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39This paper is divided in two parts. In part I, I argue against two attempts to naturalise the notion of scientific representation, by reducing it to isomorphism and similarity. I distinguish between the means and the constituents of representation, and I argue that isomorphism and similarity are common means of representation; but that they are not constituents of scientific representation. I look at the prospects for weakened versions of these theories, and I argue that only those that abandon …Read more
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17This paper expands on, and provides a qualified defence of, Arthur Fine’s selective interactions solution to the measurement problem. Fine’s approach must be understood against the background of the insolubility proof of the quantum measurement. I first defend the proof as an appropriate formal representation of the quantum measurement problem. Then I clarify the nature of selective interactions, and more generally selections, and I go on to offer three arguments in their favour. First, selectio…Read more
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24The role of models in the application of scientific theories: epistemological implicationsIn Mary S. Morgan & Margaret Morrison (eds.), Models as Mediators: Perspectives on Natural and Social Science, . 1999.
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83Probabilities, Causes and Propensities in PhysicsIn Mauricio Suárez (ed.), Probabilities, Causes and Propensities in Physics, Springer. 2010.These are the introduction chapters to the forthcoming collection of essays published by Springer (Synthese Library) and entitled Probabilities, Causes and Propensities in Physics.
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21Experimental realism defended: how inference to the most likely cause might be soundIn Luc Bovens, Carl Hoefer & Stephan Hartmann (eds.), Nancy Cartwright's Philosophy of Science, . 2010.
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54Special issue: Inferentialism in philosophy of science and in epistemology—introductionSynthese 198 (Suppl 4): 905-907. 2018.
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431Scientific representation: A long journey from pragmatics to pragmatics Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11016-010-9465-5 Authors James Ladyman, Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol, 9 Woodland Rd, Bristol, BS8 1TB UK Otávio Bueno, Department of Philosophy, University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL 33124, USA Mauricio Suárez, Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science, Complutense University of Madrid, 28040 Madrid, Spain Bas C. van Fraassen, Philosophy Department, San Francis…Read more
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440Kinds of ModelsIn Malcolm G. Anderson & Paul D. Bates (eds.), Model Validation: perspectives in hydrological science, Wiley. pp. 11-22. 2001.We separate metaphysical from epistemic questions in the evaluation of models, taking into account the distinctive functions of models as opposed to theories. The examples a\are very varied.
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57First Conference of the European Philosophy of Science Association, 14–17 November, Madrid, SpainJournal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 39 (1): 157-159. 2008.
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1054The tool box of science: Tools for the building of models with a superconductivity examplePoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 44 137-149. 1995.We call for a new philosophical conception of models in physics. Some standard conceptions take models to be useful approximations to theorems, that are the chief means to test theories. Hence the heuristics of model building is dictated by the requirements and practice of theory-testing. In this paper we argue that a theory-driven view of models can not account for common procedures used by scientists to model phenomena. We illustrate this thesis with a case study: the construction of one of th…Read more
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86The Representational Semantic ConceptionPhilosophy of Science 86 (2): 344-365. 2019.This paper argues for a representational semantic conception of scientific theories, which respects the bare claim of any semantic view, namely that theories can be characterised as sets of models. RSC must be sharply distinguished from structural versions that assume a further identity of ‘models’ and ‘structures’, which we reject. The practice-turn in the recent philosophical literature suggests instead that modelling must be understood in a deflationary spirit, in terms of the diverse represe…Read more
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15I defend a three-fold form of pluralism about chance, involving a tripartite distinction between propensities, probabilities, and frequencies. The argument has a negative and a positive part. Negatively, I argue against the identity thesis that informs current propensity theories, which already suggests the need for a tripartite distinction. Positively, I argue that that a tripartite distinction is implicit in much statistical practice. Finally, I apply a well-known framework in the modelling li…Read more
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48On the Analogy between Cognitive Representation and TruthTheoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 21 (1): 39-48. 2010.In this paper we claim that the notion of cognitive representation is irreducibly plural. By means of an analogy with the minimalist conception of truth, we show that this pluralism is compatible with a generally deflationary attitude towards representation. We then explore the extent and nature of representational pluralism by discussing the positive and negative analogies between the inferential conception of representation advocated by one of us and the minimalist conception of truth.
