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50On fundamental responsibilityPhilosophical Issues 29 (1): 198-213. 2019.Some psychological states—paradigmatically, beliefs and intentions—are rationally evaluable: they can be rational or irrational, justified or unjustified. Other states—e.g. sensations and gastrointestinal states—aren't: they're a‐rational. On a familiar but hard‐to‐make‐precise line of thought, at least part of what explains this difference is that we're somehow responsible for (having/being in) states of the former sort, in a way we're not for the others. But this responsibility can't be modele…Read more
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269Beliefs as dispositions to make judgmentsPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (3): 795-803. 2023.
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567Goodness, availability, and argument structureSynthese 198 10395-10427. 2021.According to a widely shared generic conception of inferential justification—‘the standard conception’—an agent is inferentially justified in believing that p only if she has antecedently justified beliefs in all the non-redundant premises of a good argument for p. This conception tends to serve as the starting-point in contemporary debates about the nature and scope of inferential justification: as neutral common ground between various competing, more specific, conceptions. But it’s a deeply pr…Read more
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237On Fundamental ResponsibilityPhilosophical Issues 29 (1): 198-213. 2019.Some psychological states—paradigmatically, beliefs and intentions—are rationally evaluable: they can be rational or irrational, justified or unjustified. Other states—e.g. sensations and gastrointestinal states—aren’t: they’re a-rational. On a familiar but hard-to-make-precise line of thought, at least part of what explains this difference is that we’re somehow responsible for (having/being in) states of the former sort, in a way we’re not for the others. But this responsibility can’t be modele…Read more
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814Relying on Others: An Essay in Epistemology, by Sanford C. Goldberg (review)Mind 120 (480): 1251-1258. 2011.
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804Review of "Philosophy Without Intuitions" by Herman Cappelen (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. 2013.
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1922Rationalism and the Content of Intuitive JudgementsMind 120 (478): 263-327. 2011.It is commonly held that our intuitive judgements about imaginary problem cases are justified a priori, if and when they are justified at all. In this paper I defend this view — ‘rationalism’ — against a recent objection by Timothy Williamson. I argue that his objection fails on multiple grounds, but the reasons why it fails are instructive. Williamson argues from a claim about the semantics of intuitive judgements, to a claim about their psychological underpinnings, to the denial of rationalism…Read more
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998A Priori Testimony RevisitedIn Albert Casullo & Joshua Thurow (eds.), The A Priori in Philosophy, Oxford University Press. 2013.
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Inland Norway University of Applied SciencesDepartment of Law, Philosophy and International Studies (Lillehammer)Professor
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University of Texas at AustinAssistant Professor
APA Eastern Division
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Mind |