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11470Affectivity in Heidegger I: Moods and Emotions in Being and TimePhilosophy Compass 10 (10): 661-671. 2015.This essay provides an analysis of the role of affectivity in Martin Heidegger's writings from the mid to late 1920s. We begin by situating his account of mood within the context of his project of fundamental ontology in Being and Time. We then discuss the role of Befindlichkeit and Stimmung in his account of human existence, explicate the relationship between the former and the latter, and consider the ways in which the former discloses the world. To give a more vivid and comprehensive picture …Read more
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2780The good of boredomPhilosophical Psychology 31 (3): 323-351. 2018.I argue that the state of boredom (i.e., the transitory and non-pathological experience of boredom) should be understood to be a regulatory psychological state that has the capacity to promote our well-being by contributing to personal growth and to the construction (or reconstruction) of a meaningful life
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2651The Significance of Boredom: A Sartrean ReadingIn Daniel Dahlstrom, Andreas Elpidorou & Walter Hopp (eds.), Philosophy of Mind and Phenomenology: Conceptual and Empirical Approaches, Routledge. 2015.By examining boredom through the lens of Sartre’s account of the emotions, I argue for the significance of boredom. Boredom matters, I show, for it is both informative and regulatory of one’s behavior: it informs one of the presence of an unsatisfactory situation; and, at the same time, owing to its affective, cognitive, and volitional character, boredom motivates the pursuit of a new goal when the current goal ceases to be satisfactory, attractive, or meaningful. In the absent of boredom, one w…Read more
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2595Horror, Fear, and the Sartrean Account of EmotionsSouthern Journal of Philosophy 54 (2): 209-225. 2016.Phenomenological approaches to affectivity have long recognized the vital role that emotions occupy in our lives. In this paper, I engage with Jean-Paul Sartre's well-known and highly influential theory of the emotions as it is advanced in his Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions. I examine whether Sartre's account offers two inconsistent explications of the nature of emotions. I argue that despite appearances there is a reading of Sartre's theory that is free of inconsistencies. Ultimately, I hi…Read more
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2576Is Profound Boredom Boredom?In Christos Hadjioannou (ed.), Heidegger on Affect, Palgrave. pp. 177-203. 2019.Martin Heidegger is often credited as having offered one of the most thorough phenomenological investigations of the nature of boredom. In his 1929–1930 lecture course, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude, he goes to great lengths to distinguish between three different types of boredom and to explicate their respective characters. Within the context of his discussion of one of these types of boredom, profound boredom [tiefe Langweile], Heidegger opposes much of the…Read more
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2299The bored mind is a guiding mind: toward a regulatory theory of boredomPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (3): 455-484. 2018.By presenting and synthesizing findings on the character of boredom, the article advances a theoretical account of the function of the state of boredom. The article argues that the state of boredom should be understood as a functional emotion that is both informative and regulatory of one's behavior. Boredom informs one of the presence of an unsatisfactory situation and, at the same time, it motivates one to pursue a new goal when the current goal ceases to be satisfactory, attractive or meaning…Read more
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2238Philosophy of BoredomOxford Bibliographies in Philosophy. forthcoming.The aim of this entry is to provide the reader with a philosophical map of the progression of the concept and experience of boredom throughout the Western tradition—from antiquity to current work in Anglo-American philosophy. By focusing primarily on key philosophical works on boredom, but also often discussing important literary and scientific texts, the entry exposes the reader to the rich history of boredom and illustrates how the different manifestations of boredom—idleness, horror loci, ace…Read more
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1917Boredom and Cognitive Engagement: A Functional Theory of BoredomReview of Philosophy and Psychology 14 (3): 959-988. 2022.The functional theory of boredom maintains that boredom ought to be defined in terms of its role in our mental and behavioral economy. Although the functional theory has recently received considerable attention, presentations of this theory have not specified with sufficient precision either its commitments or its consequences for the ontology of boredom. This essay offers an in-depth examination of the functional theory. It explains what boredom is according to the functional view; it shows how…Read more
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1603A Posteriori Physicalism and IntrospectionPacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1): 474-500. 2017.Introspection presents our phenomenal states in a manner otherwise than physical. This observation is often thought to amount to an argument against physicalism: if introspection presents phenomenal states as they essentially are, then phenomenal states cannot be physical states, for we are not introspectively aware of phenomenal states as physical states. In this article, I examine whether this argument threatens a posteriori physicalism. I argue that as along as proponents of a posteriori phys…Read more
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1542Affectivity in Heidegger II: Temporality, Boredom, and BeyondPhilosophy Compass 10 (10): 672-684. 2015.In ‘Affectivity in Heidegger I: Moods and Emotions in Being and Time’, we explicated the crucial role that Martin Heidegger assigns to our capacity to affectively find ourselves in the world. There, our discussion was restricted to Division I of Being and Time. Specifically, we discussed how Befindlichkeit as a basic existential and moods as the ontic counterparts of Befindlichkeit make circumspective engagement with the world possible. Indeed, according to Heidegger, it is primarily through moo…Read more
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1539The Moral Dimensions of Boredom: A call for researchReview of General Psychology 21 (1): 30-48. 2017.Despite the impressive progress that has been made on both the empirical and conceptual fronts of boredom research, there is one facet of boredom that has received remarkably little attention. This is boredom's relationship to morality. The aim of this article is to explore the moral dimensions of boredom and to argue that boredom is a morally relevant personality trait. The presence of trait boredom hinders our capacity to flourish and in doing so hurts our prospects for a moral life.
