Angeles J. Perona

Se analiza la Idea de Sujeto desde su relación con la Idea de Mundo, reconstruyendo esta relación a partir del concepto de «mundo de la vida», entendido como un «apriori» que comprende otros aprioris con cretos: corporeidad, intersubjetividad, historicidad y expresividad. A par tir de aquí, se hace una crítica de la fenomenología transcendental del último Husserl (Crisis), en cuanto pretendida «reflexión total», que, tras el análisis del mundo de la vida, conduce al concepto de un proto-yo transcendental absoluto. La crítica muestra cómo la imposibilidad de tal reflexión hace patente, a su vez, la imposibilidad de una razón autosufi ciente

Every time that one refers to the political philosophy that could be drawn from the so called " Last Wittgenstein ", the most habitual thing is to associate it with conservative positions, given that the majority of the available literature on the matter does it so. Nevertheless, in the last few years some philosophers, such as Chantal Mouffe and Paolo Virno, have tried to offer a new picture in which Wittgenstein fits better with democratic political ideas, even though this manoeuvre requires to go beyond some presuppositions of Wittgenstein philosophy. My aim is to twofold. First, I will analyze why it has been thought that some elements ofWittgenstein’s late philosophy are compatible with political conservatism. Second, I will try to point out what notions of this network should be discarded in order to make it useful to elaborate democratic anticonservative models. This last task is necessary since it is logical to think that the same body of thought cannot be coherent with so different and even opposite political derivations.

In this text, the relationship between fallibilism and cognitive vulnerability is examined using Richard Rorty’s thinking as an example. First, some of Rorty’s central ideas are collected and commented on, especially the substitution of objectivity for solidarity, since it affects relevant issues of epistemology and of reflection on rationality. Next, the notions of fallibilism and cognitive vulnerability are examined, which will be connected to an existential dimension of vulnerability. Examples of all those things are also given from Rorty’s thinking and it is highlighted that the author operates with both a negative and a positive sense of existential vulnerability. It is then stated that Rorty’s proposal implies pessimistic fallibilism and an excess of cognitive vulnerability. First, it is argued that the cause of this lies in the fact that his approach is imprisoned in what Richard Bernstein called Cartesian anxiety and secondly, this generates unwanted consequences for the Rortyan goals themselves to raise his ethnocentric proposal as a non-relativistic alternative to realism and authoritarianism. In this respect, it is maintained that the priority that Rorty attributes to solidarity is accompanied by the rejection of any notion of evidence. This produces a conceptual lacuna in the structure of his thought that makes it impossible to reflect philosophically on an epistemic activity (the activity of adducing or requesting evidence) that is a normal part of day-to-day conversational exchanges as important as controversies to determine the best option in each case. In response, we will argue that one can better work towards the achievement of Rortyan goals if we bear in mind that reasons based on solidarity do not replace and do not deactivate the value of epistemic reasons, although they do combine and reinforce each other.

La noción butleriana de política como resistencia destaca por su originalidad, pues se dobla de performatividad y, al mismo tiempo, está abierta a las alianzas. En este texto se argumenta que su singularidad proviene del marco teórico materialista elaborado por Butler, pues ofrece una caracterización de los seres humanos que los vincula socialmente por su mutua dependencia y vulnerabilidad. Finalmente, comentaré tres aspectos confusos o problemáticos de la propuesta butleriana: el primero relacionado con la reconciliación, el segundo con la emancipación y el tercero con la universalidad.

Este estudio trata de mostrar cómo las primeras reflexiones modernas sobre cuestiones de racionalidad práctica dan pie a tres modelos básicos de subjetividad: el elaborado por Maquiavelo, el que ofrece Lutero y el del utopismo. El trabajo se centra principalmente en los dos primeros.This paper aims to show how the first modern reflections on questions about practical rationality may eventually give rise to three different samples of subjectivity: first, that elaborated by Macchiavelli, secondly the one which may be found in Luther and, thirdly, the utopism. The paper focuses, however, its attention on the first two