Agemir Bavaresco

This paper walks through four different approaches to Hegel's notion of Consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Through taking four different approaches our aim is to explore the multifaceted nature of the phenomenological movement of consciousness. The first part provides an overview of the three chapters of the section on Consciousness, namely Sense-Certainty, Perception and Force and the Understanding, attempting to unearth the implicit logic that undergirds Consciousness’ experience. The second part focuses specifically on the shape of Sense-Certainty, providing an analysis of the movement from Sense-Certainty to Perception from a neuroscientific view. Thirdly, we consider an inferentialist reading of the chapters on Consciousness which has been made popular by Robert Brandom. We think that while this view elucidates the connection that Hegel draws between meaning and use, it fails to account for the vital place of immediacy in each of the shapes. Finally, the fourth part suggests that Hegel’s notion of Consciousness improves the reading of tragedy he develops in chapters 5 and 7 of the Phenomenology. While many critics have noted that Hegel fails to do justice to tragic experience, Consciousness contains an epistemology that develops analogously to the heroes of ancient tragedy. Each approach in this paper comes at Hegel’s description of the journey of Consciousness from a different angle, and together they paint a multi-layered picture of a highly important part of Hegel’s corpus.

The classic analytic tradition associated the philosophy of George Berkeley with idealism. Yet in terms of the German Idealismus, Berkeley was no idealist. Rather, he described himself as an “immaterialist”. In the classic analytic tradition we find a misunderstanding of the German Idealismus. This paper will suggest, through reference to the work of Paul Redding, that Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit presents Idealismus as that which reconciles objectivity and subjectivity in the experience of consciousness. Hegel’s Phenomenology develops this idea in the elaboration of a remarkably novel theory of consciousness. For Hegel, the conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience are a dialectical movement between consciousness and the object, or immediacy and mediacy. In the whole movement of consciousness we have the logic of contradiction working at the back of phenomenological experience that Hegel will make explicit in the Science of Logic, a logic that involves the thinker becoming consciously aware of their own thought processes. Yet Hegel’s Logic is different from the common meaning of ‘logic’. His Logic is not a formal approach to valid inference but captures the method and the moments and movement of logic. For Hegel, the great problem of classical logic is the immobility of the categories. This paper proposes that Hegel’s ‘holism’ entails the description wherein Logic, Nature, and Spirit are articulated as a whole in dialectical movement.

O presente artigo objetiva discutir a lógica subjacente ao movimento dialético da figura do Senhor e do Servo. Jean-Pierre Labarrière é quem afirma categoricamente a tese segundo a qual há uma Lógica por trás do movimento da Consciência. Ora, a questão fundamental que se coloca, nesse caso, é: qual a lógica que preside o movimento da consciência para a consciência de si, culminado em sua unidade no momento da Razão? A hipótese aqui perseguida, situando-se na esteira da interpretação de Labarrière, é de que a lógica que se encontra "por trás da consciência", nessa figura da Fenomenologia do Espírito, é a mesma lógica que Hegel apresenta na Doutrina da Essência, na Ciência da Lógica. Para tanto, explicitar as categorias lógicas da Doutrina da Essência e acompanhar o seu desdobramento configuram o objetivo central deste trabalho. This paper aims to discuss the logic that underlies the master-servant dialectic. Jean-Pierre Labarrière categorically claims that there is a logic underlying the movement of the consciousness. The fundamental issue at stake is this: What is the logic that regulates the movement of the consciousness of the self, which culminates in its unity in the moment of reason? The hypothesis advanced here, following Labarrière's suggestions, is that the logic that lies "behind the consciousness" in this figure in Phenomenology of the Mind, is the same logic that Hegel presents in the doctrine of essence in the Science of Logic. The central goal of the present work is to make explicit the logical categories of the doctrine of essence, and to follow their unfolding

