Alexander Schnell

This essay tries to account for a certain “speculative turn” in contemporary philosophy (Q. Meillassoux, G. Harman, M. Gabriel, etc.) from a phenomenological point of view . A first objective of it will consist in exposing the link between, on the one hand, the methodological sense of Husserl’s concrete phenomenological analyses (concerning, for example, time and intersubjective structure of transcendental subjectivity,) and on the other hand, the consequences that follow from the grounding of phenomenology as first philosophy. This will allow a largely underestimated research angle to be opened up, one that I call a “constructive phenomenology,” that constitutes an essential and original figure of transcendental philosophy in general. A second objective will then consist in the attempt to sketch the foundation of knowledge as knowledge , the core of a “phenomenological metaphysics.” Whereas the first part will remain within a Husserlian framework, the second will develop some elements of a “speculative transcendentalism” in a phenomenological perspective

This paper propounds an analysis of the Husserlian problem of time through the prism of his elaboration of succeeding time-diagrams. The author focuses his reflexions on the "Lectures on Inner Time-consciousness" (1905) and at the same time on the decisive advancements of the "Bernauer Time-Manuscripts" (1917-1918). These manuscripts complete the Husserlian description of constitution of time-consciousness by the element of protentional intentionality and the "original process" with its "core"-structure (Kernstruktur), on this side of immanent temporality, and try to work out the problem of the statute of the sense-data and of the self-awareness of the ultimately constitutive "flow" of consciousness

In this article, I aim to introduce Marc Richir’s refoundation of transcendantal phenomenology. Starting from the double—“symbolic” and properly “phenomenological”—constitution of the concept of phenomenon, I present the key concepts of Richir’s “phenomenology nova methodo”: hyperbolical phenomenological epoché, schematism, affectivity, phantasy, and so on. Beneath the distinction between theory of knowledge and ontology, I seek to understand both the sense of what he calls the “endogenization” of the phenomenological field and, “beyond Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty,” the role of temporality in the phenomenalization of the phenomenon.

In this study, the author develops an original reading of the Fifth Cartesian Meditation. This text, far from giving rise to a “transcendental solipsism”, as classical commentators claim, leads to a constitution of intersubjectivity on various levels . In its center, a “phenomenological construction” operates, i.e. a methodological piece that masters the genetic approach of intersubjectivity. Closely following the “almost mathematical” rigour of this crucial text of Husserl’s phenomenology, the author equally tackles the issue of the constitution of the experience of the other and the truly intersubjective structure of transcendental subjectivity. The article concludes with the metaphysical results of the analysis of the experience of the other

Dans la présente étude, je cherche à dégager ce qui me semble être l’idée fondamentale du transcendantalisme fichtéen : l’interprétation du transcendantal dans la figure du Soll caractérisée par un « redoublement possibilisant ». Cette figure est analysée à travers les deux schémas fondamentaux de la Doctrine de la Science de 1804 et la doctrine fichtéenne de l’image. Par cette figure, Fichte entend légitimer la connaissance transcendantale et accomplir la tâche suprême de la philosophie .The study aims to bring out what seems the fundamental idea of the Fichtean transcendentalism : the interpretation of the transcendental under the figure of the Soll characterized by a ‘possibilizing reduplication’. This figure is analyzed through the two basic patterns of the Science of Knowledge of 1804 and the Fichtean doctrine of the image. With this figure, Fichte wants to legitimate the transcendental knowledge and to achieve the ultimate task of philosophy

Alexander Schnell | : La position défendue dans cette contribution consiste à montrer que la compréhension de la phénoménologie comme philosophie transcendantale implique le recours à la philosophie allemande classique. L’auteur étudie, à ce dessein, une perspective d’abord gnoséologique puis ontologique, commandées sur différents registres par les concepts d’« intuition », de « construction » et de « possibilisation ». Dans un troisième moment, il établit comment, dans une perspective tirant les conclusions « métaphysiques » de ces élaborations phénoménologiques, ces deux volets peuvent être envisagés dans un projet unitaire où la « possibilisation » est conçue comme une « réflexion de la réflexion ». | : In this paper I defend the idea, that the comprehension of Phenomenology as “transcendental philosophy” requires to establish the link between Phenomenology and Classical German Philosophy. I analyze for this purpose an epistemological and than an ontological perspective where the concepts of “intuition”, of “construction”, and of “possibilisation” play a first role. Then I try to show — in a perspective drawing the metaphysical conclusions of these phenomenological analyses — that these two perspectives can be integrated in a common project where “possibilisation” is conceived of as a “reflexion of the reflexion”.

L'objectif de cet ouvrage est d'introduire le lecteur a la pensee du premier Heidegger a travers un commentaire d'Etre et temps (publie en 1927) et des cours professes a la fin des annees 1920 (en particulier les Fondements metaphysiques de la logique et les Concepts fondamentaux de la metaphysique). L'auteur expose d'abord le projet heideggerien d'une ontologie phenomenologique - en rapport (et en rupture) avec la phenomenologie husserlienne - mettant en oeuvre une analytique existentiale de l'etre-la humain qui est reconstituee selon ses moments structurels. Le chapitre central du livre est consacre au probleme du temps, chez Heidegger, au sujet duquel l'auteur propose une interpretation inedite. Les deux derniers chapitres presentent la metaphysique de l'etre-la et la metaphysique du monde avec lesquelles Heidegger s'eloigne de son projet initial et prepare le fameux tournant des annees 1930.

