Tom Beauchamp

This autobiographical sketch is being published 50 years after I started as an assistant professor at Georgetown University in 1970. In this presentation, I cannot tell the full story of these 50 years. I write only about the formative years both before and after I was hired at Georgetown, and I emphasize two subjects. The first is the importance of the individuals who were massive influences on my intellectual development and aspirations. The second is the great importance of multidisciplinary work. I came from philosophy, a discipline that generally did not emphasize or particularly value multidisciplinary work, but I was transformed by individuals in other disciplines who directed me to this style of work. Almost sheer luck brought each of these influences into my life.

After expressing our gratitude to the commentators for their valuable analyses and assessments of Principles of Biomedical Ethics, we respond to several particular critiques raised by the commentators under the following rubrics: the compatibility of different sets of principles and rules; challenges to the principle of respect for autonomy; connecting principles to cases and resolving their conflicts; the value of and compatibility of virtues and principles; common morality theory; and moral status. We point to areas where we see common agreement with our commentators and respond to their critical evaluations.

This volume presents a framework of general principles for animal research ethics together with an analysis of the principles' meaning and moral requirements. Tom L. Beauchamp and David DeGrazia's comprehensive framework addresses ethical requirements pertaining to societal benefit and features a thorough, ethically defensible program of animal welfare. The book also features commentaries on the framework of principles by eminent figures in animal research ethics from an array of relevant disciplines: veterinary medicine, biomedical research, biology, zoology, comparative psychology, primatology, law, and bioethics.

Two positions that Rosamund Rhodes puts forward are the proper starting point for this commentary: 1. Medical ethics based on the common morality that uses a body of abstract principles or rules are not ‘an adequate and appropriate guide for physicians’ actions’. 2. We need, but do not have, a true professional medical ethics for physicians, which must be ‘distinctly different’ from ethics based on common morality. I will argue that both positions are mistaken. Rhodes does not analyse what she means by a professional ‘medical ethics’ and does not supply content for what she calls ‘medical professionalism’. ‘Common morality‘ is also not given a precise meaning. However, I set aside these problems of conceptual clarity and concentrate on a paradigm case of professional ethics for physicians (and others) in interactions with patients. My example is The Belmont Report. Belmont is almost certainly a document that, in the USA, has for four decades been highly influential on physicians, especially physicians engaged in clinical research. It is not merely research ethics. In full satisfaction of the American Board of Medical Specialties’ ‘definition of medical professionalism’, The Belmont Report puts forward a system of ethical principles showing that physicians and other health professionals must conduct research in the service of the public interest and the well-being of patient–subjects. The Belmont Report also satisfies the earlier delineated conditions of medical professionalism in the American Board of Internal Medicine’s ‘Physician Charter’, which are stated in terms of the ‘fundamental principles’ of the primacy of patient welfare, patient autonomy and social justice.1,1–3 Belmont more than satisfies these conditions of medical professionalism. Indeed Belmont may well be the source of the principles …

The four principles of biomedical ethics are widely used in the world for bioethical deliberation. These theoretical guides are useful for the analysis and resolution of particularly complex ethical controversies arising in clinical and biomedical fields. This chapter develops an analysis of the basic universal principles, the common universal morality, and some characteristics of each principle. Then it discusses some problems posed by critics who have provided alternative frameworks of principles that are nonuniversal. Finally, it shows how universal moral principles are connected to human rights, how rules and rights are specified to become detailed and practical for certain moralities, and how these ideas are connected with problems of justification in bioethics and biolaw.

Book reviewed in this article: Ethical Issues in Social Research. Edited by Tom L. Beauchamp, Ruth R. Faden, R. Jay Wallace, Jr., and LeRoy Walters. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982. xii + 436 pp. $25.00 (hardcover); $8.95 (paper). Ethics of Human Subject Research. Edited by Allan J. Kimmel, Jr. San Francisco: Jossey‐Bass, 1981. 106 pp. $6.95 (paper). Social Research Ethics. Edited by Martin Bulmer. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1982. xiv + 284 pp. $39.50 (hardcover); $14.50 (paper). The Ethics of Social Research: Field‐work, Regulation and Publication. Edited by Joan E. Sieber. New York: Springer‐Verlag, 1982. x + 187 pp. $23.50 (hardcover). The Ethics of Social Research: Surveys and Experiments. Edited by Joan E. Sieber. New York: Springer‐Verlag, 1982. xii + 249 pp. $23.50 (hardcover).

