Andrew Hunter

The present paper examines conventional wisdom on the subject of the justification of indigenous peoples' intellectual property rights, and offers an alternative approach. The examination is achieved by a critique of two such conventional approaches in terms of the strength of each argument employed, and in terms of the efficacy of each in the roles allotted to them. The first such argument is Stenson and Gray's application of Kymlicka's individualist theory advocating national minority autonomy. The second argument is the labour entitlement theory of property acquisition, as advanced by Locke and Nozick. These theories only explain how a liberal social contract theorist would construct justifications from the outside. That this is inadequate is shown by reference to a case study involving indigenous claims against Australian law based on indigenous customary law. There, appeals are not made to abstract theory, but to tribal imperative. This observation finds sympathetic support in a reading of Hegel's philosophy of history. Hegel finds spirit in all peoples at all times. To Hegel, non-state peoples are developmentally prior to states; this means that states have developed dialectically from such peoples and cannot therefore deny them without self-contradiction. This places an onus upon a state that has subsumed an indigenous people to accommodate its laws and ways.

The objective of this study was to compare nutrient concentration, distribution, and select components of nutrient budgets for aspen, jack pine, and black spruce forest ecosystems at the BOReal Ecosystem Atmosphere Study, southern and northern study areas near Candle Lake, Saskatchewan and Thompson, Manitoba, Canada, respectively. The vegetation in the aspen, black spruce, and jack pine stands contained 70-79%, 53-54%, and 58-67% of total ecosystem carbon content, respectively. Soil nitrogen, calcium, and magnesium content comprised over 90% of the total ecosystem nutrient content, except for Ca and Mg content of the southern black spruce stand and Ca content of the southern aspen stand which were less than 90%. Annual litterfall N content was significantly greater for trembling aspen than for jack pine or black spruce, and was generally greater, but not significantly, for the southern than for the northern study area. Aboveground net primary production was positively correlated to annual litterfall N content for the BOREAS forests, and for all boreal forests. Annual aboveground nutrient requirements were significantly greater for trembling aspen than for jack pine or black spruce forests. Annual aboveground N requirements ranged from 37-53, 6-14, and 6-7 kg N ha-1 yr-1 for trembling aspen, jack pine, and black spruce forests, respectively. The greater nutrient requirements of deciduous than evergreen boreal forests was explained by a greater annual production of biomass and lower use efficiency of nutrients. Nutrient cycling characteristics of boreal forests were influenced by climate and forest type, with the latter having a greater influence on litterfall N, annual nutrient requirements, nutrient mean residence time, and nutrient distribution.

In "Reference and Definite Descriptions", Keith Donnellan introduces the notion of referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions--phrases such as "the author of Waverly". Here and in subsequent papers he argues that Russell's Theory of Descriptions is inadequate as a semantic analysis for all uses of definite descriptions. According to Russell's theory, definite descriptions are quantifier phrases, not singular terms. Donnellan's arguments suggest that definite descriptions are ambiguous. When they are used attributively, definite descriptions should be read as quantifier phrases. When they are used referentially, they should be read as genuine singular terms. ;I argue that it is possible to draw a sharp distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions. Following Donnellan, I argue that whether a description is used referentially or attributively depends on the intentions of the speaker concerning the truth-conditions of the proposition he wishes to express. This provides us with a precise way to determine whether a definite description is used referentially or attributively. ;I turn next to the question: Does Donnellan's referential/attributive distinction show that definite descriptions are semantically ambiguous? I distinguish two positions which have emerged in the literature. What I call The Strong Referential Thesis maintains that definite descriptions are singular terms, when they are used referentially. On this account, definite descriptions are semantically ambiguous. What I call The Weak Referential Thesis maintains that definite descriptions, when used referentially, are properly analyzed according to Russell's Theory of Descriptions. This thesis maintains that in referential cases, a speaker's utterance semantically expresses one proposition, but he may succeed in communicating some other proposition. This account attempts to defend Russell's Theory of Descriptions against the apparent counterexamples offered by Donnellan and others. ;I present two arguments in support of The Strong Referential Thesis. First, I argue that The Weak Referential Thesis results in the ascription of contradictory beliefs to speakers. I call this The Argument from the Principle of Charity. Second, I argue that The Weak Referential Thesis cannot, in all cases, explain how speakers may succeed in communicating a determinate proposition other than that which their utterances semantically express