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Lorne Falkenstein, Kant's Intuitionism: A Commentary on the Transcendental Aesthetic. Toronto: University of Toronto Press1995. Pp. xxiii + 465 (review)Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28 (2): 247-268. 1998.
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28Unity of consciousnessIn Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind, Oxford University Press. pp. 565--577. 2007.
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Kant on the mindIn Rebecca Copenhaver (ed.), History of the Philosophy of Mind, Vol. 4: Philosophy of Mind in the Early Modern and Modern Ages, Routledge. 2018.
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4How to treat persons as personsIn Alan Montefiore (ed.), Philosophy and Personal Relations: An Anglo-French Study, Mcgill-queen's University Press. pp. 62-82. 1973.
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7Kant and Time‐Order IdealismIn Adrian Bardon & Heather Dyke (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Time, Wiley-blackwell. 2013.Kant was a transcendental idealist even about the time‐order of representations. For Kant, idealism meant two things: We are aware only of the contents of our own mind and what we are aware of is largely a result of the activities of the mind. His constructivism is the central issue in this chapter. The first part of the chapter is devoted to demonstrating preliminary existence proof. The middle sections of the chapter take up the localization problem. The final section of the paper identifies a…Read more
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27Acknowledgement of external reviewers for 2002Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (95): 151-152. 2003.
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16Apperception and Related Matters in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and Opus PostumumStudies in Transcendental Philosophy 3 (3). 2022.In the Critique of Pure Reason (1781/7), Kant laid out a deep-running and largely original picture of the apperceptive mind, including a claim that in consciousness of self, one does not appear to oneself as an object and that consciousness of self is presupposed by consciousness of other things. As a result, consciousness of oneself does not provide knowledge of oneself and the referential apparatus of consciousness of self is radically different from other kinds of referential apparatus. The m…Read more
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125The representational base of consciousnessPSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12. 2006.Current views of consciousness can be divided by whether the theorist accepts or rejects cognitivism about consciousness. Cognitivism as we understand it is the view that consciousness is just a form of representation or an information-processing property of a system that has representations or perhaps both.<b> </b>Anti-cognitivists deny this, appealing to thought experiments about inverted spectra, zombies and the like to argue that consciousness could change while nothing cognitive or represen…Read more
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17Kant's A Priori Methods For Recognizing Necessary TruthsCanadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (sup1): 215-252. 1992.
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153Daniel Dennett (edited book)Cambridge University Press. 2002.Contemporary Philosophy in Focus will offer a series of introductory volumes to many of the dominant philosophical thinkers of the current age. Each volume will consist of newly commissioned essays that will cover all the major contributions of a preeminent philosopher in a systematic and accessible manner. Author of such groundbreaking and influential books as Consciousness Explained and Darwin's Dangerous Idea, Daniel C. Dennett has reached a huge general and professional audience that extends…Read more
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40Critical Notice of Bernard Williams, Problems of the Self (review)Canadian Journal of Philosophy 5 (4): 627-639. 1975.
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74Dennett’s Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment (edited book)MIT Press. 2000.The essays in this collection step back to ask: Do the complex components of Dennett's work on intentionality, consciousness, evolution, and ethics themselves ...
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29Kant’s Attack on the Amphiboly of the Concepts of ReflectionThe Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 45 41-46. 1998.In the neglected 'Amphiboly of the Concepts of Reflection,' Kant introduces a new transcendental activity, Transcendental Deliberation. It aims to determine to which faculty a representation belongs and does so by examining the representation's relationships to other representations. This enterprise yields some powerful ideas. Some of the relationships studied have great interest, numerical identity in particular. Indeed, seeing Kant discuss it here, one wonders why he did not include it in the …Read more
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324Leveling the Field: Talking Levels in Cognitive ScienceIn A. Papafragou, D. Grodner, D. Mirman & J. C. Trueswell (eds.), Proceedings of the 38th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (pp. 432-437) Cognitive Science Society., Cognitive Science Society. pp. 2399-2404. 2016.Talk of levels is everywhere in cognitive science. Whether it is in terms of adjudicating longstanding debates or motivating foundational concepts, one cannot go far without hearing about the need to talk at different ‘levels’. Yet in spite of its widespread application and use, the concept of levels has received little sustained attention within cognitive science. This paper provides an analysis of the various ways the notion of levels has been deployed within cognitive science. The paper begin…Read more
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620The Philosophy and Neuroscience MovementAnalyse & Kritik 29 (1): 3-23. 2007.A movement dedicated to applying neuroscience to traditional philosophical problems and using philosophical methods to illuminate issues in neuroscience began about twenty-five years ago. Results in neuroscience have affected how we see traditional areas of philosophical concern such as perception, belief-formation, and consciousness. There is an interesting interaction between some of the distinctive features of neuroscience and important general issues in the philosophy of science. And recent …Read more
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20Introduction: Philosophy in and Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Part IITopics in Cognitive Science 1 (3): 547-547. 2009.
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15Reconciling the Two ImagesIn S. O'Nuillain, Paul McKevitt & E. MacAogain (eds.), Two Sciences of Mind, John Benjamins. pp. 9--299. 1997.
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169Introduction: Philosophy in and Philosophy of Cognitive ScienceTopics in Cognitive Science 1 (2): 216-230. 2009.Despite being there from the beginning, philosophical approaches have never had a settled place in cognitive research and few cognitive researchers not trained in philosophy have a clear sense of what its role has been or should be. We distinguish philosophy in cognitive research and philosophy of cognitive research. Concerning philosophy in cognitive research, after exploring some standard reactions to this work by nonphilosophers, we will pay particular attention to the methods that philosophe…Read more
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