Chris Durante’s comments on my article about the compatibility of universal morality, particular moralities and multiculturalism indicate that we have very different approaches to and understandings of these three notions. Durante investigates multiculturalism from the perspective of political philosophy, whereas my approach is grounded in moral rather than political philosophy. Since he refers to his framework as an ‘ethico-political theory’, he may regard his account as a synthesis of moral and political philosophy, but this representation seems incorrect. He repeatedly refers to his discussions of multiculturalism using the language of ‘political ethics’, ‘political theory’, ‘political philosophy’, ‘political system’, ‘political ramifications’, ‘political order’, ‘political liberalism’, ‘political community’, ‘political society’, ‘political principles’ and related concepts. He bluntly states his view about the centrality of political theory: ‘Multiculturalism…is primarily concerned with establishing a political system with moral undertones rather than a moral system with political ramifications’. I take the reverse view. Durante assumes without argument that multiculturalism finds its origins and home in political philosophy; by contrast, I envision multiculturalism as primarily a moral theory about obligations to tolerate moral differences in the face of conflicts between cultural groups. I do not deny that political philosophy is relevant to the resolution of various problems of multicultural …

Business ethics raises many important philosophical issues. A first set of issues concerns the methodology of business ethics. What is the role of ethical theory in business ethics? To what extent, if at all, can thinking in business ethics be enhanced by philosophy, so as to provide real moral guidance? Another set of issues involves questions regarding markets, capitalism, and economic justice. There are related concerns about the nature of business organizations and the responsibilities they have to their members, owners, and society.The Oxford Handbook of Business Ethics is a comprehensive treatment of the field of business ethics as seen from a philosophical approach. The volume consists of 24 essays that survey the field of business ethics in a broad and accessible manner, covering all major topics about the relationship between ethical theory and business ethics. The chapters are written by accomplished philosophers who offer a systematic interpretation of their topics and discuss various moral controversies and dilemmas that plague business relationships and government-business relationships. Readers are thus presented with the major views that define the topic of the essay with critical discussions of those views, as well as topical bibliographies that identify key works in the field. In addition to philosophers who work in this area, the volume will be of interest to those in business and society seeking an up-to-date resource on this vital field. "This book is intended to provide an overview of the state of the field of philosophical business ethics. And Brenkert and Beauchamp are to be commended for having put together a collection of contributors and topics that is well-suited for this goal. The contributors are all first-rate scholars who have made important contributions to business ethics or cognate fields. They are also admirably diverse in age, ideology, and methodological approach, thus providing readers with a good glimpse into the wide range of scholarship that characterizes the field. The book will obviously be of interest to those for whom philosophical business ethics is a main area of interest. But the entries are clear and accessible enough to make the book of special value to at least two other groups: those whose approach to business ethics is not primarily philosophical will find here a useful 'crash course' in an alternative methodological approach to their own subject, and those philosophers who are not primarily interested in business ethics will be treated to a volume that makes clear the connection between business ethics and more standard philosophical subjects, and that will almost certainly provide them with new ways of thinking about both business ethics and other topics in value theory and political philosophy that are connected with business ethics in ways they might not have previously recognized. The selection of topics is also admirably comprehensive." - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.

