Anthony Jensen

ABSTRACT Nietzsche's texts invite perplexing questions about the justification and objectivity of his ethical views. According to the interpretation suggested here, Nietzsche does not advance a substantive normative ethics, but proposes, based on his ontological idea of will to power, an instrumentalist theory of value. He is not a realist about value—according to him, nothing is intrinsically valuable. However, things, actions, beliefs, and values can be evaluated with reference to their capacities in serving our fundamental quest for power. The central advantage of this interpretation against competing readings is that it attempts to make sense of how an “objective” evaluation fits together with antirealism or nihilism about value, including how the “ethics” of will to power is to be understood alongside the metaphysical and ethical doctrine of eternal recurrence.

Nietzsche, the so-called herald of the 'philosophy of the future', nevertheless dealt with the past on nearly every page of his writing. Not only was he concerned with how past values, cultural practices and institutions influence the present - he was plainly aware that any attempt to understand that influence encounters many meta-historical problems. This comprehensive and lucid exposition of the development of Nietzsche's philosophy of history explores how Nietzsche thought about history and historiography throughout his life and how it affected his most fundamental ideas. Discussion of the whole span of Nietzsche's writings, from his earliest publications as a classical philologist to his later genealogical and autobiographical projects, is interwoven with careful analysis of his own forms of writing history, the nineteenth-century paradigms which he critiqued, and the twentieth-century views which he anticipated. The book will be of much interest to scholars of Nietzsche and of nineteenth-century philosophy.

With his _An Interpretation of Nietzsche’s "On the Uses and Disadvantage of History for Life_", Anthony K. Jensen shows how 'timely' Nietzsche’s second "Untimely Meditation" really is. This comprehensive and insightful study contextualizes and analyzes a wide range of Nietzsche’s earlier thoughts about history: teleology, typology, psychology, memory, classical philology, Hegelianism, and the role historiography plays in modern culture. _On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life_ is shown to be a ‘timely’ work, too, insofar as it weaves together a number of Nietzsche's most important influences and thematic directions at that time: ancient culture, science, epistemology, and the thought of Schopenhauer and Burckhardt. Rather than dismiss it as a mere ‘early’ work, Jensen shows how the text resonates in Nietzsche’s later perspectivism, his theory of subjectivity, and Eternal Recurrence. And by using careful philological analysis of the text’s composition history, Jensen is in position to fully elucidate and evaluate Nietzsche’s arguments in their proper contexts. As such Jensen’s _Interpretation_ should restore Nietzsche’s second "Untimely Meditation" to a prominent place among 19 th Century philosophies of history.

Nietzsche stands alone among the great nineteenth-century philosophers of history to have been trained and employed as an historian. As a classical philologist, he was trained not only in Ancient languages, but also in the methods of critical hermeneutics, textual genealogy, and cultural theory. Despite this there has been comparatively little scholarly attention paid to Nietzsche's most pointed reflection on history: _On the Uses and Disadvantage of History for Life _, the second of his _Untimely Meditations_. In this monograph, Anthony K. Jensen demonstrates how ‘timely’ this work of Nietzsche’s is, revealing a text that offers insight into the most important aspects of Nietzsche’s then-contemporary philosophy of history, including teleological theories, Hegelianism, Positivism, romantic historiography, classical philology, and the role of history in education and politics. Using a straightforward and conversational approach, Jensen contextualizes the figures and movements that serve as Nietzsche’s interlocutors, and situates this text within Nietzsche’s larger philosophical project. Through an examination of Nietzsche's views, the author argues for the contemporary philosophical relevance of _On the Uses and Disadvantage of History for Life_, and advances the scholarly discussion of this oft-overlooked but nevertheless essential text.

Luigi Caranti presents his readers three carefully articulated arguments in this estimable book. The first is that Kant's career-long engagement with Cartesian skepticism culminates in the first Critique's A-edition version of the Fourth Paralogism, rather than in the later Refutation of Idealism, as is more traditionally thought. The second argues that scholars must take Kant seriously when he asserts that transcendental idealism is the only possible refutation of skepticism, since it denies the possibility of the skeptical doubt arising in the first place. Third, on the merit of its solution to this skeptical "scandal of philosophy," transcendental idealism remains today a first-rate epistemological viewpoint.What Caranti means by skepticism is restricted to Descartes's infamous "Evil Genius" hypothesis, the doubt whether any logical inference can establish a causal connection between external objects and the immediately-known affects of the mind . Caranti shows that Kant failed to adequately answer this charge throughout the pre-critical period since he then identified phenomena with mind-dependent representations and noumena with the cause of those representations. That causal argument would never satisfy since it presumed the very inference denied by the skeptic in the first

