Predrag Cicovacki

Kant's central goal in the Critique of Pure Reason is to investigate conditions of the possibility of cognition. He assumes that what is given to us by means of the senses is not sufficient for cognition. The senses yield us only the "raw material" for cognition. It is because of our conceptual apparatus that we are able to determine, or discriminate among, what is presented by the senses. ;My main task in the dissertation is to examine Kant's account of the nature of concepts relevant for empirical cognition. Contrary to some recent commentators, like Walsh, and Guyer, I conclude that Kant's account is philosophically defensible and that it has relevance to issues of contemporary concern in epistemology. ;Central to Kant's account of the possibility of empirical concepts is his understanding of concepts as rules. Even empirical concepts, like 'table' and 'book', function as rules because of their multiple instantiability. By means of such rules we identify and re-identify items of perceptual encounters and ascribe to them various properties and relations. However, the employment of such concepts yields cognition only if they are not formed and applied arbitrarily. Instead, those concepts have to be formed and employed in accordance with some rules. Kant argues that categorial concepts, like 'substance' and 'cause', function as meta-rules for the formation and cognitive application of empirical concepts. ;Kant further argues that categories are not arbitrary rules. I attempt to clarify and defend Kant's view by comparing categories with Searlean constitutive rules. By means of categories we construct cognizable properties for items of perceptual encounters; they must conform to categories for the reason that only by means of the application of categories can any of them become objects of cognition. It is, thus, the role of constitutive rules of cognition which proves the legitimate right of categories to be employed in cognition.

This paper is a reply to Eric Chelstrom’s “Criticism of Cicovacki’s The Analysis of Wonder.” Chelstrom mostly critiques my reconstruction of the role of love and personality in Hartmann’s philosophy. I offer a defense of my interpretation by illuminating how Hartmann’s philosophical project differs from that of Kant. Although Hartmann does not sufficiently develop either his conception of love or his understanding of personality, I argue that both conceptions could be further elaborated and that they could serve as the ways to reintroduce Hartmann into the mainstream of the current philosophical discussion.

This book intends to show that we should re-think and re-evaluate our dogmatic commitment to a cognitivistic attitude. Our high regard for knowledge is due to the fact that we expect that it will help us satisfy not only our practical needs but also guide us toward a meaningful and fulfilled life. A careful examination of the nature and limits of knowledge reveals that both expectations cannot be satisfied. Following Kant, Cicovacki comes to the conclusion that, although our knowledge of reality seems to be reliable and true, at the same time it seems to be one-sided and very narrowly oriented. Our practical purposes seem to be served quite well, but it is dubious whether our knowledge helps us understand and find our own place and role in reality. Those pursuing science and analytic philosophy do not seem to realize that our knowledge of reality is at the same time reliable and true, and yet distorting and damaging. Cicovacki focuses on Kant's question: ^D< "What is man?" as the ultimate question of philosophy. He invites a new interpretation of Kant since the question indicates that, for Kant, a broadly construed philosophical anthropology, rather than metaphysics, or epistemology, or ethics, is the most fundamental philosophical discipline. "The real philosopher," Kant tells us, is "the teacher of wisdom through doctrine and example." Contents: Prelude; PART I: A Knowledge of Knowledge; The Epistemological Project; Cognition, Recognition, and Cognitive Interest; Concepts as Rules; Concepts as Norms; PART II: A Knowledge of Ignorance; Striving for Truth: The Problem of Criterion; Dreams and Reality: On the Existential Presupposition of Cognitive Experience; The Real and the Preceived; Healing the Wound; Bibliography; Index.

Two critics respond to Predrag Cicovacki’s book, Gandi’s Footprints. Cicovacki opens the discussion by presenting his motivations for exploring a paradox, that Gandhi’s work is widely revered but not widely emulated. Cicovacki explores a resolution to the paradox by suggesting how Gandhi’s promising visions may be followed without being imitated, especially Gandhi’s insight that we must seek spiritual grounding for life in a materialistic world. Critic Sanjay Lal affirms Cicovacki’s insight but suggests that precisely because Gandhi’s aspirations for spiritual life were profoundly transformative we should take care not to dilute them into our conventional wisdoms. Critic Carlo Filice asks how Gandhi’s commitment to unified reality could be more clearly articulated once a distinction is drawn between spirit and matter, also how Gandhi’s nonviolence could manage to embrace important exceptions. In reply to critics, Cicovacki proposes an approach to Gandhi informed by the insights of Tagore.

The philosophy of Albert Schweitzer has proved widely influential in modern thinking, especially in the field of ethics. His leading ethical idea can be summarized in the phrase "reverence for life" - namely, that good consists in maintaining and perfecting life, and evil consists in destroying and obstructing life. For Schweitzer, all life is sacred. Ethics thus deals with human attitudes and behavior toward all living beings.Unlike many moral philosophers, Schweitzer argues that knowledge of human nature does not provide a sufficient foundation for any adequate moral theory. That is why he bases his ethics on much broader foundations, articulated in his philosophy of civilization and the philosophy of religion. Schweitzer argues that the material aspect of our civilization has become far more important than its spiritual counterpart. Even organized religion has put itself in the service of politics and economy, thereby losing its vitality and moral authority.Schweitzer's ethics of reverence for life, argues Predrag Cicovacki, offers a viable alternative at a time when traditional ethical theories are found inadequate. Schweitzer's robust and un-dogmatic idealism may offer the best antidote to the prevailing relativism and nihilism of the postmodern epoch. His ethical vision directs us toward a new way of building a more just and more peaceful world. Collecting sixteen of Schweitzer's most effective essays, this volume serves as a compelling introduction to this remarkable thinker and humanist.