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1382The New Science of the Mind: From Extended Mind to Embodied PhenomenologyPhilosophical Psychology 25 (5): 771-774. 2012.Philosophical Psychology, Volume 0, Issue 0, Page 1-4, Ahead of Print
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1050Moods and Appraisals: How the Phenomenology and Science of Emotions Can Come TogetherHuman Studies (4): 1-27. 2013.In this paper, I articulate Heidegger’s notion of Befindlichkeit and show that his phenomenological account of affective existence can be understood in terms of contemporary work on emotions. By examining Heidegger’s account alongside contemporary accounts of emotions, I not only demonstrate the ways in which key aspects of the former are present in the latter; I also explicate in detail the ways in which our understanding of Befindlichkeit and its relationship to moods and emotions can benefit …Read more
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1047Phenomenal ConceptsOxford Bibliographies Online. 2015.Phenomenal concepts are the concepts that we deploy when – but arguably not only when – we introspectively examine, focus on, or take notice of the phenomenal character of our experiences. They refer to phenomenal properties (or qualities) and they do so in a subjective (first-personal) and direct (non-relational) manner. It is through the use of such concepts that the phenomenal character of our experiences is made salient to us. Discourse about the nature of phenomenal concepts plays an i…Read more
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1038Embodied Conceivability: How to Keep the Phenomenal Concept Strategy GroundedMind and Language 31 (5): 580-611. 2016.The Phenomenal Concept Strategy offers the physicalist perhaps the most promising means of explaining why the connection between mental facts and physical facts appears to be contingent even though it is not. In this article, we show that the large body of evidence suggesting that our concepts are often embodied and grounded in sensorimotor systems speaks against standard forms of the PCS. We argue, nevertheless, that it is possible to formulate a novel version of the PCS that is thoroughly in k…Read more
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1013Having it Both Ways: Consciousness, Unique Not OtherworldlyPhilosophia 41 (4): 1181-1203. 2013.I respond to Chalmers’ (2006, 2010) objection to the Phenomenal Concept Strategy (PCS) by showing that his objection is faced with a dilemma that ultimately undercuts its force. Chalmers argues that no version of PCS can posit psychological features that are both physically explicable and capable of explaining our epistemic situation. In response, I show that what Chalmers calls ‘our epistemic situation’ admits either of a phenomenal or of a topic-neutral characterization, neither of which suppo…Read more
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1011Emotions in Early Sartre: The Primacy of FrustrationMidwest Studies in Philosophy 41 (1): 241-259. 2017.Sartre’s account of the emotions presupposes a conception of human nature that is never fully articulated. The paper aims to render such conception explicit and to argue that frustration occupies a foundational place in Sartre’s picture of affective existence.
