•  31
    Is Open‐mindedness a Moral Virtue?
    Ratio 30 (3): 343-358. 2017.
    Is open-mindedness a moral virtue? Surprisingly, this question has not received much attention from philosophers. In this paper, we fill this lacuna by arguing that there are good grounds for thinking that it is. In particular, we show that the extant account of open-mindedness as a moral virtue faces an objection that appears to show that exercising the character trait may not be virtuous. To offset this objection, we argue that a much stronger argument can be made for the case that open-minded…Read more
  •  17
    The Unity of Definition in the Nicomachean Ethics
    Southwest Philosophy Review 32 (2): 95-113. 2016.
  •  12
    Why Are So Few Generous?
    Southwest Philosophy Review 33 (2): 127-145. 2017.
    To be generous, by Aristotle’s lights, one does not have to be a saint. Rather, Aristotle’s criteria for generosity are ordinary and consistent with the norms of his day. It is surprising, then, to find Aristotle claiming that very few people succeed in being generous. This claim generates a puzzle: if generosity is not extraordinarily demanding, why are so few fulfilling its criteria? The puzzle is not addressed by the literature on generosity, but it is worth addressing for its surprising expl…Read more
  •  6
    Is Aristotelian Generosity a Unified Virtue?
    Polish Journal of Philosophy 10 (2): 17-29. 2016.
    Commentators worry that Aristotelian generosity is a conglomeration of distinct virtues, rather than a single, unified virtue. This paper argues that the virtue of generosity is unified if we recognize that the generous person’s goal lies in promoting friendship — in particular, in ensuring that there is sufficient wealth to support a community of friends. One of the important consequences of this reading is that it reverses the standard interpretation according to which Aristotelian generosity …Read more