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25"Comments on Achille Varzi's" Change, Temporal Parts, and the Argument from Vagueness"Dialectica 59 (4): 499-502. 2005.
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71Adequacy Results for Some Priorean Modal Propositional LogicsNotre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 40 (2): 236-249. 1999.Standard possible world semantics for propositional modal languages ignore truth-value gaps. However, simple considerations suggest that it should not be so. In Section 1, I identify what I take to be a correct truth-clause for necessity under the assumption that some possible worlds are incomplete (i.e., "at" which some propositions lack a truth-value). In Section 2, I build a world semantics, the semantics of TV-models, for standard modal propositional languages, which agrees with the truth-cl…Read more
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309Plus on monte plus on s’amuse : IntroductionLes ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 9 (2): 149-151. 2014.Fabrice Correia ,Christine Tappolet
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27Review of L. Haaparanta and H.J. Koskinen , Categories of Being: Essays on Metaphysics and Logic (review)Dialectica 69 (1): 138-143. 2015.
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177From Grounding to Truth-Making: Some ThoughtsPhilosophical Papers Dedicated to Kevin Mulligan. 2011.I assume that truth-making is to be understood in terms of grounding, and I show how, on that assumption, various general properties of truth-making follow from certain features of grounding.
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32Review of Wojciech Żełaniec, The Recalcitrant Synthetic A Priori (review)Dialectica 56 (1): 85-88. 2002.
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186On the Logic of Factual EquivalenceReview of Symbolic Logic 9 (1): 103-122. 2016.Say that two sentences are factually equivalent when they describe the same facts or situations, understood as worldly items, i.e. as bits of reality rather than as representations of reality. The notion of factual equivalence is certainly of central interest to philosophical semantics, but it plays a role in a much wider range of philosophical areas. What is the logic of factual equivalence? This paper attempts to give a partial answer to this question, by providing an answer the following, mor…Read more
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101Husserl on foundationDialectica 58 (3). 2004.In the third of his Logical Investigations, Husserl draws an important distinction between two kinds of parts: the dependent parts like the redness of a visual datum or the squareness of a given picture, and the independent parts like the head of a horse or a brick in a wall. On his view, the distinction is to be understood in terms of a more fundamental notion, the notion of foundation. This paper is an attempt at clarifying that notion. Such attempts have already been undertaken by Peter Simon…Read more
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