (2): 127-129. 1999.
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115Deontology and valueRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 47 197-208. 2000.Integration and coherence are central values in human existence. It would be a serious objection to any proposed way of life that it led to us being alienated or cut off from others or from some importan part of ourselves. Morality, with the strenuous demands it makes on us, is one area in which alienation is both particularly threatening and peculiarly undesirable. If morality cuts us off from some important part of ourselves then it appears unattractive, and if it cuts us off from others then …Read more
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279Achievement, welfare and consequentialismAnalysis 61 (2). 2001.significant role for accomplishment thereby admits a ‘Trojan Horse’ (267).1 To abandon hedonism in favour of a conception of well-being that incorporates achievement is to take the first step down a slippery slope toward the collapse of the other two pillars of utilitarian morality: welfarism and consequentialism. We shall argue that Crisp’s arguments do not support these conclusions. We begin with welfarism. Crisp defines it thus: ‘Well-being is the only value. Everything good must be good for …Read more
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87Reasonable doubt and the presumption of innocence: The case of the bayesian jurorTopoi 18 (2): 117-126. 1999.There is a substantial literature on the Bayesian approach, and the application of Bayes'' theorem, to legal matters. However, I have found no discussion that explores fully the issue of how a Bayesian juror might be led from an initial "presumption of innocence" to the judgment (required for conviction in criminal cases) that the suspect is "guilty beyond a reasonable doubt". I shall argue here that a Bayesian juror, if she acts in accord with what the law prescribes, will virtually never reach…Read more
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86The Oxford handbook of rationality (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2004.Rationality has long been a central topic in philosophy, crossing standard divisions and categories. It continues to attract much attention in published research and teaching by philosophers as well as scholars in other disciplines, including economics, psychology, and law. The Oxford Handbook of Rationality is an indispensable reference to the current state of play in this vital and interdisciplinary area of study. Twenty-two newly commissioned chapters by a roster of distinguished philosophers…Read more
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47I—David McNaughton and Piers Rawling: Descriptivism, Normativity and the Metaphysics of ReasonsAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1): 23-45. 2003.Simon Blackburn can be seen as challenging those committed to sui generis moral facts to explain the supervenience of the moral on the descriptive. We hold that normative facts in general are sui generis. We also hold that the normative supervenes on the descriptive, and we here endeavour to answer the generalization of Blackburn's challenge. In the course of pursuing this answer, we suggest that Frank Jackson's descriptivism rests on a conception of properties inappropriate to discussions of no…Read more
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225Can Scanlon avoid redundancy by passing the buck?Analysis 63 (4). 2003.Scanlon suggests a buck-passing account of goodness. To say that something is good is not to give a reason to, say, favour it; rather it is to say that there are such reasons. When it comes to wrongness, however, Scanlon rejects a buck-passing account: to say that j ing is wrong is, on his view, to give a sufficient moral reason not to j. Philip Stratton-Lake 2003 argues that Scanlon can evade a redundancy objection against his (Scanlon’s) view of wrongness by adopting a buck-passing account of …Read more
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34The exchange paradox, finite additivity, and the principle of dominancePoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 71 49-76. 2000.
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144Conditional and Conditioned ReasonsUtilitas 14 (2): 240. 2002.This paper is a brief reponse to some of Douglas Portmore's criticisms of our version of the agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction
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Akeel Bilgrami, Belief and MeaningInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies 3 (2): 353-354. 1995.
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