University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2014
Ann Arbor, Michigan, United States of America
  •  91
    The Logic of Counterpart Theory with Actuality
    with Richmond H. Thomason
    Journal of Philosophical Logic (1): 1-31. 2012.
    It has been claimed that counterpart theory cannot support a theory of actuality without rendering obviously invalid formulas valid or obviously valid formulas invalid. We argue that these claims are not based on logical flaws of counterpart theory itself, but point to the lack of appropriate devices in first-order logic for “remembering” the values of variables. We formulate a mildly dynamic version of first-order logic with appropriate memory devices and show how to base a version of counterpa…Read more
  •  31
    Common-law judicial reasoning and analogy
    Legal Theory 20 (2): 133-156. 2014.
    Proponents of strict rule-based theories of judicial reasoning in common-law systems have offered a number of criticisms of analogical alternatives. I explain these criticisms and show that at best they apply equally well to rule-based theories. Further, I show how the analogical theories explain a feature of judicial common-law reasoningthat rule-based theories ignore. Finally, I show that reason-based, analogical theories of common-law judicial reasoning, such as those offered by John Horty an…Read more
  •  23
    An improved factor based approach to precedential constraint
    Artificial Intelligence and Law 23 (2): 133-160. 2015.
    In this article I argue for rule-based, non-monotonic theories of common law judicial reasoning and improve upon one such theory offered by Horty and Bench-Capon. The improvements reveal some of the interconnections between formal theories of judicial reasoning and traditional issues within jurisprudence regarding the notions of the ratio decidendi and obiter dicta. Though I do not purport to resolve the long-standing jurisprudential issues here, it is beneficial for theorists both of legal phil…Read more
  •  16
    Representing dimensions within the reason model of precedent
    Artificial Intelligence and Law 26 (1): 1-22. 2018.
    This paper gives an account of dimensions in the reason model found in Horty : 1–33, 2011), Horty and Bench-Capon and Rigoni :133–160, 2015. doi: 10.1007/s10506-015-9166-x). The account is constructed with the purpose of rectifying problems with the approach to incorporating dimensions in Horty, namely, the problems arising from the collapse of the distinction between the reason model and the result model on that approach. Examination of the newly constructed theory revealed that the importance …Read more