O presente artigo objetiva discutir a lógica subjacente ao movimento dialético da figura do Senhor e do Servo. Jean-Pierre Labarrière é quem afirma categoricamente a tese segundo a qual há uma Lógica por trás do movimento da Consciência. Ora, a questão fundamental que se coloca, nesse caso,é: qual a lógica que preside o movimento da consciência para a consciência de si, culminado em sua unidade no momento da Razão? A hipótese aqui perseguida, situando-se na esteira da interpretação de Labarrière, é de que a lógica que se encontra "por trás da consciência", nessa figura da Fenomenologiado Espírito, é a mesma lógica que Hegel apresenta na Doutrina da Essência, na Ciência da Lógica. Paratanto, explicitar as categorias lógicas da Doutrina da Essência e acompanhar o seu desdobramento configuram o objetivo central deste trabalho

New settings for communication are being built, having, at one side, great corporations of television, radio, press and on line media, and at the other side the role of the independent / alternative press, understood as not bound to a private, public or state enterprise or to some economic group. It takes gradually shape the constitution of the opposition between the traditional media and the independent / alternative press, having as a material base the new technologies of information. How can the new technology of information associated to the new settings of press freedom and the phenomenon of the contradiction of public opinion in the era of internet accomplish the mediation of the opinion in a globalized society? Or still, starting from the presupposition of the press freedom, how to guarantee that the society solves the contradiction of the public opinion? The phenomenon of the public opinion is contradicting because it has in itself, at the same time, the universality of constitutional principles of Law and Ethics, together with the peculiarity of the citizens’ rights and concerns. This contradiction finds its solution by means of the mediation of the freedom of the press itself within a frame of democratic legality. This is the power of the contradiction: to put into effect the dialectic tension between the opposed poles of the universal and the particular in the press freedom, avowing the right of every citizen to express publicly his opinion. This is Hegel’s theory of public opinion: the press freedom and the parliament, as a politic space, are privileged spheres of the mediation of the contradictory phenomenon of the public opinion. Keywords: Press freedom; public opinion; press; citizen journalists.

Social networks merge the real and the virtual in virtual actuality that forms the basis of human networks. In this sense, the anthropology of technology, in conjunction with cyberanthropology, allows the diagnosis of a new identity of human beingsstemming from the phenomenon of social networks. Do the intersubjective relations established in different contexts of publicity and pluralism of meanings emerging from the interface with social networks, which dilute the limits of human communication and boundaries, still allow usto understand the real and the virtual in a dualistic way? Or, rather, what is the immanent logic of the antagonism of unsociable human sociability that allows the scenarios of “outrage and hope” in global self-communication? The following interdisciplinary study aims first to involve cyberanthropology, anthropology of technology and philosophy to show the cultural implications of the identity of human beings connected to social networks. Then, we study the genealogy of the anthropology of techno-science and Kant’s antagonism in unsociable human sociability. Finally, we describe the Hegelian logic of reflexive manifestation between free objectivity and subjectivity, and communication as virtuality

A Filosofia Moderna Alemã não inventou o sujeito nem o descobriu pela primeira vez. Mas, em Kant e no Idealismo Alemão, a teoria do sujeito e da liberdade chegou a um nível de reflexão, de diferenciação e de aprofundamento nunca alcançado antes e poucas vezes depois. A temática do sujeito livre é tão central para esta corrente que ela poderia ser compreendida sob o título geral de “Filosofia da Liberdade”. O volume reúne alguns resultados da pesquisa sobre “Sujeito e Liberdade”, pensados nessa perspectiva da Filosofia Moderna Alemã. Ele é fruto da colaboração de pesquisadores dos Programas de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia da Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS) e da Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC), no Programa Nacional de Cooperação Acadêmica (PROCAD), promovido pela Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES). A maioria dos textos foi apresentada no Simpósio PROCAD PUCRS-UFC, sobre a mesma temática, realizado de 25 a 28 de agosto de 2011, em Fortaleza. Além destes, Christian Iber, Anton Friedrich Koch e Andreas Schmidt contribuíram para enriquecer este livro com seus artigos.

