Ansgar Lyssy

I will first provide a brief outline of Iselin’s main work on the philosophy of history, focusing on these questions: What are the aims of universal history? What function does it have? Subsequently, I will examine the particular concept of humanity that is the subject of Iselin’s history. I argue that the subject of universal history is denoted by a kind of hybrid concept that connects morality qua human nature with humankind understood as the collective of all humans - this being Iselin’s most impressive and influential philosophical invention. Regarding the ‘constellation’ that Iselin is situated in, I will briefly argue that the book methodically sketches a unique approach to universal history within the German-speaking world, while making certain advantages and limitations in this project transparent and arguing that it is also the first book to introduce the term "humanity" ("Menschheit") in a prominent place, a term that was to play a central role in late German Enlightenment. I claim that this concept of humanity most likely had a significant impact on Kant’s and Herder’s conceptions of humanity, as a consequence of which some ideas found in both authors can be interpreted as implicit reactions against Iselin.

For Kant, a body fills out space by means of its causal efficacy. The essential properties of matter are hence dependent on underlying forces and it is one task of the Opus postumum (OP) to reconstruct the system of forces. In order to avoid an infinite regress of causal explanations, this system of forces needs to account for a primitive origin of all mechanical moving forces in something that is constitutive of forces, yet radically different - this is the ether that fills all space that constantly moves or vibrates all the parts of the material bodies internally. I argue that we can read Kant’s argument for the existence of the ether through the lens of dispositions: essential properties of matter, such as ponderability, coercibility, cohesibility, and exhaustibility, should be understood as dispositions. These dispositions are ‘physically conditioned,’ as Kant calls it, on the ether. To display their manifest and perceivable properties, the ether acts as the ubiquitous and universal ‘activation stimulus’ of the dispositions that make up material bodies. He causes them to constantly display their manifest properties that make them continuously perceivable and causally efficient. Thereby Kant offers a solution to a problem formulated by Simon Blackburn, namely that purely dispositional matter would lead us into skepticism.

The concept of causality is central to the assessment of numerous related metaphysical and epistemic positions, in Hegel and elsewhere. The present essay tries 1) to understand Hegel’s critique of the merely categorically understood concept of causality; 2) to uncover the theoretical structure that must accompany the categorical concept of causality in order to avoid the problems mentioned above; and 3) to argue that such a theory of causality has a fundamental function for Hegel’s conception of objectivity.

Maupertuis and Euler had an ambivalent and tense relationship to their Leibniz, especially concerning his grounding of physics in metaphysics. Consequently, this paper has two intersecting goals: first, it attempts to flesh out some aspects of the reception of Leibnizian thought in the context of Enlightenment physics, more precisely, in the deduction of the Principle of least action (henceforth PLA). Second, it also highlights a specific approach towards the intersection of physics and metaphysics that was championed by the Berlin Academy, which would not have been well received in Paris or London. To that end, I will briefly examine some aspects of the strategies of argumentation, metaphysical presumptions and self-ascribed methodologies (often quite different from their actual methodology) employed by Maupertuis and Euler in their respective deductions of the PLA.

I propose a reading of Kant’s anthropological project as a theory of integration, emphasizing the role of teleological judgments and explanations plays within it. First, I will take a look at a certain type of teleological knowledge that Kant calls prudence and that consists in finding the appropriate means for an end. Second, I will use this to flesh out my interpretation of Kant’s anthropology as a theory of integration, i.e. as a meta-discipline that strives to unite several distinct disciplines by means of teleological judgments. Third, I will then reconsider what prudence means within this broader, integrative context and, as a consequence, how Kant systematically reframes anthropological prudence in opposition to mere observational physiological knowledge.

It was not so long ago that the dominant picture of Kant’s practical philosophy was formalistic, focusing almost exclusively on his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and Critique of Practical Reason. However, the overall picture of Kant’s wide-ranging philosophy has since been broadened and deepened. We now have a much more complete understanding of the range of Kant’s practical interests and of his contributions to areas as diverse as anthropology, pedagogy, and legal theory. What remains somewhat obscure, however, is how these different contributions hang together in the way that Kant suggests that they must. This book explores these different conceptions of humanity, morality, and legality in Kant as main ‘manifestations’ or ‘dimensions’ of practical normativity. These interrelated terms play a crucial role in highlighting different rational obligations, their source, and their applicability in the face of changing circumstances.

