Predrag Cicovacki

Mahatma K. Gandhi's dedication to finding a path of liberation from an epidemic of violence has been well documented before. The central issue and the novelty of this book is its focus on what Gandhi wanted to liberate us for. The book also provides an assessment of how viable his positive vision of humanity is. Gandhi revolutionized the struggle for Indian liberation from Great Britain by convincing his countrymen that they must turn to nonviolence and that India needed to be liberated from its social ills--poverty, unemployment, opium addiction, institution of child marriage, inequality of women, and Hindu-Muslim frictions--even more than it needed political freedom. Although Gandhi's legacy has not been forgotten, it has often been distorted. He is called "Mahatma" and venerated as a saint, but not followed and often misinterpreted. Predrag Cicovacki attempts to de-mythologize Gandhi and take a closer look at his thoughts, aims, and struggles. He invites us to look at the footprints Gandhi left for us, and follow them as carefully and critically as possible. Cicovacki concludes that Gandhi's spiritual vision of humanity and the importance of adherence to truth are his lasting legacy.

Structured to introduce the reader into all aspects of the philosophy of Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950), this book aims to stimulate further interest into his thought. Once considered the most studious and systematic of all the German philosophers of the twentieth-century, this prolific author has been nearly forgotten. For many years a student and an admirer of Hartmann's work, Cicovacki argues that a closer look into Hartmann's ontologically and axiologically oriented philosophy contains a promise of a vital philosophical orientation, especially with regard to our understanding of the nature, place, and role of humanity in the larger world. "The Analysis of Wonder" - Hartmann's own definition of philosophy - is an invitation to the readers to challenge their preconceived and self-interested notions of reality in order to relearn to appreciate the always changing and conflicting world, in all of its complexity, richness, and sublimity.

This essay examines the significance of Kant's transcendental philosophy by focusing on the central metaphors used in his works. The four metaphors singled out here are those of the Copernican turn, the land of truth and the ocean of illusion, the starry heavens and the moral law, and of perpetual peace. The author emphasizes the strong and the weak points of Kant's philosophy that these metaphors reveals, and argues that these central metaphors work together and point toward the two essential concerns of Kant's entire philosophical opus: an active role of the creative subject in all forms of human experience, and the boundaries of the subject's creativity. Further reflection should not only reveal some other metaphors and their role in Kant's philosophy, but also clarify how he himself understand the nature of metaphors: Are metaphors the expression of our creativity, or of the limitations of our creativity?. Ovaj rad ispituje znacaj Kantove transcendentalne filozofije time sto se usmerava na centralne metafore koriscene u njegovim delima. Cetiri metafore su ovde izdvojene kao najvaznije: kopernikanski obrt, postojbina istine i okean iluzije, zvezdano nebo i moralni zakon, i vecni mir. Autor naglasava jake i slabe stane Kantove filozofije koje razotkrivaju te metafore i argumentise da, uzete zajedno, one ukazuju na dve centralne preokupacije citavog Kantovog filozofskog opusa: aktivna uloga kreativnog subjekta u svim formama ljudskog iskustva, i granice ljudske kreativnosti. Dalja refleksija bi trebalo ne samo da ukaze na neke druge metafore i njihovu ulogu u Kantovoj filozofiji, nego takodje i da razjasni kako je on shvatao samu prirodu metafora: Da H su metafore izraz nase kreativnosti, ili pak izraz granica te kreativnosti?.

U ovom radu autor prvo analizira razlike i slicnosti izmedju rata i terorizma, a zatim argumentise da su i jedan i drugi duboko nemoralni. Njihove razlike su mnogo manje znacajne od njihovih slicnosti, o kojih je glavna ona koja se sastoji u negiranju stanovista da je svaki ljudski zivot jednako vredan. To negiranje otvara put ka nehumanom i nasilnom tretmanu onih (neprijatelja, drugih) koji nisu toliko vredni koliko i mi, sto karakterise i terorizam i rat. Pored neprihvatljivih moralnih implikacija proisteklog iz takvog tretmana drugih ljudskih bica, dalja zajednicka i problematicna posledica terorizma i rata se sastoji u cinjenici da dehumanizacija drugih vodi, na kraju, i ka dehumanizaciji nas samih.

Albert Schweitzer became well-known for his ethics of reverence for life. While Schweitzer’s life and his ethics have had an enormous appeal to wide audiences all over the world, philosophers have generally ignored his contribution. This may be a loss for philosophy, for, despite some internal problems and inconsistencies, Schweitzer’s ethics of reverence for life promises a viable alternative to utilitarianism, Kantianism, and virtue ethics. The task of my paper is the following. Schweitzer argues that reverence for life is the basic ethical principle and the highest moral value. After briefly presenting Schweitzer’s view, I will consider two questions: 1. Can Schweitzer show that reverence for life is the highest moral value? 2. Is reverence for life a moral value in the firstplace? I will argue that, with some provision, Schweitzer’s position is tenable. In response to the second question, by comparing Schweitzer with Isaiah Berlin, I maintain that reverence for life is a moral value. In response to the first question, Schweitzer’s position must be modified. By comparing Schweitzer with Nicolai Hartmann, I make a case that reverence for life is the most basic and fundamental, but not the highest moral value.

The article debates the problems of metaphors in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. The most important four Kantian metaphors analyzed here are: the Copernican revolution, the island of truth and the stormy ocean of illusion, the starry heavens and the moral law, and the vision of perpetual peace. Besides the extensive analysis of these four metaphors and of some criticism directed towards some of the core problems of Kantianism, these pages try to answer to the question if Kant‟s metaphors are still capable of stimulating our systematic thinking.

Albert Schweitzer (1875-1965) became well-known for his ethics of reverence for life. While Schweitzer’s life and his ethics have had an enormous appeal to wide audiences all over the world, philosophers have generally ignored his contribution. This may be a loss for philosophy, for, despite some internal problems and inconsistencies, Schweitzer’s ethics of reverence for life promises a viable alternative to utilitarianism, Kantianism, and virtue ethics. The task of my paper is the following. Schweitzer argues that reverence for life is the basic ethical principle and the highest moral value. After briefly presenting Schweitzer’s view, I will consider two questions: 1. Can Schweitzer show that reverence for life is the highest moral value (principle)? 2. Is reverence for life a moral value in the firstplace? I will argue that, with some provision, Schweitzer’s position is tenable. In response to the second question, by comparing Schweitzer with Isaiah Berlin, I maintain that reverence for life is a moral value. In response to the first question, Schweitzer’s position must be modified. By comparing Schweitzer with Nicolai Hartmann, I make a case that reverence for life is the most basic and fundamental, but not the highest moral value.

The author argues that love should play a central role in philosophy (and ethics). In the past, philosophical practice has been too narrowly defined by theory and explanation. Although unquestionably important, they do not belong to the very core of our philosophizing. Philosophy is primarily a way of life, centered on the soul and the development of our humanity – in its most diverse aspects and to its utmost potential. For such a life to be possible, love must play a central role in philosophy and philosophy should be understood not in the traditional sense as “the love of wisdom,” but in a new way – as the wisdom of love.

This essay analyzes Marcel Proust's claim that "Crime and Punishment" could be the title of all of Dostoevskys novels. Although Proust reveals some important points regarding the motivation for Dostoevskys writings, his account is also inadequate in some relevant respects. For example, while Proust calls our attention to what happens to victimizers, he ignores the perspective of victims; thus Ivan Karamazovs challenge remains unaccounted for in Proust's interpretation. More importantly Proust does not account for Dostoevsky's optimism, which, in connection with his realism, is the central aspect of Dostoevsky novelistic and philosophical approach.