In Unfit for the Future, Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu take up intriguing questions about whether human moral capacities should be improved to steer us in paths of improved decision making in confronting global crises. They assess the sufficiency of traditional moral practices and human nature as we confront ever more daunting moral and policy challenges. They start from the position that ‘human beings are not by nature equipped with a moral psychology that empowers them to cope with the moral problems that these new conditions of life create. Nor could the currently favoured political system of liberal democracy overcome these moral deficiencies’ (p. 1).1 The authors defend their starting point by presenting a variety of scenarios and conditions under which humans commonly fail to pursue a morally proper course of action even when aware that it is the proper course. Critical weaknesses include failed political will, biases to the near future, partiality to family and friends, insufficient sympathy, low levels of non-parochial altruism, underdeveloped conceptions of responsibility and a relatively weak sense of justice. The authors assess human nature as so morally deficient that it will be unable to successfully address impending and catastrophic problems at the global level: ‘Human beings now have at their disposal means by which they could undermine the conditions of worthwhile life on Earth forever ’ through their failures to deal with the depletion of essential natural resources, overpopulation, poverty, terrorism, anthropogenic climate change, nuclear weapons and use of biological weapons (p. 1, 2, 5, 37–39, 47–49, 60–63, 66–68, 75, 76, 83, 108, 109, 123, 127, 133, 134).1 This book's most convincing and sobering arguments are in its many passages on the depth and continuously increasing character of these catastrophic problems. It is the most persuasive presentation of the threats these …

Over the course of its first seven editions, Principles of Biomedical Ethics has proved to be, globally, the most widely used, authored work in biomedical ethics. It is unique in being a book in bioethics used in numerous disciplines for purposes of instruction in bioethics. Its framework of moral principles is authoritative for many professional associations and biomedical institutions-for instruction in both clinical ethics and research ethics. It has been widely used in several disciplines for purposes of teaching in the classroom, during conferences, etc.

“Applied ethics” has been the major growth area in North American philosophy in the last decade, yet a robust confidence and enthusiasm over its promise is far from universal in academic philosophy. It is considered nonphilosophical in West Germany, and has largely failed to penetrate British departments of philosophy. Whether it has any intellectually or pedagogically redeeming value is still widely debated in North America, where many who have tried to teach some area of applied ethics for the first time have seen their courses grind to a halt in unresolvable quandaries, practical exigencies, or unavailable technical information. Consequently, some departments are at war over whether to hire or confer tenure on those who teach these subjects. Many also remain unconvinced that philosophical generalizations or theories can play any significant role in applied contexts. They may even doubt both that applied ethics is really ethics and that philosophy should accomodate this creature in its curriculum.

Literature on the mental capacities and cognitive mechanisms of the great apes has been silent about whether they can act autonomously. This paper provides a philosophical theory of autonomy supported by psychological studies of the cognitive mechanisms that underlie chimpanzee behavior to argue that chimpanzees can act autonomously even though their psychological mechanisms differ from those of humans. Chimpanzees satisfy the two basic conditions of autonomy: (1) liberty (the absence of controlling influences) and (2) agency (self-initiated intentional action), each of which is specified here in terms of conditions of understanding, intention, and self-control. In this account, chimpanzees make knowledge-based choices reflecting a richly information-based and socially sophisticated understanding of the world. Finally, two major theories of autonomy (Kantian theory and two-level theory) are rejected as too narrow to adequately address these issues, necessitating the modifications made in the present approach.

: The Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments has correctly argued that persons and institutions can sometimes be held responsible for actions taken more than a half-century ago, when practices and policies on the use of research subjects were strikingly different. In reaching its conclusions, the Committee did not altogether adhere to the language and commitments of its own ethical framework. In its Final Report, the Committee emphasizes judgments of wrongdoing, to the relative neglect of culpability; it discusses mitigating conditions that are exculpatory, but does not provide a thoroughgoing assessment of either culpability or exculpation. However, the Committee's shortcomings are mild in comparison to the deficiencies in the "Report of the UCSF Ad Hoc Fact Finding Committee on World War II Human Radiation Experiments" of the University of California at San Francisco. The latter report reaches no significant judgments of either wrongdoing or culpability. The findings that should have been reached by both committees are discussed.

: The belief persists in philosophy, religion, science, and popular culture that some special cognitive property of persons like self-consciousness confers a unique moral standing. However, no set of cognitive properties confers moral standing, and metaphysical personhood is not sufficient for either moral personhood or moral standing. Cognitive theories all fail to capture the depth of commitments embedded in using the language of "person." It is more assumed than demonstrated in these theories that nonhuman animals lack a relevant form of self-consciousness or its functional equivalent. Although nonhuman animals are not plausible candidates for moral personhood, humans too fail to qualify as moral persons if they lack one or more of the conditions of moral personhood. If moral personhood were the sole basis of moral rights, then these humans would lack rights--and precisely for the reasons that nonhuman animals would.