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12We offer a review of some of the most influential views on the status of Reichenbach’s Principle of the Common Cause (PCC) for genuinely indeterministic systems. We first argue that the PCC is properly a conjunction of two distinct claims, one metaphysical and another methodological. Both claims can and have been contested in the literature, but here we simply assume that the metaphysical claim is correct, in order to focus our analysis on the status of the methodological claim. We briefly revie…Read more
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39This paper is divided in two parts. In part I, I argue against two attempts to naturalise the notion of scientific representation, by reducing it to isomorphism and similarity. I distinguish between the means and the constituents of representation, and I argue that isomorphism and similarity are common means of representation; but that they are not constituents of scientific representation. I look at the prospects for weakened versions of these theories, and I argue that only those that abandon …Read more
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17This paper expands on, and provides a qualified defence of, Arthur Fine’s selective interactions solution to the measurement problem. Fine’s approach must be understood against the background of the insolubility proof of the quantum measurement. I first defend the proof as an appropriate formal representation of the quantum measurement problem. Then I clarify the nature of selective interactions, and more generally selections, and I go on to offer three arguments in their favour. First, selectio…Read more
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25The role of models in the application of scientific theories: epistemological implicationsIn Mary S. Morgan & Margaret Morrison (eds.), Models as Mediators: Perspectives on Natural and Social Science, . 1999.
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21Experimental realism defended: how inference to the most likely cause might be soundIn Luc Bovens, Carl Hoefer & Stephan Hartmann (eds.), Nancy Cartwright's Philosophy of Science, . 2010.
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86These are the introduction chapters to the forthcoming collection of essays published by Springer (Synthese Library) and entitled Probabilities, Causes and Propensities in Physics.
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55Special issue: Inferentialism in philosophy of science and in epistemology—introductionSynthese 198 (Suppl 4): 905-907. 2018.
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431Scientific representation: A long journey from pragmatics to pragmatics Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11016-010-9465-5 Authors James Ladyman, Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol, 9 Woodland Rd, Bristol, BS8 1TB UK Otávio Bueno, Department of Philosophy, University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL 33124, USA Mauricio Suárez, Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science, Complutense University of Madrid, 28040 Madrid, Spain Bas C. van Fraassen, Philosophy Department, San Francis…Read more
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444Kinds of ModelsIn Malcolm G. Anderson & Paul D. Bates (eds.), Model Validation: perspectives in hydrological science, Wiley. pp. 11-22. 2001.We separate metaphysical from epistemic questions in the evaluation of models, taking into account the distinctive functions of models as opposed to theories. The examples a\are very varied.
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57First Conference of the European Philosophy of Science Association, 14–17 November, Madrid, SpainJournal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 39 (1): 157-159. 2008.
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1078The tool box of science: Tools for the building of models with a superconductivity examplePoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 44 137-149. 1995.We call for a new philosophical conception of models in physics. Some standard conceptions take models to be useful approximations to theorems, that are the chief means to test theories. Hence the heuristics of model building is dictated by the requirements and practice of theory-testing. In this paper we argue that a theory-driven view of models can not account for common procedures used by scientists to model phenomena. We illustrate this thesis with a case study: the construction of one of th…Read more
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87The Representational Semantic ConceptionPhilosophy of Science 86 (2): 344-365. 2019.This paper argues for a representational semantic conception of scientific theories, which respects the bare claim of any semantic view, namely that theories can be characterised as sets of models. RSC must be sharply distinguished from structural versions that assume a further identity of ‘models’ and ‘structures’, which we reject. The practice-turn in the recent philosophical literature suggests instead that modelling must be understood in a deflationary spirit, in terms of the diverse represe…Read more
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17I defend a three-fold form of pluralism about chance, involving a tripartite distinction between propensities, probabilities, and frequencies. The argument has a negative and a positive part. Negatively, I argue against the identity thesis that informs current propensity theories, which already suggests the need for a tripartite distinction. Positively, I argue that that a tripartite distinction is implicit in much statistical practice. Finally, I apply a well-known framework in the modelling li…Read more
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48On the Analogy between Cognitive Representation and TruthTheoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 21 (1): 39-48. 2010.In this paper we claim that the notion of cognitive representation is irreducibly plural. By means of an analogy with the minimalist conception of truth, we show that this pluralism is compatible with a generally deflationary attitude towards representation. We then explore the extent and nature of representational pluralism by discussing the positive and negative analogies between the inferential conception of representation advocated by one of us and the minimalist conception of truth.