Levinas a cherche a eriger l'ethique en philosophie premiere. Comment ce projet est-il conciliable avec la methode phenomenologique dont il s'est toujours inspire et dont il est reste tributaire tout au long de sa vie? L'auteur essaie d'y repondre en mettant en evidence ce qu'il appelle une phenomenologie sans phenomenalite. Celle-ci s'inscrit expressement dans la tradition de la phenomenologie transcendantale que Levinas prolonge et actualise en promouvant un concept inedit du transcendantal (concu comme conditionnement mutuel du constituant et du constitue ). Au sommet de cette phenomenologie est l' epiphanie du visage, manifestation d'une alterite radicale qui confere le sens a l'apparaissant sur un mode non intentionnel et non phenomenal. C'est autour du visage que s'articulent les categories fondamentales de son parcours: jouissance, demeure, possession, feminite, amour, erotisme, fecondite, etc. Le present ouvrage qui s'appuie essentiellement sur le premier chef d'oeuvre de Levinas (Totalite et infini, paru en 1961) tente d'eclaircir ces concepts, tout en exposant les idees directrices de la philosophie levinassienne de la subjectivite, de la transcendance, du langage, du temps et de la verite.

Die Metaphysik ist seit dem 21. Jahrhundert erneut in den Fokus der Aufmerksamkeit geruckt. Alexander Schnell entwickelt eine Position, die sich von neueren "realistischen" Ansatzen unterscheidet. In den systematischen Ausarbeitungen der klassischen deutschen Philosophie verstanden sich die Deutschen Idealisten zugleich als die grossten Realisten. In der aktuellen Diskussion hingegen scheint jeder idealistische Standpunkt kompromittiert zu sein, da er auf einem uberholten Subjektivismus beruhe. Der hier verteidigte transzendentale Idealismus verfolgt eine Perspektive, in der die Frage nach dem "Sein" diesseits der hypostasierten Subjekt-Objekt-Beziehung gestellt wird. Diese Abhandlung uber die phanomenologische Metaphysik fugt sich somit in eine zeitgenossische Debatte ein, die sowohl philosophische (insbesondere dank des "neuen Realismus") als auch anthropologische (in Bezug auf den Status des "Relationismus") Relevanz hat.

From a phenomenological point of view the ‘real’ is neither to be identified with the ‘given’ nor with the ‘withdrawn’. It rather has to be examined in its relatedness to the factual. This in turn requires the reflection of the basic correlation of being and thought. By engaging in this task the author of this essay distinguishes five modalities: 1. the possibility of the accessibility of the world, 2. the actual modes of constitution of appearance 3. the genetic moment of phenomenalization, 4. The eventfulness and singularity of every case, 5. the existence of the world as such. These modalities constitute the realm of the transcendental and they allow us to differentiate how the real ‘exists’. In this sense the essay continues the work of Richir’s “phenomenology of the real”, at the same time it goes beyond Richir’s work. The standpoint of “phenomenological constructivism” allows the integration of skepticist insights into the concept of the transcendental.

Resumo Neste artigo, o autor apresenta uma ideia original de “subjectividade”, na medida em que esta se desenvolve, no contexto da recém-fundada fenomenologia transcendental, designada por “fenomenologia generativa”. Esta figura da subjectividade é caracterizada por dois aspectos fundamentais : por um lado a “vibração” ou “oscilação” entre o “eu” e o “exterior” ; uma dimensão quadrupla de “transcendência”. Palavras-chave : alteridade, imaginação, mundo, self, subjectividade, transcendênciaIn this article I would like to put forward an original figure of “subjectivity” in so far as it is developed in the context of a newly founded transcendental phenomenology called “generative phenomenology”. This figure of subjectivity is characterized by two fundamental aspects : the “vibration” or “oscillation” between the “self” and the “exterior” on the one hand and the quadruple dimension of “transcendence” on the other. Keywords : alterity, imagination, self, subjectivity, transcendence, world

This paper raises the question – based on the works of Marc Richir and Dominique Pradelle – if and how phenomenology deals with an “anti-Copernican” revolution, considering that the motif of a “Copernican” revolution seems to have gone through some modifications that reflect a certain deposition of the constitutive role of the subject. Its fundamental thesis is that a certain dimension “beyond” the Copernican revolution does not reestablish a “Ptolemaic” realism but rather opens a dimension “beneath”: beneath the subject and the object where can take place a mutual relationship between an a-subjective constitutive power and a pre-empirical foundational being. This dimension “beneath” means that the alternative does not concern a “pre-Copernican” realism on the one hand and an “idealism” leaving in the shadows the relationship between the transcendental method and an ontological perspective on the other, but rather puts forward a constructive circularity between the transcendental constitution and an ontological foundation. It follows that “normativity” is not achieved on the basis of pre-given objectivity – because it would mean a petition principia – but draws upon the “pre-immanent generativity”.