Ansgar Lyssy

One central debate in the German Enlightenment concerned the “Bestimmung” or vocation of humankind, involving authors such as Spalding, Abbt, Mendelssohn, and Schiller, continued by authors such as Fichte and Reinhold. While originally developed as a theological concept, the idea of a vocation was easily adapted in other contexts, such as philosophy of nature (Blumenbach, Mendelssohn) or philosophy of art (Schiller). It also had a remarkably strong impact on Kant’s philosophy that is not yet entirely understood. Kant is one of the very few modern thinkers who explicitly writes about the origins of humankind, as well as the way we can conceive the passage of humanity through time, and finally about our conception of the distant future of humankind. It seems clear that the concept of vocation connects the (conjectural) beginning of humankind to its (ideal) future. In this paper, I will elaborate this aspect, focusing primarily on both the origins and future of humankind and the way they are connected by this specific conception of a vocation. I argue that Kant picks up on the Enlightenment debate on the vocation of the human being and combines it not only with core ideas of the philosophy of pedagogy of his time, but it is also inspired by the philosophy of history, as he develops his perspective on the formation and cultivation also in his critical engagement with Herder’s philosophy (see, e.g., Review of Herder’s Ideas, AA 8:56). The germs for humankind’s future have already been implanted in the very beginning of its existence, yet only freedom and self-determination can work on removing their internal and external limitations to achieve the fulfillment of this vocation. So the vocation is not an external ‘calling’, but rather an internal striving towards self-fulfillment. This striving, however, should not only be conceived on the individual level, but needs to be related to an ideal of society, in which the relevant human actions are both facilitated and enticed. The vocation of humankind as a collective thus relates to the achievement of individual freedom in a just society. In this sense, it can be made clear that Kant’s concept of humankind’s vocation is not only a yet underrated core concept in Kant’s moral philosophy and his pedagogical ideas, but serves as a nexus to connect them both to his philosophy of history.

What makes us human beings? Is it merely some corporeal aspect, or rather some specific mental capacity, language, or some form of moral agency or social life? Is there a gendered bias within the concept of humanity? How do human beings become more human, and can we somehow cease to be human? This volume provides some answers to these fundamental questions and more by charting the increased preoccupation of the European Enlightenment with the concepts of humankind and humanity. Chapters investigate the philosophical concerns of major figures across Western Europe, including Montesquieu, Diderot, Rousseau, Locke, Hume, Ferguson, Kant, Herder, Johann Friedrich Blumenbach and the Comte de Buffon. As these philosophers develop important descriptive and comparative approaches to the human species and moral and social ideals of humanity, they present a view of the Enlightenment project as a particular kind of humanism that is different from its Ancient and Renaissance predecessors. With contributions from a team of internationally recognized scholars, including Stephen Gaukroger, Michael Forster, Céline Spector, Jacqueline Taylor, and Günter Zöller, this book offers a novel interpretation of the Enlightenment that is both clear in focus and impressive in scope.

In this paper, I argue that Hegel’s account of causality as developed in the Science of Logic can be described as a ‘manipulationist’ account of causality. First, some conceptual clarifications will help set our sights on the goal of the paper. What is a theory of causality comprised of? And what is a manipulationist account of causality? Next, I sketch the development of those concepts in the SL that are relevant to the present topic (e.g., causality, objectivity, and the idea). Here, Hegel moves from developing the concept of causality to unfolding a set of objective causal relations. The latter is then understood as a theory and hence as a product of the self-conscious mind that filters for relevancy and usability. I argue that Hegel’s account of causality does meet the criteria for being understood as an example of a MAC.

