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138On the Relation Between Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual EthicsRatio 33 (4): 281-294. 2020.In recent years, there has been growing discussion amongst philosophers about “conceptual engineering”. Put roughly, conceptual engineering concerns the assessment and improvement of concepts, or of other devices we use in thought and talk (e.g., words). This often involves attempts to modify our existing concepts (or other representational devices), and/or our practices of using them. This paper explores the relation between conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics, where conceptual ethics …Read more
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320Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2019.Conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics are branches of philosophy concerned with questions about how to assess and ameliorate our representational devices (such as concepts and words). It's a part of philosophy concerned with questions about which concepts we should use (and why), how concepts can be improved, when concepts should be abandoned, and how proposals for amelioration can be implemented. Central parts of the history of philosophy have engaged with these issues, but the focus of …Read more
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143Metasemantics: New Essays on the Foundations of Meaning (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2014.Metasemantics comprises new work on the philosophical foundations of linguistic semantics, by a diverse group of established and emerging experts in the philosophy of language, metaphysics, and the theory of content. The science of semantics aspires to systematically specify the meanings of linguistic expressions in context. The paradigmatic metasemantic question is accordingly: what more basic or fundamental features of the world metaphysically determine these semantic facts? Efforts to answer …Read more
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2A Plea for the Metaphysics of MeaningIn Alexis Burgess & Brett Sherman (eds.), Metasemantics: New Essays on the Foundations of Meaning, Oxford University Press. 2014.
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24Chapter Eight. Insolubility?In José Medina & David Wood (eds.), Truth, Blackwell. pp. 116-134. 2005-01-01.
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27Chapter Four. IndeterminacyIn José Medina & David Wood (eds.), Truth, Blackwell. pp. 52-67. 2005-01-01.
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30Chapter Seven. KripkeIn José Medina & David Wood (eds.), Truth, Blackwell. pp. 102-115. 2005-01-01.
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21Chapter One. IntroductionIn José Medina & David Wood (eds.), Truth, Blackwell. pp. 1-15. 2005-01-01.
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32Chapter Five. RealismIn José Medina & David Wood (eds.), Truth, Blackwell. pp. 68-82. 2005-01-01.
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24Chapter Three. DeflationismIn José Medina & David Wood (eds.), Truth, Blackwell. pp. 33-51. 2005-01-01.
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26Chapter Six. AntirealismIn José Medina & David Wood (eds.), Truth, Blackwell. pp. 83-101. 2005-01-01.
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117TruthPrinceton University Press. 2011.This is a concise, advanced introduction to current philosophical debates about truth. A blend of philosophical and technical material, the book is organized around, but not limited to, the tendency known as deflationism, according to which there is not much to say about the nature of truth. In clear language, Burgess and Burgess cover a wide range of issues, including the nature of truth, the status of truth-value gaps, the relationship between truth and meaning, relativism and pluralism about …Read more
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808Conceptual Ethics IPhilosophy Compass 8 (12): 1091-1101. 2013.Which concepts should we use to think and talk about the world and to do all of the other things that mental and linguistic representation facilitates? This is the guiding question of the field that we call ‘conceptual ethics’. Conceptual ethics is not often discussed as its own systematic branch of normative theory. A case can nevertheless be made that the field is already quite active, with contributions coming in from areas as diverse as fundamental metaphysics and social/political philosophy…Read more
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Singular Ontology: How ToIn Christopher Daly (ed.), Palgrave Handbook on Philosophical Methods, Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 77-111. 2015.
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105Keeping ‘True’: A Case Study in Conceptual EthicsInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (5-6): 580-606. 2014.Suppose our ordinary notion of truth is ‘inconsistent’ in the sense that its meaning is partly given by principles that classically entail a logical contradiction. Should we replace the notion with a consistent surrogate? This paper begins by defusing various arguments in favor of this revisionary proposal, including Kevin Scharp’s contention that we need to replace truth for the purposes of semantic theorizing . Borrowing a certain conservative metasemantic principle from Matti Eklund, the arti…Read more
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157The Things We Do with IdentityMind 127 (505): 105-128. 2018.Cognitive partitions are useful. The notion of numerical identity helps us induce them. Consider, for instance, the role of identity in representing an equivalence relation like taking the same train. This expressive function of identity has been largely overlooked. Other possible functions of the concept have been over-emphasized. It is not clear that we use identity to represent individual objects or quantify over collections of them. Understanding what the concept is good for looks especially…Read more
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1How We Ought to do Things with WordsIn Robert Bolger & Scott Korb (eds.), Gesturing Toward Reality, Bloomsbury Academic. 2014.
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357Conceptual Ethics IIPhilosophy Compass 8 (12): 1102-1110. 2013.Which concepts should we use to think and talk about the world, and to do all of the other things that mental and linguistic representation facilitates? This is the guiding question of the field that we call ‘conceptual ethics’. Conceptual ethics is not often discussed as its own systematic branch of normative theory. A case can nevertheless be made that the field is already quite active, with contributions coming in from areas as diverse as fundamental metaphysics and social/political philosoph…Read more
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129Metalinguistic Descriptivism for MilliansAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3): 443-457. 2013.Metalinguistic descriptivism is the view that proper names are semantically equivalent to descriptions featuring their own quotations (e.g., ?Socrates? means ?the bearer of ?Socrates??). The present paper shows that Millians can actually accept an inferential version of this equivalence thesis without running afoul of the modal argument. Indeed, they should: for it preserves the explanatory virtues of more familiar forms of descriptivism while avoiding objections (old and new) to Kent Bach's nom…Read more
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Pomona CollegeVisiting Assistant Professor
Claremont, California, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Language |