Philipp W. Rosemann

Ce livre contient les actes d'un seminaire de recherche qui fut organise au sein de l'Institut superieur de philosophie a Louvain-la-Neuve en 1996. Centre sur des problemes de methodologie souleves par l'edition, la traduction et l'interpretation des textes anciens et medievaux, ce seminaire poursuivit le but de mettre en relief les presuppositions philosophiques qui sous-tendent toute decision methodologique. Ainsi Philipp W. Rosemann essaie de montrer dans sa contribution que le neo-medievisme actuel ne peut etre compris que dans le contexte du mouvement postmoderne; Jos Decorte et Charles Burnett analysent les fondements theoriques de la pratique medievale de la traduction; Laura Rizzerio parle de la difficulte d'interpreter une philosophie qui, comme celle de Platon, questionne la valeur de l'ecriture; Steve G. Lofts se penche sur les connections entre strategies d'interpretation et philsophie de l'histoire chez Cassirer. D'autres contributions decrivent de nouvelles approches methodologiques a des problemes anciens, tels la difficile question de l'authenticite et chronologie des oeuvres aristoteliciennes (Christian Rutten) ou le probleme de la traduction des textes thomistes (C. Brouwer - M. Peeters).

Philipp Rosemann - Heidegger's Transcendental History - Journal of the History of Philosophy 40:4 Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.4 501-523 Heidegger's Transcendental History Philipp W. Rosemann 1. Introduction: "Aletheia Is Not A Greek Word" John D. Caputo has argued that Heidegger's account of the development of Western metaphysics—a story of continuous decline from heroic Greek times to the total oblivion of Being in the technological age—needs to be "demythologized." This does not mean to discard altogether Heidegger's often insightful historical analyses; yet it is necessary to recognize that his conception of history can be read at another level than that of the narrative of the ever-increasing logocentrism of Western thought. Read "critically," Caputo suggests, Heidegger makes claims about transcendental history; not about certain facts in the history of Being, but about the a priori structure rendering these facts possible. Aletheia, then, "is no longer a Greek word." Un-concealment is the "Wesen of history, the process of letting history be, which can never be itself something historical." Caputo's interpretation makes sense. The later Heidegger famously acknowledged that his etymological understanding of aletheia as un-concealment is not historically verifiable in even the earliest Greek texts: "[w]e must acknowledge the fact," he writes in 1964, "that aletheia, unconcealment in the sense of the clearing of presence, was..