Tom Beauchamp

: The Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments has correctly argued that persons and institutions can sometimes be held responsible for actions taken more than a half-century ago, when practices and policies on the use of research subjects were strikingly different. In reaching its conclusions, the Committee did not altogether adhere to the language and commitments of its own ethical framework. In its Final Report, the Committee emphasizes judgments of wrongdoing, to the relative neglect of culpability; it discusses mitigating conditions that are exculpatory, but does not provide a thoroughgoing assessment of either culpability or exculpation. However, the Committee's shortcomings are mild in comparison to the deficiencies in the "Report of the UCSF Ad Hoc Fact Finding Committee on World War II Human Radiation Experiments" of the University of California at San Francisco. The latter report reaches no significant judgments of either wrongdoing or culpability. The findings that should have been reached by both committees are discussed

: Phenomena of moral conflict and disagreement have led writers in ethics to two antithetical conclusions: Either valid moral distinctions hold universally or they hold relative to a particular and contingent moral framework, and so cannot be applied with universal validly. Responding to three articles in this issue of the Journal that criticize his previously published views on the common morality, the author maintains that one can consistently deny universality to some justified moral norms and claim universality for others. Universality is located in the common morality and nonuniversality in other parts of the moral life, called "particular moralities." The existence of universal moral standards is defended in terms of: (1) a theory of the objectives of morality, (2) an account of the norms that achieve those objectives, and (3) an account of normative justification (both pragmatic and coherentist).

Robert Baker and Laurence McCullough argue that the "applied ethics model" is deficient and in need of a replacement model. However, they supply no clear meaning to "applied ethics" and miss most of what is important in the literature on methodology that treats this question. The Baker-McCullough account of medical and applied ethics is a straw man that has had no influence in these fields or in philosophical ethics. The authors are also on shaky historical grounds in dealing with two problems: (1) the historical source of the notion of "practical ethics" and (2) the historical source of and the assimilation of the term "autonomy" into applied philosophy and professional ethics. They mistakenly hold (1) that the expression "practical ethics" was first used in a publication by Thomas Percival and (2) that Kant is the primary historical source of the notion of autonomy as that notion is used in contemporary applied ethics.

Western ethics and law have been slow to come to conclusions about the right to choose the time and manner of one's death. However, policies, practices, and legal precedents have evolved quickly in the last quarter of the twentieth century, from the forgoing of respirators to the use of Do Not Resuscitate (DNR) orders, to the forgoing of all medical technologies (including hydration and nutrition), and now, in one U.S. state, to legalized physician-assisted suicide. The sweep of history—from the Quinlan case in New Jersey to legislation in Oregon that allows physician-assisted suicide—has been as rapid as it has been revolutionary.

To address some questions in global biomedical ethics, three problems about cultural moral differences and alleged differences in Eastern and Western cultures are addressed: The first is whether the East has fundamentally different moral traditions from those in the West. Concentrating on Japan and the United States, it is argued that theses of profound and fundamental East-West differences are dubious because of many forms of shared morality. The second is whether human rights theory is a Western invention with no firm traditions in Eastern moral traditions. It is argued that this thesis is unsupported both historically and in contemporary bioethics. The third problem is whether multiculturalist theory casts doubt on claims of universal principles and rights. It is argued that the reverse is true: multiculturalism is a universalistic theory. The argument throughout supports common morality theory.

about Hume: David Hume is one of the greatest of philosophers. Today he probably ranks highest of all British philosophers in terms of influence and philosophical standing. His philosophical work ranges across morals, the mind, metaphysics, epistemology, and aesthetics; he had broad interests not only in philosophy as it is now conceived but in history, politics, economics, religion, and the arts. He was a master of English prose. about the Clarendon Hume Edition: The Clarendon Hume will include all of his works except his History of England and minor historical writings; it will be the only thorough critical edition, and will provide a far more extensive scholarly treatment than any previous editions. This edition offers authoritative annotation, bibliographical information, and indexes, and draws upon the major advances in textual scholarship that have been made since the publication of earlier editions--advances both in the understanding of editorial principle and practice and in knowledge of the history of Hume's own texts. General Editors: Professors T. L. Beauchamp, D. F. Norton, M. A. Stewart. The Edition will comprise: Vols. 1 and 2: A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by D. F. Norton Vol. 3: An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, edited by T. L. Beauchamp Vol. 4: An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, edited by T. L. Beauchamp Vol. 5: The Natural History of Religion and the Dissertation on the Passions Vols. 6 and 7: Essays Vol. 8: Dialogues concerning Natural Religion and other posthumous publications, edited by M. A. Stewart.

What is the organizational structure of Hume’s essay? The first three paragraphs are purely introductory and somewhat incidental. To someone untutored in Hume’s general religious skepticism, these opening remarks might appear to be the vain boasts of a philosopher in praise of philosophy. More plausibly, his opening remarks are stage-setting devices. They prepare the reader not for what Hume will argue but rather for how he will uncompromisingly challenge commonly held presuppositions about the sensitive issue of suicide. His comments are methodological or perhaps meta-philosophical in character. In more contemporary language, Hume is promoting the following two theses in these introductory paragraphs, each of which has to do with the inadequacy of non-philosophical foundations for reaching conclusions about the morality of suicide

In recent years, the right of employees to know about health hazards in the workplace has emerged as a major issue in occupational health policy. A general consensus has gradually evolved that there is a right to know, and correlatively that there is a moral obligation to disclose relevant information to workers. For example, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, and several other U.S. federal agencies, informed the U.S. Senate as early as July 1977 that ‘workers have the right to know whether or not they are exposed to hazardous chemical and physical agents regulated by the Federal Government.’ In 1980, the Occupational Safety and Health Adminstration promulgated regulations guaranteeing workers access to medical and exposure records.

Hume wrote about fundamental similarities and dissimilarities between human and nonhuman animals. His work was centered on the cognitive and emotional lives of animals, rather than their moral or legal standing, but his theories have implications for issues of moral standing. The historical background of these controversies reaches to ancient philosophy and to several prominent figures in early modern philosophy. Hume develops several of the themes in this literature. His underlying method is analogical arg ument and his conclusions are generally favorable regarding the abilities in animals. Hume does not attribute a moral sense or capacity of judgment to animals, but he does suggest that their actions exhibit moral qualities, such as other-regarding instincts. Hume allows in-kind differences in both demonstrative reason and moral judgment, but in the domains of both causal reason and moral agency he believes there are differences of degree rather than of kind. Hume's most significant philosophical contribution was to move as far as anyone before him to a naturalistic explanation of human and nonhuman minds that invited psychological and epistemological examination of minds by using the identical methods and categories for man and beast.