Angelo Antonio Pires De Oliveira

In this paper, I discuss in detail one of the first conclusions drawn by Aristotle in the ergonargument. The paper provides an in-depth approach to Nicomachean Ethics’ lines 1098a3-4, where one reads: “λείπεταιδὴπρακτικήτιςτοῦλόγονἔχοντος”. I divide the discussion into two parts. In the first part, I put under scrutiny how one should take the word “πρακτική” and argue that one should avoid taking this word as meaning “practical” in the passage. I will argue in favor of taking it as meaning “active”. The exegetical inconvenience of taking “πρακτική” as meaning “practical” is the fact that it restricts the results achieved in the ergonargument by excluding the possibility of contemplation being considered a eudaimonlife. In the second part, I discuss the expression “λόγονἔχον” and provide some arguments to take it as preliminarily introducing the criterion of division of the virtues that will be spelled out in ENI.13 so that the λόγον-ἔχονpart of the soul here also makes reference to thevirtue of the non-rational part, i.e., virtue of character. I offer a deflationary view by showing that the moral psychology is developed in ENI.7 within the limits imposed by the ergonargument.

In this paper, I put under scrutiny the arguments put forward by Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics (NE) VI.9. The paper has two main parts. In the first, I examine the NE VI.9’s first part where Aristotle develops the concept of good deliberation, offering its definition in 1142b27-28. In the second, I examine the connection between good deliberation and phronesis, and, then, I discuss the vexata quæstio about if the lines 1142b31-33 might be read as introducing the claim that phronesis provides moral ends.