This book investigates various aspects of freedom as developed in the philosophical systems of Kant and Fichte. Freedom, both Kant and Fichte insist, does not mean that we can chose or think independently from all rules or necessity, but rather that we willingly accept a certain kind of submission under these rules. Therefore, the conditions of our knowledge affect and inform our self-understanding, our willing, and the ways we justify our practical choices. The essays in this volume explore both philosophers' conceptions of human freedom as they relate to art, history, politics, and religion. They reveal how integrating freedom into a system of thought is crucial for our understanding of modern philosophy. System and Freedom in Kant and Fichte will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working on Kant, modern philosophy, and German Studies.

This book offers new perspectives on the theoretical elements of the Opus postumum, Kant's project of a final work which remained unknown until eighty years after his death. The contributors read the OP as a central work in establishing the relation between Kant's transcendental philosophy, his natural philosophy, practical philosophy, philosophy of religion, metaphysics, and his broader epistemology. Interpreting the OP is an important task because it helps reveal how Kant himself tried to correct and develop his critical philosophy. It also sheds light on the foundational role of the three Critiques for other philosophical inquiries, as well as the unified philosophical system that Kant sought to establish. The chapters in this volume address a range of topics relevant to the epistemological and theoretical problems raised in the OP, including the transition from the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science to physics as an answer to a deficiency in critical thought; the notion of ether and, more specifically, its transcendental deduction; self-affection and the self-positing of the subject; and the idea of God and the system of ideas in the highest standpoint of transcendental philosophy. Perspectives on Kant's Opus postumum will be of interest to upper-level students and scholars working on Kant.

Kausalität und Teleologie sind zentrale Begriffe in der Philosophie von G. W. Leibniz (1646–1716). Leibniz betont immer wieder, dass das Weltgeschehen zugleich kausal und final bestimmt ist. In epistemologischer Hinsicht bedeutet dies, dass jedes Ereignis sowohl aus seiner Ursache als auch aus seinem Zweck heraus erklärt werden kann. Für die Ontologie gilt, dass physische Ereignisse durch Wirkursachen bestimmt sind, die ihnen zugrundeliegenden Substanzen aber nach Perfektion streben und damit auf Ziele hin ausgerichtet sind. Leibniz entwickelt in diesem Zusammenhang ein komplexes philosophisches System, das diese scheinbar gegenläufigen Ideen integrieren soll und das eine Prinzipienlehre, eine komplexe Substanzontologie, eine Theorie dynamischer Kräfte und eine Organismuskonzeption umfasst. Anders ausgedrückt: Leibniz will die galileische Mechanik mit der aristotelischen Substanzenlehre und der christlichen Schöpfungslehre versöhnen. Ansgar Lyssy macht einen Vorschlag, wie diese metaphysische Synthese zu verstehen ist.

Ansgar Lyssy,Christian Leduc | : Le principe de moindre action fut découvert dans le domaine de l’optique et dans celui de la mathématisation du corps en mouvement à l’intérieur d’une structure de forces. Aussi bien Euler que Maupertuis prennent appui sur une compréhension métaphysique de la nature pour justifier l’extension de ce principe à un principe général de physique. Dans le présent article, je soutiens que les deux croient que la nature elle-même ne saurait employer de moyens inutiles pour ses fins, et est donc économique. Le principe de moindre action peut être compris comme une tentative d’intégrer l’idée métaphysique d’une « économie de la nature » à l’intérieur du domaine de la science. | : The principle of least action was discovered in the realm of optics and in the mathematical properties of a body moving within a framework of forces. Both Euler and Maupertuis rely on a metaphysical understanding of nature to justify the expansion of this principle into a general principle of physics. In this paper, I argue that both believe that nature itself uses no unnecessary means for its ends, thus is economical. The principle of least action can be understood as the attempt to integrate this metaphysical idea of an “economy of nature” into the realm of science