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363Intention and Judgment-Dependence: First-Personal vs. Third-Personal AccountsPhilosophical Explorations 27 (1): 41-56. 2023.ABSTRACT A Third-Person-Based or Third-Personal Judgment-Dependent account of mental content implies that, as an a priori matter, facts about a subject’s mental content are precisely captured by the judgments of a second-person or an interpreter. Alex Byrne, Bill Child, and others have discussed attributing such a view to Donald Davidson. This account significantly departs from a First-Person-Based or First-Personal Judgment-Dependent account, such as Crispin Wright’s, according to which, as an …Read more
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275Quine and First-Person AuthorityLogos and Episteme 14 (2): 141-161. 2023.Blackburn and Searle have argued that Quine‘s thesis of the indeterminacy of translation results in a denial of the sort of first-person authority that we commonly concede we have over our mental and semantical content. For, the indeterminacy thesis implies that there is no determinate meaning to know at all. And, according to Quine, the indeterminacy holds at home too. For Blackburn, Quine must constrain the domain of indeterminacy to the case of translation only. Searle believes that Quine has…Read more
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205A Critical Review of the Mainstream Reading of Kripke’s Wittgenstein: On Misunderstanding Kripke’s Wittgenstein (In Persian)Journal of Philosophical Investigations at University of Tabriz. forthcoming.In this paper, I will argue against certain criticisms of Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s sceptical argument and sceptical solution, made especially by Baker and Hacker, McGinn, and McDowell. I will show that their interpretation of Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s view is misplaced. According to Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s sceptical argument, there is no fact as to what someone means by her words. For Kripke, this conclusion, combined with Classical Realist view of meaning, leads to the Wittgensteinian paradox, acc…Read more
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168Kripke’s Wittgenstein and Ginsborg’s Reductive Dispositionalism (In Persian)Metaphysics (University of Isfahan). forthcoming.Kripke in his famous book on Wittgenstein’s later philosophy argues, on behalf of Wittgenstein, that there can be no fact of the matter as to what a speaker means by her words, that is, no fact that can meet the Constitution Demand and the Normativity Demand. He particularly argues against the dispositional view, according to which meaning facts are constituted by facts about the speaker's dispositions to respond in a certain way on certain occasions. He argues that facts about dispositions are …Read more
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1Naturalism and Its Challenges (edited book)Routledge. forthcoming.This volume features new essays on the application and role of naturalism in philosophical inquiry. It serves as an important update on current controversies about naturalism.
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269Intention, Judgement-Dependence and Self-DeceptionRes Philosophica 100 (2): 203-226. 2023.Wright’s judgement-dependent account of intention is an attempt to show that truths about a subject’s intentions can be viewed as constituted by the subject’s own best judgements about those intentions. The judgements are considered to be best if they are formed under certain cognitively optimal conditions, which mainly include the subject’s conceptual competence, attentiveness to the questions about what the intentions are, and lack of any material self-deception. Offering a substantive, non-tr…Read more
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59Kripke’s WittgensteinInternet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (IEP). 2022.Saul Kripke, in his celebrated book Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982), offers a novel reading of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s main remarks in his later works, especially in Philosophical Investigations (1953) and, to some extent, in Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (1956). Kripke presents Wittgenstein as proposing a skeptical argument against a certain conception of meaning and linguistic understanding, as well as a skeptical solution to such a problem. Many philosophers have c…Read more
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43Davidson on Pure Intending: A Non-Reductionist Judgement-Dependent AccountDialogue 61 (2): 369-391. 2022.RésuméJe soutiendrai que la façon dont Davidson rend compte de l'intention pure peut être comprise comme une analyse de l'intention comme étant relative à un jugement dans une perspective en première personne. Selon Davidson, avoir la pure intention de faire A, c'est formuler un jugement tout bien considéré qu'il est désirable de faire A. Dans cette analyse anti-réductionniste, l'intention est traitée comme un état irréductible du sujet. J’établirai une comparaison entre cette analyse et celle d…Read more
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440Blackburn’s Wittgenstein: The Quasi-RealistIn Ali Hossein Khani & Gary N. Kemp (eds.), Wittgenstein and Other Philosophers (Volume I), Routledge. forthcoming.
