Patrick A. Heelan

(1926 - 2015)

The author proposes the thesis that all perception, including observation in natural science, is hermeneutical as well as causal; that is, the perceiver (or observer) learns to 'read' instrumental or other perceptual stimuli as one learns to read a text. This hermeneutical aspect at the heart of natural science is located where it might be least expected, within acts of scientific observation. In relation to the history of science, the question is addressed to what extent the hermeneutical component within scientific observation opens natural science to the charge of reflecting merely cultural values, and of providing merely a culturally acceptable reading of the "Book of Nature", rather than, as the author states, one stating universal antecedent conditions of possibility of cultural activity itself

Two philosophical traditions with much in common, (classical) pragmatism and (Heidegger's) hermeneutic philosophy, are here\ncompared with respect to their approach to the philosophy of science. Both emphasize action as a mode of interpreting experience.\nBoth have developed important categories – inquiry, meaning, theory, praxis, coping, historicity, life-world – and each has\noffered an alternative to the more traditional philosophies of science stemming from Descartes, Hume, and Comte. Pragmatism's\nabduction works with the dual perspectives of theory (as explanation) and praxis (as culture). The hermeneutical circle depends\nin addition on the lifeworld as background source of ontological meaning and resource for strategies of inquiry. Thus a hermeneutical\nphilosophy of research involves three components: lifeworld (as ontological and strategic), theory (as explanatory), and praxis\n(as constitutive of culture)

A structural analogy is pointed out between a check hermeneutically developed phenomenological description, based on Husserl, of the process of perceptual cognition on the one hand and quantum mechanical measurement on the other hand. In Husserl's analytic phase of the cognition process, the 'intentionality-structure' of the subject/object union prior to predication of a local object is an entangled symmetry-making state, and this entanglement is broken in the synthetic phase when the particular local object is constituted under the influence of an iota ('inner horizon') and the 'facticity' of the local world ('outer horizon'). Replacing 'perceptual cognition' by 'measurement' and 'subject' by 'expert subject using a measuring device' the analogy of a formal quantum structure is extended to the conscious structure of all empirical cognition. This is laid out in three theses: about perception, about classical measurement, and about quantum measurement. The results point to the need for research into the quantum structure of the physical embodiment of human cognition

This essay is dominated by three themes that recur contrapuntally in Heisenberg’s writings: observation, description, and ontology—prompted always by a concern about the role played by the subjective inquirer in scientific meaning-making, and by the ontology of scientific claims. Among the related themes are; the tension between paradigmatic concerns with structure and philosophical concerns with reality, the possibility of scientific revolutions, such as relativity and quantum mechanics, that can overthrow the classical traditions of natural science and the inadequacy of a psychophysical parallelism for an epistemology of reason. The influence of Husserl and Heidegger is in his neokantian concern about the role of subjectivity. Heisenberg was a long-time friend of Heidegger and familiar with Heidegger’s hermeneutical phenomenology and its critique of Greek philosophy; he also contributed an essay to a Festschrift in Heidegger’s honor in 1959

The topic of this excellent little book is the debate about whether the humanities proceed differently from the natural sciences, and in particular, about whether literary interpretations are decidably true or false or whether they are decidable merely in relation to assertability. Decidability and historicity are, as Stegmuller points out, also a problem for the natural sciences, because of the dilemmas of confirmation and of background knowledge. The excellence of this book is in the way Anglo-American realist and Continental constructivist approaches consider and reconsider the core problem of how meaning is found in texts and in experimental facts by interpretation and how--or whether--this meaning can be assessed for truth.