This paper has two main purposes, the first is to develop a criticism on the notion of modernity, or Western rationalism, presented in contemporary theories of modernity, characterized by the idea of autonomy and self-sufficiency of reason regarding the foundation of a binding notion of social normativity. The study criticizes the main perception of these theories of modernity, namely, the proposition that profane and secularized rationalism, marked by an impartial, neutral, formal and impersonal perspective in axiological-methodological terms, is enough to ensure this same epistemological-moral Universalism without religion and metaphysics. The second purpose consists in arguing in favor of a political and religious Universalism that points to the incapacity of this purist and independent notion of reason in generating and sustaining, without foundation and application based on metaphysics and religion, a universal content of Human Rights. The work is grounded on bibliographical analysis of contemporary theories of modernity, from a criticism to their central presumption, which is the autonomy, self-referentiality and self-subsistence of reason relatively to religion and metaphysics, proposing, as a conclusion, the correlation of reason and religion-metaphysics as the path and the content of epistemological-moral Universalism.

Criticamos, no artigo, duas exigências fundamentais postas pelo paradigma normativo da modernidade como condição da crítica, da reflexividade e da emancipação, a saber, a racionalização epistemológica dos sujeitos, das práticas e dos valores como critério da justificação e da validade, e o procedimentalismo imparcial, neutro, formal e impessoal como práxis da fundamentação ético-política. Argumentaremos que essas duas exigências teórico-práticas levam a dois graves problemas para uma teoria social crítica e para uma práxis política emancipatória relativamente à modernidade: primeiro, sujeitos epistemológico-políticos marginalizados pela modernidade teriam de abandonar a carnalidade e a vinculação ao seu contexto e sua situação de vítimas da modernidade como condição de uma perspectiva crítica frente à própria modernidade como universalismo epistemológico-moral autêntico; segundo, uma perspectiva político-metodológica imparcial, neutral, formal e impessoal conduz tanto à apoliticidade e à despolitização dos sujeitos da fundamentação quanto à correlação de institucionalismo forte, cientificismo e lógica sistêmica, já que, nesse segundo caso, apenas as instituições e desde uma dinâmica lógico-técnica têm condições de assumir uma atuação e um enquadramento sociais nesses requisitos de imparcialidade, impessoalidade, neutralidade e formalismo. Como alternativa, apontaremos para a necessidade, por parte das vítimas da modernização, de uma voz- práxis política-politizante, carnal e vinculada, que tem como ponto de partida sua condição de marginalização e sua pertença social e antropológica como base da autoafirmação, da resistência e da luta e que se processa sob a forma de um anarquismo estético-político anti-sistêmico, anti-institucionalista e anti-cientificista, aberto, inclusivo e participativo. Palavras-chave: Modernização. Institucionalismo. Lógica sistêmica. Excluídos. Anarquismo estético-político.

O tema do idealismo e realismo é abordado por Hegel e Marx de um modo específico. De um lado, Hegel entende que toda a verdadeira filosofia é um idealismo. De outro, Marx defende que o verdadeiro pensamento inicia com o realismo. Nós entendemos que as abordagens não são excludentes, pois, trata-se de pontos de partida diferentes. Os diagnósticos têm na contradição o motor da história; e na dialética o método de descrever e analisar o real. A partir das categorias da finitude e infinitude de Hegel e da categoria do fetichismo de Marx estabelecemos aproximações e diferenças entre os dois autores.