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497The Root of the Third Dogma of Empiricism: Davidson vs. Quine on FactualismActa Analytica 38 (1): 161-183. 2023.Davidson has famously argued that conceptual relativism, which, for him, is based on the content-scheme dualism, or the “third dogma” of empiricism, is either unintelligible or philosophically uninteresting and has accused Quine of holding onto such a dogma. For Davidson, there can be found no intelligible ground for the claim that there may exist untranslatable languages: all languages, if they are languages, are in principle inter-translatable and uttered sentences, if identifiable as utteranc…Read more
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304Kripke's Wittgenstein: The Meaning ScepticIn Ali Hossein Khani & Gary N. Kemp (eds.), Wittgenstein and Other Philosophers (Volume I), Routledge. forthcoming.
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Quine, Naturalism and First-Person Epistemology (In Persian)Iranian Institute of Philosophy (IRIP) Publishing. forthcoming.The book will discuss and criticize the objections from Blackburn, Searle and Glock to Quine's arguments for the indeterminacy of translation, i.e., that these arguments result in a denial of first-person authority, as well as Hylton’s solution to these objections. The book argues that these objections, as well as Hylton's solution, all rely on a misconstrual of Quine, among other things, that there can be a distinction between meaning and translation for Quine. I will then offer a Strawsonian-W…Read more
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Wittgenstein and Other Philosophers: His Influence on Historical and Contemporary Analytic Philosophers (Volume II) (edited book)Routledge. forthcoming.This edited volume includes 49 Chapters, each of which discusses the influence of a philosopher's reading of Wittgenstein in his/her philosophical works and the way such Wittgensteinian ideas have manifested themselves in those works.
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1Wittgenstein and Other Philosophers: His Influence on Historical and Contemporary Analytic Philosophers (Volume I) (edited book)Routledge. forthcoming.This edited volume includes 36 Chapters, each of which discusses the influence of a philosopher's reading of Wittgenstein in his/her philosophical works and the way such Wittgensteinian ideas have manifested themselves in those works.
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269Davidson on Pure Intending: A Non-Reductionist Judgement-Dependent AccountDialogue 61 (2): 369-391. 2022.RésuméJe soutiendrai que la façon dont Davidson rend compte de l'intention pure peut être comprise comme une analyse de l'intention comme étant relative à un jugement dans une perspective en première personne. Selon Davidson, avoir la pure intention de faire A, c'est formuler un jugement tout bien considéré qu'il est désirable de faire A. Dans cette analyse anti-réductionniste, l'intention est traitée comme un état irréductible du sujet. J’établirai une comparaison entre cette analyse et celle d…Read more
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16RelativismPhilosophical Quarterly 71 (2): 441-443. 2021.Relativism. By Baghramian Maria, Coliva Annalisa.
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270The Indeterminacy of Translation and Radical InterpretationInternet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2021.The Indeterminacy of Translation and Radical Interpretation The indeterminacy of translation is the thesis that translation, meaning, and reference are all indeterminate: there are always alternative translations of a sentence and a term, and nothing objective in the world can decide which translation is the right one. This is a skeptical conclusion because what it … Continue reading The Indeterminacy of Translation and Radical Interpretation →
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392Davidson's Wittgensteinian MetaphilosophyAcademia Letters 1-6. 2021.In this short paper, I am going to discuss an often neglected aspect of Davidson's philosophy, his metaphilosophy. Metaphilosophy is traditionally defined as the philosophy of philosophy. This definition, however, is not illuminating. I think metaphilosophy aims at a disclosure of the nature of philosophical questions, what they are and how to approach them. ...
