A. K. Flowerree

In this paper, I argue that epistemic reparations are complex social achievements. Previous accounts of epistemic reparations have failed to highlight the complex social nature of the epistemic goods that constitute epistemic reparations. To generate the knowledge required, a speaker must successfully communicate evaluatively robust content in a way that generates common knowledge. It is not sufficient fora speaker to offer information, they must generate knowledge. I argue that there are two conditions for a successful epistemic reparation: it must receive audience uptake, and it must generate a reparative response. Since most cases of egregious wrongdoing intersect with systematic oppression and active ignorance, the barriers to epistemic reparations are high. Epistemic reparations are achievements because of myriad barriers to successful uptake and response. This shows an additional value to epistemic reparations. Epistemic Reparations can serve as a work of epistemic justice by providing pinpricks of light in systems of epistemic oppression.

According to the Principle of Charity, we ought to interpret each other charitably. That is, we ought to adopt the interpretation that shows the interpreted person in the best light. The Principle of Charity is motivated by appealing to a harm asymmetry: it is worse (the thought goes) to mistakenly criticize someone than to fail to rightfully criticize them. This chapter argues that in oppressive contexts, charity is not enough. First, the Principle of Charity is myopic. Charitable interpretation only considers harm to the person being interpreted and ignores third party harms. Second, under conditions of oppression, our conceptual resources and evidential standards will be systematically biased against marginalized perspectives. So charitable interpretations will overlook harm to marginalized persons. Finally, the chapter give a diagnosis of the Principle of Charity: It misunderstands the interpersonal interpretive aim. The interpersonal interpretive aim is to interpret one another in a way that accurately captures the normative features that are crucial to our interpersonal relationships. What we need is not a Principle of Charity, but an Aim of Justice. The chapter’s conclusion explains what an Aim of Justice would require of us, notably, empathetic engagement and intellectual humility.

In this paper, I argue for a conditional parity thesis: if we are agents with respect to our intentions, we are agents with respect to our beliefs. In the final section, I motivate a categorical version of the parity thesis: we are agents with respect to belief and intention. My aim in this paper is to show that there is no unique challenge facing epistemic agency that is not also facing agency with respect to intention. My thesis is ambitious on two fronts. First, the parity thesis is a substantive thesis about the nature of belief and intention. I argue that there is a structural parity of belief and intention; the status of whether they are agential stands and falls together. Second, the parity thesis illuminates the nature of agency. It constrains what counts as a satisfactory account of agency: either we must accept agency of both belief and intention, or we must reject both. In the final section, I argue that we have prima facie reason to accept agency of belief and intention. Finally, I diagnose why there has been such resistance to epistemic agency. Epistemic agency is problematic, but its problems are problems with agency, not problems with epistemic agency.