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8SECCIÓN MONOGRÁFICA: Dispositions, Causes and Propensities in Science.IntroductionTheoria 19 (3): 257-258. 2010.
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26ChanceIn Eleanor Knox & Alastair Wilson (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Physics, Routledge. 2022.A brief introduction to the history and philosophy of physical chance.
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25Causal processes and propensities in quantum mechanicsTheoria 19 (3): 271-300. 2010.I offer an alternative interpretation of Van Fraassen's influential arguments against causal realism in quantum mechanics. These arguments provide in fact a good guide to the different causal models available for the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen correlations, which in turn shed light on the nature of quantum propensities.
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154Scientific Realism, the Galilean Strategy, and RepresentationPoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 101 (1): 269-292. 2009.This paper critically reviews Philip Kitcher's most recent epistemology of science, real realism . I argue that this view is unstable under different understandings of the term 'representation', and that the arguments offered for the position are either unsound or invalid depending on the understanding employed. Suitably modified those arguments are however convincing in favor of a deflationary version of real realism, which I refer to as the bare view . The bare view accepts Kitcher's Galilean …Read more
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176Bohmian dispositionsSynthese 192 (10): 3203-3228. 2015.This paper argues for a broadly dispositionalist approach to the ontology of Bohmian mechanics . It first distinguishes the ‘minimal’ and the ‘causal’ versions of Bohm’s theory, and then briefly reviews some of the claims advanced on behalf of the ‘causal’ version by its proponents. A number of ontological or interpretive accounts of the wave function in BM are then addressed in detail, including configuration space, multi-field, nomological, and dispositional approaches. The main objection to e…Read more
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40Review of R.I.G Hughes, The Theoretical Practices of Physics: Philosophical Essays (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (12). 2010.
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51Probability (review)Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 26 (1): 99-103. 2011.
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379Fictions, inference and realismIn John Woods (ed.), Fictions and Models: New Essays, Philosophia Verlag. 2010.Abstract: It is often assumed without argument that fictionalism in the philosophy of science contradicts scientific realism. This paper is a critical analysis of this assumption. The kind of fictionalism that is at present discussed in philosophy of science is characterised, and distinguished from fictionalism in other areas. A distinction is then drawn between forms of fictional representation, and two competing accounts of fiction in science are discussed. I then outline explicitly what I tak…Read more
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25Hacking KuhnRevista de Filosofía (Madrid) 28 (2): 261-284. 2003.Thomas Kuhn’s work, particularly his famous book Structure of Scientific Revolutions, is often interpreted as a failed attempt to defend four radical thesis about science: epistemic pessimism, semantic relativism, methodological irrationalism and metaphysical idealism. In this paper I argue that such interpretation depends essentially on a false model of scientific knowledge, according to which the objects of scientific belief are always explanatory scientific theories, which are in turn empiric…Read more
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60Review. Quantum state diffusion. I PercivalBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (3): 527-530. 2000.
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50Theories, models, and representationsIn L. Magnani, N. J. Nersessian & P. Thagard (eds.), Model-Based Reasoning in Scientific Discovery, Kluwer/plenum. pp. 75--83. 1999.I argue against an account of scientific representation suggested by the semantic, or structuralist, conception of scientific theories. Proponents of this conception often employ the term “model” to refer to bare “structures”, which naturally leads them to attempt to characterize the relation between models and reality as a purely structural one. I argue instead that scientific models are typically “representations”, in the pragmatist sense of the term: they are inherently intended for specific …Read more
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London School of EconomicsDepartment of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific MethodAssociate Researcher
Madrid, Madrid, Spain
Areas of Specialization
Science, Logic, and Mathematics |
Areas of Interest
8 more