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964Boredom and Poverty: A Theoretical ModelIn The Moral Psychology of Boredom, Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 171-208. 2022.The aim of this chapter is to articulate the ways in which our social standing, and particularly our socio-economic status (SES), affects, even transforms, the experience of boredom. Even if boredom can be said to be democratic, in the sense that it can potentially affect all of us, it does not actually affect all of us in the same way. Boredom, I argue, is unjust—some groups are disproportionately negatively impacted by boredom through no fault of their own. Depending on our social position and…Read more
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903Really Boring ArtErgo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8 (30): 190-218. 2022.There is little question as to whether there is good boring art, though its existence raises a number of questions for both the philosophy of art and the philosophy of emotions. How can boredom ever be a desideratum of art? How can our standing commitments concerning the nature of aesthetic experience and artistic value accommodate the existence of boring art? How can being bored constitute an appropriate mode of engagement with a work of art as a work of art? More broadly, how can there be work…Read more
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881Introduction: The Character of PhysicalismTopoi 37 (3): 435-455. 2018.The aim of this editorial introduction is twofold. First, Sects. 1–8 offer a critical introduction to the metaphysical character of physicalism. In those sections, I present and evaluate different ways in which proponents of physicalism have made explicit the metaphysical dependence that is said to hold between the non-physical and the physical. Some of these accounts are found to be problematic; others are shown to be somewhat more promising. In the end, som…Read more
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864Reasoning About the Mark of the Cognitive: A Response to Adams and Garrison (review)Minds and Machines (2): 1-11. 2013.I critically examine Adams and Garrison’s proposed necessary condition for the mark of the cognitive (Adams and Garrison in Minds Mach 23(3):339–352, 2013). After a brief presentation of their position, I argue not only that their proposal is in need of additional support, but also that it is too restrictive
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795The “New Mind” revisited, or minding the content/vehicle distinction: a response to Manzotti and PepperellAI and Society 28 (4): 461-466. 2013.I argue that Manzotti and Pepperell’s presentation of the New Mind not only obfuscates pertinent differences between externalist views of various strengths, but also, and most problematically, conflates a distinction that cannot, without consequences, be conflated. We can talk about the contents of the mind and/or about the vehicles of those contents. But we should not conflate the two. Conflation of contents and vehicles comes with a price. In Manzotti and Pepperell’s case, it undermines claims…Read more
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767Is boredom one or many? A functional solution to the problem of heterogeneityMind and Language 36 (3): 491-511. 2020.Despite great progress in our theoretical and empirical investigations of boredom, a basic issue regarding boredom remains unresolved: it is still unclear whether the construct of boredom is a unitary one or not. By surveying the relevant literature on boredom and arousal, the paper makes a case for the unity of the construct of boredom. It argues, first, that extant empirical findings do not support the heterogeneity of boredom, and, second, that a theoretically motivated and empirically ground…Read more
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758Seeing the ImpossibleJournal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 74 (1): 11-21. 2016.I defend the view that it is not impossible to see the impossible. I provide two examples in which one sees the impossible and defend these examples from potential objections. Theories of depiction should make room for impossible depictions
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747Jadedness: A philosophical analysisPhilosophical Studies 1 1-24. 2023.The essay contributes to the philosophical literature on emotions by advancing a detailed analysis of jadedness and by investigating whether jadedness can be subject to the various standards that are often thought to apply to our emotional states. The essay argues that jadedness is the affective experience of weariness, lack of care, and mild disdain with some object, and that it crucially involves the realisation that such an object was previously, but is no longer, significant to us. On the ba…Read more
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682Fear, anxiety, and boredomIn Thomas Szanto & Hilge Landweer (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Phenomenology of Emotion, Routledge. pp. 392-402. 2020.Phenomenology's central insight is that affectivity is not an inconsequential or contingent characteristic of human existence. Emotions, moods, sentiments, and feelings are not accidents of human existence. They do not happen to happen to us. Rather, we exist the way we do because of and through our affective experiences. Phenomenology thus acknowledges the centrality and ubiquity of affectivity by noting the multitude of ways in which our existence is permeated by our various affective experien…Read more
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674The Moral Significance of Boredom: An IntroductionIn The Moral Psychology of Boredom, Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 1-34. 2022.This is the introductory chapter to The Moral Psychology of Boredom (Rowman & Littlefield, 2021). It discusses the various ways in which boredom is morally significant and offers a summary of the experiential profile of boredom.
Louisville, Kentucky, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
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Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Phenomenal Concepts |
Formulating Physicalism |
Boredom |
Explaining Consciousness? |
Consciousness and Materialism |
Emotions, Misc |
PhilPapers Editorships
Physicalism |
Dualism |
Psychophysical Supervenience |
Moods |
Boredom |