In the text, we put the category of differences as anthropological-ontological and epistemological-moral contemporary ethos and praxis which challenge-streamline institutionalized and universalist religions, for example the Catholic Church, in their use of essentialist and naturalized foundations as normative-paradigmatic basis for framing, legitimation and orientation of these differences, as basement for the dialectics between plurality and unity regarding these differences. From that, we will argue that the institutionalized and universalist religions’ central challenge – and, in our case again, the Catholic Church’s central challenge – consists in the deconstruction of the correlation among strong institutionalism, strict anthropological-ontological and epistemological-moral objectivity and political-normative fundamentalism. In this sense, as long as religious institutions bring the differences as normative praxis and epistemological-political subjects into their internal dynamic of constitution, legitimation and social foment of the creed, it is possible to achieve the weakening and the moderation – and perhaps the own abandonment – of the essentialist and naturalized foundations as basis for framing of all areas of human life. Anyway, as we think, this must be the case for gender and sexuality, which could not and should not be grounded on such an essentialist and naturalized basis.

Hegel’s Philosophy of Law deals in theLaw section of the categories: person, property and contract. Research critically reconstructs this theory from a Marxist perspective. In the concept of person, first of all, the singular will is reduced to a solipsist will unrelated to intersubjectivity. Then, the concept of Hegelian property bases the private appropriation of property as the externalization of the singular will. This legal property guarantees the maintenance and reproduction of private property, that is, it will guarantee the private accumulation of capital, Marx will say. Anyway, the theory of the contract would link the autonomy of the contracting wills, however, it is a mere appearance, because, in fact, the owners’ wills are under the domination of the capitalist market, as it is explained in Marx’s Capital. The theoretical deficit of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law in general is that the legal concepts of person and property correspond to the abstract will. Hegel describes the juridical description of the legal system of the modern state as the development of free will that legitimizes the asymmetry of civil society in its socioeconomic inequalities.

This article argues that Habermas’s division of the process of Western modernization into cultural modernity (a pure normative sphere) and social-economic modernization (a pure technical-logical or instrumental sphere) and his use of this theoretical-political standpoint in order to ground a model of radical political democracy as an impartial, neutral, impersonal and formal procedural juridical-political paradigm based on the dialectics between institutionalization and spontaneity lead to strong institutionalism in politics. The notion of modern social systems or institutions as structures of impartial, neutral, formal and impersonal proceduralism with a technical-logical or instrumental sense, constitution and evolution implies their non-political and non-normative understanding, depoliticizing them. As a consequence, institutions (especially political and economic ones) become self-referential and self-subsisting structures-subjects which are centralized and managed by institutional elites and technicians from a technical-logical standpoint-dynamics. We argue that a model of radical political democracy must overcome such separation between cultural modernity and social-economic modernization, politicizing the social systems and making them normative-political institutions-subjects streamlined and defined by social struggles between conflicting social classes, their hegemony and counterpoints.

O tema do reconhecimento é central na obra de G. W. F Hegel. Classicamente, situa-se na figura da luta entre o senhor e o escravo, na Fenomenologia do Espírito. A intersubjetividade e, portanto, o reconhecimento, na obra hegeliana, colocam o seguinte problema: como é possível construir uma interpretação que supere o conceito de subjetividads moderna, positivado pela prática jusfilosófica, vindo a garantir um novo paradigma fundado na intersubjetividade e, portanto, pressupondo a teoria hegeliana do reconhecimento? Em primeiro lugar, analisa-se o desejo antropológico de reconhecimento como fonte da idéia de justiça em A. Kojéve. Em seguida, apresenta-se, segundo 0 mesmo autor, a fenomenologia da justiça, que parte do princípio de que o desejo, conforme Hegel, quer o reconhecimento, sendo este a fonte última da idéia de justiça. Kojéve expõe fenomenologicamente a idéia de justiça, em três momentos: a justiça aristocrática ou a igualdade, a justiça burguesa ou a equivalência e a justiça cidadã ou a equidade. Finalmente, conclui-se que o reconhecimento intersubjetivo ocorre em vários níveis de mediação social, jurídica e política. Assim, na complexidade da sociedade mundializada, produzir uma hermenêutica jusfilosófica de cunho intersubjetivo encontra, na teoria hegeliana do reconhecimento, um fundamental pressuposto epistemológico.