Alfredo Vernazzani

Cognitive representations are typically analysed in terms of content, vehicle and format. While current work on formats appeals to intuitions about external representations, such as words and maps, in this paper we develop a computational view of formats that does not rely on intuitions. In our view, formats are individuated by the computational profiles of vehicles, i.e., the set of constraints that fix the computational transformations vehicles can undergo. The resulting picture is strongly pluralistic, it makes space for a variety of different formats, and is intimately tied to the computational approach to cognition in cognitive science and artificial intelligence.

The mainstream account of scientific understanding is explanationism. According to explanationism, scientific understanding is only achieved when a subject grasps a full or partial explanation of the target phenomenon. Objectualists disagree and argue that there are instances of scientific understanding that outstrip explanatory understanding. In this paper, I advance a novel form of objectualism that I call epistemic pluralism or PLURALISM for short. On this view, the satisfaction of any scientific epistemic concern, explanatory or not, constitutes a partial ground for understanding a phenomenon scientifically. I put pressure on explanationism by arguing that, in contrast with PLURALISM, it faces a dilemma when it comes to account for the epistemic achievements of non-explanatory scientific research.

It is widely agreed that language understanding has a distinctive phenomenology, as illustrated by phenomenal contrast cases. Yet it remains unclear how to account for the perceptual phenomenology of language experience. I advance a rhythmic account, which explains this phenomenology in terms of changes in the rhythm of sensory capacities in both reading and speech perception. After presenting conceptual and empirical foundations for the account, I argue that it should be abductively preferred over competing views, especially the semantic perceptual view, which holds that we literally perceive linguistic meaning.

It is widely agreed that language understanding has a distinctive phenomenology, as illustrated by phenomenal contrast cases. Yet it remains unclear how to account for the perceptual phenomenology of language experience. I advance a rhythmic account, which explains this phenomenology in terms of changes in rhythm of sensory capacities in both reading and speech perception. After presenting conceptual and empirical foundations for the account, I argue that it should be abductively preferred over competing views, especially the semantic perceptual view, which holds that we literally perceive linguistic meaning.