Why a hermeneutical philosophy of the natural sciences? It is necessary to address the philosophic crisis of realism vs relativism in the natural sciences. This crisis is seen as a part of the cultural crisis that Husserl and Heidegger identified and attributed to the hegemonic role of theoretical and calculative thought in Western societies. The role of theory is addressed using the hermeneutical circle to probe the origin of theoretic meaning in scientific cultural praxes. This is studied in Galileo's discovery of the phases of Venus; the practice of measurement; the different theories and practices of space perception; the historicality and temporality of scientific research communities which ground paradigm change; and the process of discovery. The paper draws particularly from the work of Heidegger. Though envisaging all science and scholarship, the highlighted theme is research in the natural sciences

Two hundred years ago, Friedrich Schleiermacher took critical issue with Immanuel Kant's intellectual notion of intuition as applied to human nature (Wellmon 2006). He found it necessary to modify—"hermeneutically," as he said—Kant's notion of anthropology by enabling it to include as human the new and strange human tribes Captain Cook found in the Pacific South Seas. A similar hermeneutic move is necessary if physics is to include the local contextual empirical syntheses of relativity and quantum physics. In this hermeneutical revision the synthesis is formed around the notion of a Hilbert Vector Space as the universal grammar of physics, adding to it the dynamic of the Schrödinger equation, and representing empirical "observables" by projection operators that map the subspaces of definite measurable values. Among the set of observable projection operators, some pairs share the same subspace, commute with one another, and share a common laboratory setting. Other pairs do not share this property and are described as being mutually complementary. Complementary symmetries introduce into the discursive language of physics the commonsense notion of contextuality. The new synthesis, proposed by Eugene Wigner, John von Neumann, and (in his own way) Paul Dirac, brought physics into the community of common language and established it as a work of general human achievement. 1.

The ArgumentIn this rejoinder to Gyorgy Markus, I argue that although there are nonphilosophical hermeneutical studies of communication among scientists from which much can be learned about scientific practices, there is also the philosophical genre of a hermeneutics of natural science, with which this paper is concerned. The former is the nonphilosophical use of hermeneutics in the study of texts and historical sources; the latter is a philosophy pursued within a working canon of philosophical works defined principally by the writings of Heidegger and Husserl. There is also a hermeneutically sensitive analytic philosophy of science, such as in the work of Kuhn, Toulmin, and Elkana. These genres are distinguished by their literary canons and their basic phenomenologies or critical experiential givens; each genre comprises an exemplary phenomenology as understood with the help of a characteristic fundamental literary canon.I argue that analytic philosophy is pursued within a canon that makes it difficult to raise hermeneutical questions about natural science, and that it assumes a generally positivistic phenomenology. I argue that hermeneutical phenomenology currently defines itself in dialectical opposition to “science” as understood by analytic philosophy, and has failed to exploit the opportunity of making its own positive contribution to the philosophy of science by examining for itself the phenomenology of laboratory work, especially data production, and the transformation of the language of theory into a descriptive language of scientific phenomena. A “strong” hermeneutical philosophy of natural science, then, challenges both analytic philosophy and the existing tradition of hermeneutical phenomenology.

Today when congressional committees are investigating laboratory notebooks, when the media debate the possibility of cold-fusion, and advertising presents drugs as remedies for everything from infertility to hair loss, the stage is set for the postmodern crisis of confidence in science. This crisis was ushered in by F. Nietzsche, and taken up by M. Heidegger, J. Habermas, Critical Theory, the Strong School of the Sociology of Science, by Margaret Thatcher, on the right and by Jacques Derrida, on the left—and, of course, by the Greens. For so many intellectuals of the population, science has lost its legitimacy as uniquely privileged life-giving knowledge. The spirit of postmodernism in philosophy, as exemplified by Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida, Lyotard, and many who claim to be hermeneutic thinkers, has turned against the "master narratives" of our culture which give legitimacy to the institutions of our society and has turned especially against the privileged status of modernist science which is central to this narrative. Since modernism dominates our society mostly through the success and prestige of formal and theoretical systems of codification allied with technical expertise, the most pressing problem for postmodernity then is coming to terms with science and its prevalent modernist interpretation. This is the problem I want to address. 2012 APA, all rights reserved)