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1What's the Beef with Cultivated Meat?Etikk I Praksis - Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics. forthcoming.
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37Circular Definitions of ‘Good’ and the Good of Circular DefinitionsEthical Theory and Moral Practice 1-14. forthcoming.I defend the view that circular definitions can be useful and illuminating by focusing on the fitting-attitudes analysis of value. This definition states that an item has value if and only if it is a fitting target of attitudes. Good items are the fitting targets of positive attitudes, and bad items are the fitting targets of negative ones. I shall argue that a circular version of this definition, defended by Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2006), is preferable to its non-circular counterpart a…Read more
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28The Ethics of Viewing Illegally Shared PornographyJournal of Applied Philosophy. forthcoming.I argue that the consumption of illegally shared pornography is often morally problematic. My argument is not based on any general condemnation of pornography or even illegal content sharing as such. Instead, my argument emphasizes that commercial pornography that is illegally shared risks violating the consent and thus the dignity of its performers. In this way, illegally shared pornography is akin to ‘revenge porn’, involving the non-consensual distribution and consumption of sexually intimate…Read more
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1Value, Morality & Social Reality: Essays dedicated to Dan Egonsson, Björn Petersson & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (edited book)Department of Philosophy, Lund University. 2023.
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16On neutral value and fitting indifferenceSouthern Journal of Philosophy. forthcoming.A standard approach to neutral value suggests that it can be understood in comparative terms by reference to value relations. I develop some objections to the standard approach based on assumptions about value facts being closely connected to fittingness facts. I then suggest that these objections give us reasons to amend the standard approach with a noncomparative understanding. The claim is that if an item has neutral value, then it is a fitting target of indifference, where this is understood…Read more
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Anarkismen, auktoriteten och hierarkin: Ett begreppsligt käbbel.Tidskrift För Politisk Filosofi 26 (3). 2023.
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Individually Fitting but Collectively Unfitting BlameIn Andrés Garcia, Mattias Gunnemyr & Jakob Werkmäster (eds.), Value, Morality & Social Reality: Essays dedicated to Dan Egonsson, Björn Petersson & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, Department of Philosophy, Lund University. pp. 159-172. 2023.
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17Value relations sans evaluative groundsRatio 36 (2): 137-146. 2023.I argue that there can be value relations without individual values to support them. The fact that an item is better than another item does not have to be explained by reference to the values of the individual items. Instead, value relations can be grounded directly and exhaustively in descriptive facts about their relata. I show that my suggestion fits well with plausible perspectives on the nature of values and reasons, respectively. One of them is the fitting‐attitudes view, according to whic…Read more
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73Reconciling the deprivation account with the final badness of deathJournal of Value Inquiry 1-14. forthcoming.
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31The Unfairness Objection to the Practice of Collective Moral ResponsibilityJournal of Value Inquiry 56 (4): 1-16. 2021.
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68The New Explanatory Objection Against the Fitting Attitude Account of ValuePhilosophia 50 (4): 1845-1860. 2022.The explanatory objection against the fitting attitude account of value states that if the properties of attitudes explain fittingness facts, but do not always explain value facts, then value facts cannot be identical with or reduced to fittingness facts. One reply to this objection is to claim that the constitutive properties of attitudes also explain value facts, for they are enablers for the value possessed by an object. In this paper we argue that the enabling maneuver exposes FA to a new ex…Read more
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Om analysen av värde i termer av passande attityder och dess neutralitet.Filosofisk Tidskrift. forthcoming.
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70The explanatory objection to the fitting attitude analysis of valuePhilosophical Studies 178 (4): 1207-1221. 2020.The fitting attitude analysis of value states that for objects to have value is for them to be the fitting targets of attitudes. Good objects are the fitting targets of positive attitudes, while bad objects are the fitting targets of negative attitudes. The following paper presents an argument to the effect that value and the fittingness of attitudes differ in terms of their explanations. Whereas the fittingness of attitudes is explained, inter alia, by both the properties of attitudes and those…Read more
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36Toward a Reasons-First View of Normative Background ConditionsPhilosophia 48 (3): 981-992. 2020.Background conditions are thought to explain how objects can have value in virtue of certain features and how reasons can consist in certain facts. The following paper provides an account of what background conditions are and what effect they have on normative features. It defends the idea that if values depend on reasons, then there is nothing really surprising or mysterious about the presence of background conditions in normative explanations. Background conditions turn out to be a natural and…Read more
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54Subjectivism and the Framework of Constitutive GroundsEthical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (1): 155-167. 2018.Philosophers have applied the framework of constitutive grounds to make sense of the disagreement between subjectivism and objectivism. The framework understands the two theories as being involved in a disagreement about the extent to which value is determined by attitudes. Although the framework affords us with some useful observations about how this should be interpreted, the question how value can be determined by attitudes in the first place is left largely unanswered. Here we explore the be…Read more
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35The Finality and Instrumentality of Value in a WayPhilosophia 47 (3): 681-692. 2019.Final value accrues to objects that are good for their own sakes, while instrumental value accrues to objects that are good for the sake of their effects. The following paper aims to show that this distinction cuts across some surprising areas of the evaluative domain. This means that there may be some unexpected types of value that can come in a final or instrumental form. The argument proceeds by looking at two prominent types of value, namely kind-value and personal value. The former accrues …Read more
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38Francesco Orsi: Value Theory: Bloomsbury Publishing. 9781472524089. 192 pp. Paperback. £17.99Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (2): 521-522. 2016.
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78Between Values and the World: Studies in second-order value theoryDissertation, Lund. 2018.Value is an inescapable part of the human experience and what life must be like for a conscious and feeling person. Philosophical questions about value are therefore naturally invited: What sort of thing would value be if it were part of the furniture of the world? How should we understand the relations that value is thought to stand in to other things? In a broad sense, these are formal questions calling for philosophical studies into the understanding of value notions. The following work repre…Read more
Berlin, Berlin, Germany
Areas of Specialization
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |
Value Theory, Miscellaneous |
Areas of Interest
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