Der Mensch nimmt in der Aufklärungsphilosophie eine zentrale Stelle ein. Doch die Menschheit ist von offenkundigen Differenzen geprägt, die von der Philosophie und der Wissenschaft eingeholt und in einen Zusammenhang gebracht werden müssen: Es gibt den Menschen nicht. Das Individuum ist durch sein Geschlecht, seine Herkunft, seine soziale Stellung, sein Wissen, seinen Glauben usw. maßgeblich geprägt. Demnach gibt es auch keinen einheitlichen Zugang zum Menschen, sondern vielmehr eine Pluralität an Perspektiven, die mal mehr, mal weniger deskriptiv oder normativ sein können, spekulativ oder empirisch, ontologisch oder historisierend. Damit geht eine Zersplitterung der Disziplinen einher, die den Menschen zum Gegenstand haben: Empirische und philosophische Anthropologie, Ethnologie, Universalgeschichte, Medizin, Naturgeschichte, Sprachwissenschaft, Theorie der Politik, ganz zu schweigen von der Literatur. Im Verlauf des 18. Jahrhunderts übernimmt die Philosophie eine vermittelnde und überblickende Rolle und in ihr werden immer wiedFrank Palmeri: State of Nature, Stages of Society: Enlightenment Conjectural History and Modern Social Discourse. Columbia University Press. New York 2016. 384 S.; Isaak Iselin: Geschichte der Menschheit, hg. von Sundar Henny und Isabelle Wienand. Schwabe. Basel 2017. 559 S.; Raphaele Andrault, Stefanie Buchenau, Claire Crignon, Anne-Lise Rey(Hg.): Médecine et philosophie de la nature humaine de lâge classique aux lumières. Garnier. Paris 2014. 500 S.; Alexander Cook, Ned Curthoys, Shino Konishi (Hg.): Representing Humanity in the Age of Enlightenment, Pickering + Chatto 2013 / Routledge 2016. 256 S.; Anik Waldow, Nigel DeSouza (Hg.): Herder. Philosophy and Anthropology. Oxford University Press. Oxford 2017. 288 S.; Georg Raatz: Aufklärung als Selbstdeutung. Eine genetisch-systematische Rekonstruktion von Johann Joachim Spaldings Bestimmung des Menschen (1748). Mohr Siebeck. Tübingen 2014. 541 S.; Laura Anna Macor: Die Bestimmung des Menschen (1748–1800). Eine Begriffsgeschic.

For Kant, a body fills out space by means of its causal efficacy. The essential properties of matter are hence dependent on underlying forces and it is one task of the Opus postumum (OP) to reconstruct the system of forces. In order to avoid an infinite regress of causal explanations, this system of forces needs to account for a primitive origin of all mechanical moving forces in something that is constitutive of forces, yet radically different - this is the ether that fills all space that constantly moves or vibrates all the parts of the material bodies internally. I argue that we can read Kant’s argument for the existence of the ether through the lens of dispositions: essential properties of matter, such as ponderability, coercibility, cohesibility, and exhaustibility, should be understood as dispositions. These dispositions are ‘physically conditioned,’ as Kant calls it, on the ether. To display their manifest and perceivable properties, the ether acts as the ubiquitous and universal ‘activation stimulus’ of the dispositions that make up material bodies. He causes them to constantly display their manifest properties that make them continuously perceivable and causally efficient. Thereby Kant offers a solution to a problem formulated by Simon Blackburn, namely that purely dispositional matter would lead us into skepticism.

I will first provide a brief outline of Iselin’s main work on the philosophy of history, focusing on these questions: What are the aims of universal history? What function does it have? Subsequently, I will examine the particular concept of humanity that is the subject of Iselin’s history. I argue that the subject of universal history is denoted by a kind of hybrid concept that connects morality qua human nature with humankind understood as the collective of all humans - this being Iselin’s most impressive and influential philosophical invention. Regarding the ‘constellation’ that Iselin is situated in, I will briefly argue that the book methodically sketches a unique approach to universal history within the German-speaking world, while making certain advantages and limitations in this project transparent and arguing that it is also the first book to introduce the term "humanity" ("Menschheit") in a prominent place, a term that was to play a central role in late German Enlightenment. I claim that this concept of humanity most likely had a significant impact on Kant’s and Herder’s conceptions of humanity, as a consequence of which some ideas found in both authors can be interpreted as implicit reactions against Iselin.

The concept of causality is central to the assessment of numerous related metaphysical and epistemic positions, in Hegel and elsewhere. The present essay tries 1) to understand Hegel’s critique of the merely categorically understood concept of causality; 2) to uncover the theoretical structure that must accompany the categorical concept of causality in order to avoid the problems mentioned above; and 3) to argue that such a theory of causality has a fundamental function for Hegel’s conception of objectivity.

Maupertuis and Euler had an ambivalent and tense relationship to their Leibniz, especially concerning his grounding of physics in metaphysics. Consequently, this paper has two intersecting goals: first, it attempts to flesh out some aspects of the reception of Leibnizian thought in the context of Enlightenment physics, more precisely, in the deduction of the Principle of least action (henceforth PLA). Second, it also highlights a specific approach towards the intersection of physics and metaphysics that was championed by the Berlin Academy, which would not have been well received in Paris or London. To that end, I will briefly examine some aspects of the strategies of argumentation, metaphysical presumptions and self-ascribed methodologies (often quite different from their actual methodology) employed by Maupertuis and Euler in their respective deductions of the PLA.