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195Davidson’s Main Arguments for the Necessity of Language for Thought (In Persian)Ketab-E-Mah-E-Falsafeh 6 (68): 66-77. 2013.نگاهی بر استدلالهای دونالد دیویدسون در باب ضرورت زبان برای اندیشه
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159The Main Challenges between Dummett and McDowell: On Theories of Meaning and Adequate Descriptions of Speakers' Linguistic Behaviour. (In Persian)Nameh-YE-Mofid Journal 5 (2): 109-126. 2009.بررسی اصلیترین چالشهای میان دامت و مک داول در باب نظریة معنا و توصیف مناسب رفتار زبانی
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170On Dummett's Interpretation and Criticisms of Frege's View of Meaning. (In Persian)Ketab-E-Mah-E-Falsafeh 4 (37). 2010.نگاهی به تفسیر و انتقادات دامت از آموزههای فرگه پیرامون مباحث معناشناختی
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180Davidson's Argument for the Compositionality of Natural Languages and the Slingshot Argument. (In Persian)Zehn 11 (42): 97-120. 2010.«بررسی استدلال دیویدسون در باب ترکیبی بودن زبانهای طبیعی و «استدلال قلاب سنگی
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203Davidson's View of Meaning and Dummett's Objections to It. (In Persian)Methodology of Social Science and Humanities Journal 16 (64-65): 211-236. 2010.روششناسی دیویدسون در باب معنا و تعبیر رادیکال و انتقادات دامت به آن
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189On Michael Dummett’s Anti-realism and Verificationist View. (In Persian)Metaphysics (University of Isfahan) 2 (7): 63-78. 2010.واکاوی ضدواقعگرایی و رهیافت تحقیقگرایانة مایکل دامت
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156On Kripke’s Wittgenstein's Sceptical Argument and Solution. (In Persian)Zehn 12 (45): 121-146. 2011.بررسی استدلال و پاسخ شکگرایانة کریپکی و برخی از واکنشها به آن
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344McTaggart on the Unreality of Time: Boghossian's Argument against Error-TheoryZehn 81 91-115. 2020.McTaggart, in his famous paper, “The Unreality of Time” (1908), argues in favor of the sceptical claim that time is unreal. His main argument is based on detecting a paradox in our ordinary descriptions of time or events occurring in time. Based on our common sense conception of time, time and the events happening in it can be described in two ways: either as having the properties of “being past”, “being present” and “being future”, or as having the properties of “being earlier than”, “being lat…Read more
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530Islam and Science: The Philosophical Grounds for a Genuine DebateZygon 55 (4): 1011-1040. 2020.What does it take for Islam and science to engage in a genuine conversation with each other? This essay is an attempt to answer this question by clarifying the conditions which make having such a conversation possible and plausible. I will first distinguish between three notions of conversation: the trivial conversation (which requires sharing a common language and the meaning of its ordinary expressions), superficial conversation (in which although the language is shared, the communicators fail…Read more
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441Davidson on Self‐Knowledge: A Transcendental ExplanationSouthern Journal of Philosophy 59 (2): 153-184. 2021.Davidson has attempted to offer his own solution to the problem of self-knowledge, but there has been no consensus between his commentators on what this solution is. Many have claimed that Davidson’s account stems from his remarks on disquotational specifications of self-ascriptions of meaning and mental content, the account which I will call the “Disquotational Explanation”. It has also been claimed that Davidson’s account rather rests on his version of content externalism, which I will call th…Read more
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504Davidson’s WittgensteinJournal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 8 (5): 1-26. 2020.Although the later Wittgenstein appears as one of the most influential figures in Davidson’s later works on meaning, it is not, for the most part, clear how Davidson interprets and employs Wittgenstein’s ideas. In this paper, I will argue that Davidson’s later works on meaning can be seen as mainly a manifestation of his attempt to accommodate the later Wittgenstein’s basic ideas about meaning and understanding, especially the requirement of drawing the seems right/is right distinction and the w…Read more
Ali Hossein Khani
Iranian Institute of Philosophy (IRIP)
Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences
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Iranian Institute of Philosophy (IRIP)Assistant Professor
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Institute for Research in Fundamental SciencesSchool of Analytic PhilosophyResearch Fellow (Part-time)
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Language |
Epistemology |
General Philosophy of Science |
Areas of Interest
1 more
Philosophy of Mind |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |
Meta-Ethics |
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Metaphilosophy |
Philosophy of Action |