Principles that provide general normative frameworks in bioethics have been criticized since the late 1980s, when several different methods and types of moral philosophy began to be proposed as alternatives or substitutes. Several accounts have emerged in recent years, including: (1) Impartial Rule Theory (supported in this issue by K. Danner Clouser), (2) Casuistry (supported in this issue by Albert Jonsen), and (3) Virtue Ethics (supported in this issue by Edmund D. Pellegrino). Although often…
Read morePrinciples that provide general normative frameworks in bioethics have been criticized since the late 1980s, when several different methods and types of moral philosophy began to be proposed as alternatives or substitutes. Several accounts have emerged in recent years, including: (1) Impartial Rule Theory (supported in this issue by K. Danner Clouser), (2) Casuistry (supported in this issue by Albert Jonsen), and (3) Virtue Ethics (supported in this issue by Edmund D. Pellegrino). Although often presented as rival methods or theories, these approaches are consistent with and should not be considered adversaries of a principle-based account.
