Bernard Baertschi

As elsewhere, the ethical debate on embryonic stem cell research in Central Europe, especially Germany and Switzerland, involves controversy over the status of the human embryo. There is a distinctive Kantian flavor to the standard arguments however, and we show how they often embody a set of misunderstandings and argumentative shortcuts we term "embryological Kantianism." We also undertake a broader analysis of three arguments typically presented in this debate, especially in official position papers, namely the identity, continuity, and potentiality arguments. It turns out that these arguments do not support the strong, quasi-personal status accorded to the embryos in these official opinions.

This article analyses neuronal determinism and mentions that at first sight it appears to be a type of qualified determinism. Neurodeterminism is better conceived as determinism tout court when it is applied to human beings. It differs importantly from genetic determinism, together the two views that are often regarded as similar in form if not in content. Moreover, the article examines the question of genetic determinism, because it is a paradigm of qualified determinism. It then explains the meaning of determinism tout court, its relation with the notions of “free will” and “responsibility,” and the debate about their alleged incompatibility. It provides an understanding of what neurodeterminism consists of, shows that it should be conceived as determinism tout court when it is applied to human beings, imparting an empirical turn to a very old metaphysical conundrum.

Recently at the J. Craig Venter Institute, a microorganism has been created through synthetic biology. In the future, more complex living beings will very probably be produced. In our natural environment, we live amongst a whole variety of beings. Some of them have moral status — they have a moral importance and we cannot treat them in just any way we please —; some do not. When it becomes possible to create artificially living beings who naturally possess moral status, will this artificiality modify their status? Many people contend that it will, but I am not of the same mind and will develop three arguments against it

Distributive justice, like every other value, is not suspended in mid-air: its implementation depends on certain conditions, the well-known ‹circumstances of justice›. In this paper, I attempt to spell them out, first for justice proper , then for international justice. Those circumstances relate to the conceptual parts of justice and are four in number: scarcity, needs and merit, social cooperation, and authority of distribution. As far as international justice is concerned, there is a problem with the last circumstance: as yet no international authority of distribution exists. This does not, however, mean that international justice is impossible or undesirable; only that we have the task to create such an authority

For some decades, the concept of human dignity has been widely discussed in bioethical literature. Some authors think that this concept is central to questions of respect for human beings, whereas others are very critical of it. It should be noted that, in these debates, dignity is one component of a long-lasting and widespread conceptual construct used to support a stance on the ethical question of the moral status of an action or being. This construct has been used from Modernity onward to condemn slavery and torture as violations of human dignity. In spelling it out, we can come to a better understanding of what “dignity” means and become aware that there exists a quite useful place for this notion in our ethical thought, albeit a modest one

To read into the mind of another person has for a long time been a fantasy—and sometimes a vague possibility. In science fiction, there are stories of aliens who are able to decipher the thoughts of other beings using some type of device. When I was a boy, I remember reading a cartoon of Bibi Fricotin, in which Bibi, a young boy like me, found some glasses that allowed him to read other people’s thoughts. For a time, I was afraid when I came across adults wearing glasses. With such devices, privacy and childish innocence would be in jeopardy, but fortunately, this was only a remote possibility. The idea would be worrying for lay people, ethicists and lawyers, but it is only a fantasy. Recently, with the development...

Les textes rassembles ici marquent un tournant decisif de la philosophie biranienne: apres avoir developpe sa pensee dans les Memoires couronnes (tomes II, III, IV, VI), Maine de Biran, revenant sur ses pas, estime qu'il a laisse sans solution les problemes de la metaphysiques classiques. Il s'efforce d'y repondre a partir de son propre point de vue et elabore a cet effet ses theories de la croyance et de l'absolu: l'etre ne se reduit pas au phenomene qui le manifeste; etre, ce n'est pas etre percu. C'est dans les Rapports des sciences naturelles avec la psychologie que Biran traite pour la premiere fois ces questions de maniere detaillee, ce qui l'oblige a reprendre sa distinction du sujet et de l'objet, et a revoir sa critique de Condillac et des cartesiens. On trouvera aussi dans ce volume plusieurs opuscules de la meme epoque abordant ces questions, et notamment des discours prononces a la societe philosophique qu'il animait alors.