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117Substituting the sensesIn Mohan Matthen (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception, Oxford University Press Uk. 2015.Sensory substitution devices are a type of sensory prosthesis that (typically) convert visual stimuli transduced by a camera into tactile or auditory stimulation. They are designed to be used by people with impaired vision so that they can recover some of the functions normally subserved by vision. In this chapter we will consider what philosophers might learn about the nature of the senses from the neuroscience of sensory substitution. We will show how sensory substitution devices work by ex…Read more
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Introduction: The extended mind in focus / Richard Menary The extended mindIn Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind, Mit Press. 2010.
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1268This unpublished article was written around 2009 for a journal special issue of a journal which never materialized. In 2018, the article was rewritten and published in the Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability. It can be found on PhilPapers as Drayson and Clark (2018), 'Cognitive Disability and the Embodied, Extended Mind'.
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Memento's revenge: The extended mind, extendedIn Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind, Mit Press. 2010.
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775How to situate cognition: Letting nature take its courseIn Murat Aydede & P. Robbins (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition, Cambridge University Press. pp. 55--77. 2008.1. The Situation in Cognition 2. Situated Cognition: A Potted Recent History 3. Extensions in Biology, Computation, and Cognition 4. Articulating the Idea of Cognitive Extension 5. Are Some Resources Intrinsically Non-Cognitive? 6. Is Cognition Extended or Only Embedded? 7. Letting Nature Take Its Course
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Embodied cognition and the sciences of the mindIn Michela Massimi (ed.), Philosophy and the Sciences for Everyone, Routledge. 2014.
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49New humans? Ethics, trust, and the extended mindIn J. Adam Carter, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, S. Orestis Palermos & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Extended Epistemology, Oxford University Press. pp. 331-352. 2018.Strange inversions occur when things work in ways that turn received wisdom upside down. Hume offered a strangely inverted story about causation, and Darwin, about apparent design. Dennett suggests that a strange inversion also occurs when we project our own reactive complexes outward, painting our world with elusive properties like cuteness, sweetness, blueness, sexiness, funniness, and more. Such properties strike us as experiential causes, but they are really effects—a kind of shorthand for w…Read more
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30Intelligent problem-solvers externalize cognitive operationsNature Human Behaviour 3 (2): 136-142. 2019.The use of forward models is well established in cognitive and computational neuroscience. We compare and contrast two recent, but interestingly divergent, accounts of the place of forward models in the human cognitive architecture. On the Auxiliary Forward Model account, forward models are special-purpose prediction mechanisms implemented by additional circuitry distinct from core mechanisms of perception and action. On the Integral Forward Model account, forward models lie at the heart of all …Read more
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274Beyond the 'Bayesian blur': predictive processing and the nature of subjective experienceJournal of Consciousness Studies 25 (3-4): 71-87. 2018.Recent work in cognitive and computational neuroscience depicts the brain as in some sense implementing probabilistic inference. This suggests a puzzle. If the processing that enables perceptual experience involves representing or approximating probability distributions, why does experience itself appear univocal and determinate, apparently bearing no traces of those probabilistic roots? In this paper, I canvass a range of responses, including the denial of univocality and determinacy itself. I …Read more
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1033Cognitive disability and embodied, extended mindsIn Adam Cureton & David Wasserman (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability, Oxford University Press. 2020.Many models of cognitive ability and disability rely on the idea of cognition as abstract reasoning processes implemented in the brain. Research in cognitive science, however, emphasizes the way that our cognitive skills are embodied in our more basic capacities for sensing and moving, and the way that tools in the external environment can extend the cognitive abilities of our brains. This chapter addresses the implications of research in embodied cognition and extended cognition for how we thin…Read more
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112New humans? Ethics, trust, and the extended mindIn J. Adam Carter, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, S. Orestis Palermos & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Extended Epistemology, Oxford University Press. pp. 331-351. 2018.The possibility of extended cognition invites the possibility of extended knowledge. We examine what is minimally required for such forms of technologically extended knowledge to arise and whether existing and future technologies can allow for such forms of epistemic extension. Answering in the positive, we explore some of the ensuing transformations in the ethical obligations and personal rights of the resulting ‘new humans.’
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25Word, Niche and Super-Niche: How Language Makes Minds Matter MoreTheoria 20 (3): 255-268. 2010.How does language impact thought? One useful way to approach this important but elusive question may be to consider language itself as a cognition-enhancing animal-built structure. To take this perspective is to view language as a kind of self-constructed cognitive niche.
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2037How to Knit Your Own Markov BlanketPhilosophy and Predictive Processing. 2017.Hohwy (Hohwy 2016, Hohwy 2017) argues there is a tension between the free energy principle and leading depictions of mind as embodied, enactive, and extended (so-called ‘EEE1 cognition’). The tension is traced to the importance, in free energy formulations, of a conception of mind and agency that depends upon the presence of a ‘Markov blanket’ demarcating the agent from the surrounding world. In what follows I show that the Markov blanket considerations do not, in fact, lead to the kinds of tens…Read more
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Associative Engines: Connectionism, Concepts and Representational ChangeBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (4): 1047-1058. 1994.
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5On Executive AttentionPSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 15 (1). 2009.In her excellent and thought-provoking essay ";Searching for the Source of Executive Attention";; Catherine Stinson argues that many accounts of executive attention threaten to involve some kind of conceptual confusion. While agreeing with many of the key criticisms, I explore some possible responses, which retain some of the flavor of the notion of executive attention
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The Legacy of Alan Turing, Volumes 1 and 2. Volume 1: Machines and ThoughtMind 108 (429): 187-195. 1999.
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15Department of Philosophy, Washington University, Saint Louis, Missouri FRIDAY, April 8 SATURDAY, April 9 Welcome: Roger Gibson University (review)Minds and Machines 3 (511). 1993.
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7 Is “mind” a scientific kind?In Philip R. Loockvane (ed.), The nature of concepts: evolution, structure, and representation, Routledge. pp. 155. 1999.
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11How to Qualify for a Cognitive Upgrade: Executive Control, Glass Ceilings and the Limits of Simian SuccessIn David McFarland, Keith Stenning & Maggie McGonigle (eds.), The Complex Mind: An Interdisciplinary Approach, Palgrave-macmillan. pp. 197. 2012.
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22A brain SpeaksIn Susan Schneider (ed.), Science Fiction and Philosophy: From Time Travel to Superintelligence, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 122. 2009.
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70Mind: Natural, artificial, hybrid, and “super”In Susan Schneider (ed.), Science Fiction and Philosophy: From Time Travel to Superintelligence, Wiley-blackwell. 2009.
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74Cyborgs UnpluggedIn Susan Schneider (ed.), Science Fiction and Philosophy: From Time Travel to Superintelligence, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 170. 2009.
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9Critique of Rumelhart and McClellandIn Alvin I. Goldman (ed.), Readings in Philosophy and Cognitive Science, Mit Press. 1993.
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1Of Norms and NeuronsIn and J. Larrazabal J. Ezquerro A. Clark (ed.), Philosophy and Cognitive Science: Categories, Consciousness, and Reasoning, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 59--71. 1996.
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36Systematicity, structured representations and cognitive architecture: A reply to Fodor and PylyshynIn Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (eds.), Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 198--218. 1991.
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64Much work in economics, the social sciences, and elsewhere takes as its starting point a somewhat unrealistic conception of rationality ââ¬â a conception that ignores or downplays both the temporal and the situated aspects of human reason. Biological reason, I shall argue, is better conceived as an iterated process of adaptive response made under extreme time pressure and exquisitely keyed to a variety of external structures and circumstances. These external structures and circumstances act …Read more