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8SECCIÓN MONOGRÁFICA: Dispositions, Causes and Propensities in Science.IntroductionTheoria 19 (3): 257-258. 2010.
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26ChanceIn Eleanor Knox & Alastair Wilson (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Physics, Routledge. 2022.A brief introduction to the history and philosophy of physical chance.
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25Causal processes and propensities in quantum mechanicsTheoria 19 (3): 271-300. 2010.I offer an alternative interpretation of Van Fraassen's influential arguments against causal realism in quantum mechanics. These arguments provide in fact a good guide to the different causal models available for the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen correlations, which in turn shed light on the nature of quantum propensities.
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50Theories, models, and representationsIn L. Magnani, N. J. Nersessian & P. Thagard (eds.), Model-Based Reasoning in Scientific Discovery, Kluwer/plenum. pp. 75--83. 1999.I argue against an account of scientific representation suggested by the semantic, or structuralist, conception of scientific theories. Proponents of this conception often employ the term “model” to refer to bare “structures”, which naturally leads them to attempt to characterize the relation between models and reality as a purely structural one. I argue instead that scientific models are typically “representations”, in the pragmatist sense of the term: they are inherently intended for specific …Read more
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145Causal Markov, robustness and the quantum correlationsIn Mauricio Suárez (ed.), Probabilities, Causes and Propensities in Physics, Springer. 2010.It is still a matter of controversy whether the Principle of the Common Cause (PCC) can be used as a basis for sound causal inference. It is thus to be expected that its application to quantum mechanics should be a correspondingly controversial issue. Indeed the early 90’s saw a flurry of papers addressing just this issue in connection with the EPR correlations. Yet, that debate does not seem to have caught up with the most recent literature on causal inference generally, which has moved on to c…Read more
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494Scientific representation: Against similarity and isomorphismInternational Studies in the Philosophy of Science 17 (3): 225-244. 2003.I argue against theories that attempt to reduce scientific representation to similarity or isomorphism. These reductive theories aim to radically naturalize the notion of representation, since they treat scientist's purposes and intentions as non-essential to representation. I distinguish between the means and the constituents of representation, and I argue that similarity and isomorphism are common but not universal means of representation. I then present four other arguments to show that simil…Read more
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324Quantum propensitiesStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 38 (2): 418-438. 2007.This paper reviews four attempts throughout the history of quantum mechanics to explicitly employ dispositional notions in order to solve the quantum paradoxes, namely: Margenau's latencies, Heisenberg's potentialities, Maxwell's propensitons, and the recent selective propensities interpretation of quantum mechanics. Difficulties and challenges are raised for all of them, and it is concluded that the selective propensities approach nicely encompasses the virtues of its predecessors. Finally, som…Read more
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113On quantum propensities: Two arguments revisitedErkenntnis 61 (1): 1-16. 2004.Peter Milne and Neal Grossman have argued against Popper's propensity interpretation of quantum mechanics, by appeal to the two-slit experiment and to the distinction between mixtures and superpositions, respectively. In this paper I show that a different propensity interpretation successfully meets their objections. According to this interpretation, the possession of a quantum propensity by a quantum system is independent of the experimental set-ups designed to test it, even though its manifest…Read more
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67Fictions, Conditionals, and Stellar AstrophysicsInternational Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27 (3): 235-252. 2013.This article argues in favour of an inferential role for fictions in scientific modelling. The argument proceeds by means of a detailed case study, namely models of the internal structure of stars in stellar astrophysics. The main assumptions in such models are described, and it is argued that they are best understood as useful fictions. The role that conditionals play in these models is explained, and it is argued that fictional assumptions play an important role as either background or anteced…Read more
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881Theories: Tools versus modelsStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 39 (1): 62-81. 2008.In “The Toolbox of Science” (1995) together with Towfic Shomar we advocated a form of instrumentalism about scientific theories. We separately developed this view further in a number of subsequent works. Steven French, James Ladyman, Otavio Bueno and Newton Da Costa (FLBD) have since written at least eight papers and a book criticising our work. Here we defend ourselves. First we explain what we mean in denying that models derive from theory – and why their failure to do so should be lamented. S…Read more
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London School of EconomicsDepartment of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific MethodAssociate Researcher
Madrid, Madrid, Spain
Areas of Specialization
Science, Logic, and Mathematics |
Areas of Interest
8 more