Akira Ota

The two competing camps of theorists in moral psychology share one common view on the disagreement between their theories: moral foundations theory presupposes basic emotion theory, while dyadic morality theory presupposes constructionist theory of emotion. The paper challenges this common view. First, it reviews the four theories. Second, it clarifies the issue about the relation between the moral contents and emotions on which the two camps of moral-psychological theorists dispute. Third, it identifies the explananda for the moral-psychological theories, and examines the two distinctive types of explanations that each of the two theories offers to them. Finally, it concludes that the deepest disagreement between the two morality theories consists in the role that the theories give to emotions in explaining moral judgments.

In psychology and cognitive neuroscience, two major theories are competing for the best theory of emotion: basic emotion theory and psychological constructionism. It is not easy to see where the theories are different and how the differences are to be understood. In addition, a growing body of empirical evidence, including neuro-imaging data, has been introduced in the debates in the recent years, and the old arguments for or against each theory need to be reconsidered in the light of this new body of evidence. This paper aims to elucidate the differences between basic emotion theory and psychological constructionism. For this purpose, the paper, first, discuses five different issues in terms of which the two theories are to be contrasted: homogeneity, localization, basicness, natural-kindness, and elimination of folk-psychological emotions. Second, it goes on to formulate and compare arguments for each of the two theories along the dimensions of the five issues. Finally, using this procedure, the paper reveals that the two theories differ most fundamentally with regard to whether compound emotional states or their constituents are natural kinds, and that further evidence concerning the homogeneity and localization of emotions is needed to settle the debates between the two theories.