I propose a reading of Kant’s anthropological project as a theory of integration, emphasizing the role of teleological judgments and explanations plays within it. First, I will take a look at a certain type of teleological knowledge that Kant calls prudence and that consists in finding the appropriate means for an end. Second, I will use this to flesh out my interpretation of Kant’s anthropology as a theory of integration, i.e. as a meta-discipline that strives to unite several distinct disciplines by means of teleological judgments. Third, I will then reconsider what prudence means within this broader, integrative context and, as a consequence, how Kant systematically reframes anthropological prudence in opposition to mere observational physiological knowledge.

It was not so long ago that the dominant picture of Kant’s practical philosophy was formalistic, focusing almost exclusively on his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and Critique of Practical Reason. However, the overall picture of Kant’s wide-ranging philosophy has since been broadened and deepened. We now have a much more complete understanding of the range of Kant’s practical interests and of his contributions to areas as diverse as anthropology, pedagogy, and legal theory. What remains somewhat obscure, however, is how these different contributions hang together in the way that Kant suggests that they must. This book explores these different conceptions of humanity, morality, and legality in Kant as main ‘manifestations’ or ‘dimensions’ of practical normativity. These interrelated terms play a crucial role in highlighting different rational obligations, their source, and their applicability in the face of changing circumstances.

René Descartes: Der Briefwechsel mit Elisabeth von der Pfalz, hrsg. von Isabelle Wieland und Olivier Ribordy, übers. von dies. und Benno Wirz. Hamburg 2015. Meiner Verlag. XLI, 543 S. René Descartes: Die Welt: Abhandlung über das Licht, Der Mensch, hrsg. und übers. von Christian Wohlers, Hamburg 2015. Meiner Verlag. XLVI, 422 S. Historical Dictionary of Descartes and Cartesian Philosophy, hrsg. von Roger Ariew, Dennis Des Chene, Douglas M. Jesseph, Tad M. Schmaltz, Theo Verbeek, zweite und überarbeitete Auflage, Lanham 2015. Rowman +amp; Littlefield. XX, 388 S. The Cambridge Descartes Lexicon, hrsg. von Lawrence Nolan, Cambridge 2016. Cambridge University Press. LXVIII, 778 S. Hanoch Ben-Yami: Descartes Philosophical Revolution: A Reassessment, Basingstoke 2015. Palgrave Macmillan. 281 S. Richard F. Hassing: Cartesian Psychophysics and the Whole Nature of Man – On Descartess Passions of the Soul, Lanham 2015. Lexington Books. 246 S. C. P. Ragland: The Will to Reason. Theodicy and Freedom in Descartes, Oxford 2016. Oxford University Press. XII, 255 S. Die neuere Literatur zu Descartes umfasst Editionen, Hilfsmittel wie historische Lexika und Sekundärliteratur. Descartes wird immer weniger als isolierter Gipfeldenker erfasst, sondern auch in dialogischer Auseinandersetzung mit seinen Zeitgenossen begriffen. Die früher meist für sich betrachteten Principia und Meditationen können innerhalb des weiter gefassten Werkes von Descartes gewinnbringend kontextualisiert werden. Laut gängiger Philosophiegeschichtsschreibung findet mit Descartes ein radikaler Bruch mit vorherigen Traditionen der Theoriebildung statt, der auch die frühe Neuzeit einläutet – doch es wird deutlich, dass dies als eine historiographische Vereinfachung zu verstehen ist, die in der neuen Forschung problematisiert und neu erfasst wird. So wird etwa klar, dass selbst die Cartesianer den Zweifel und das cogito nicht unbedingt als die großen philosophischen Durchbrüche wahrgenommen haben, wie sie in der Retrospektive zumeist dargestellt werden.

Friedrich Bouterwek’s Idea of an Apodictic (1799) is a lengthy defense of the core claims of Kant’s first Critique against different types of skeptical criticism. Bouterwek argues that Kant’s presupposition of knowledge is vulnerable to skeptical attacks and he suggests shifting the apodictic and hence foundational commitment to reality from the domain of theoretical knowledge towards that of practical agency. Reality is not represented in our knowledge, but instead experienced directly as resistance against our will. The will is not a mere idea within a transcendental framework of theoretical speculation, but a proper force, a real entity that we can experience directly and that dissolves the abstract distinction between reality and thought.

This book investigates various aspects of freedom as developed in the philosophical systems of Kant and Fichte. Freedom, both Kant and Fichte insist, does not mean that we can chose or think independently from all rules or necessity, but rather that we willingly accept a certain kind of submission under these rules. Therefore, the conditions of our knowledge affect and inform our self-understanding, our willing, and the ways we justify our practical choices. The essays in this volume explore both philosophers' conceptions of human freedom as they relate to art, history, politics, and religion. They reveal how integrating freedom into a system of thought is crucial for our understanding of modern philosophy. System and Freedom in Kant and Fichte will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working on Kant, modern philosophy, and German Studies.