This article exams the philosophy of history of the now mostly-forgotten 19th Century philosopher, Eduard von Hartmann. Hartmann inverts Hegel’s rational teleology by his reliance on a notion of ‘unconscious ideas’. Purposes are a species of idea. All natural things, including unintelligent natural things, will purposes of which they are often not conscious. These unconscious ideas cannot be held by natural beings that lack intellect, so there must be some supra-naturalistic being, which Hartmann names the Metaphysical Unconscious, that imposes purposes on unconsciously-acting agents. The course of human history is the gradual becoming-conscious of the ends posited by the Metaphysical Unconscious. Insofar as nature always achieves the purposes of the Metaphysical Unconscious this is the best of all possible worlds. Insofar as those purposes are realized irrespective of human happiness, historical progress becomes the gradual assurance of human misery.

The twelve contributors to this volume embody the best in ancient philosophical scholarship from America and Europe. Each author presents a carefully-wrought argument that adds substantially to the literature in their chosen topics.Carlo Natali’s “Socrates’ Dialectic in Xenophon’s Memorabilia” argues for the internal coherence of Xenophon’s conceptions of dialegesthai and dialektikos, and shows how Xenophon portrays elenchos as one method among several Socrates used to encourage his interlocutors to become better citizens. In the eclectic “If You Know What Is Best, You Do It,” Gerhard Seel argues for a weak form of moral intellectualism, the possibility of a deontological Socratic ethics, and for the restriction of “Socratic” knowledge to meta-ethical claims. Charles H. Kahn briefly shows how Plato wrestled with the popular acceptance of hedonism. The strange acceptance of hedonism in the Protagoras is said to be neither straightforwardly ironical nor exactly a thesis Plato himself outright rejected at that time. Terrence Irwin, in “Socrates and Euthyphro,” examines the difference between “god-beloved” and “pious” in terms of a

Nietzsche’s relationship with Burckhardt’s image of the Renaissance was a way of practicing history. Nietzsche shared with Burckhardt the preference for typology, the belief that truth is reached intuitively and concerns the inner identity of all things, and for great cultural historical objects and individuals. And he shared it with him in some part precisely because two of their most significant common influences were Goethe and Schopenhauer. Beyond this, I argue that there are a few minor and a few more significant disjunctions in their approach to the historiography of the Renaissance. I address what we might call the question of motive: that Burckhardt’s purpose in construing the Renaissance was in fact quite opposed to Nietzsche’s more radical gaze upon history.

I argue that, despite similarities between them, Hayden White has fundamentally misunderstood Nietzsche’s philosophy of history. White, like many postmodern historical theorists, attributes to Nietzsche a truth-relativism with respect to historical facts and a value-relativism with respect to the worth of competing interpretations. I show that both of these attributions take insufficient account of Nietzsche’s perspectivism. Nietzsche rejects relativism and endorses interpretations that further the interests of particular types of life. When Nietzsche’s position is properly distinguished from the kind of relativism ascribed by White, it will appear a coherent middle-ground between the positivist construal of historical truth and post-modern truth relativism.

Resumo: A Segunda consideração extemporânea geralmente é tida em conta por filósofos e historiadores, em razão de sua crítica ao que Nietzsche classifica como “doença histórica”,. Isso por uma boa razão: a crítica de Nietzsche tem como alvo não apenas a famosa tríade composta por historiadores monumentais, antiquários e críticos, mas também suas modalidades contemporâneas em historiografia e teleologia científicas. O que frequentes vezes é desconsiderado é que o próprio Nietzsche expõe - ainda que numa retórica altamente estilizada - uma concepção afirmativa da história. Essa concepção, como eu proponho, faz o leitor retornar ao enunciado que inaugura o livro, qual seja, o Ceterum Censeo, de Goethe. A demanda de Nietzsche de que a história serve à vida é uma nova aplicação da teoria de Goethe do crescimento morfológico como consequência de forças polares concorrentes para o reino da história. Uma vez que Goethe tinha os organismos vivos como a crescer por meio de forças em concorrência, também Nietzsche entendia que os indivíduos e culturas cresciam por meio de uma história considerada, acima de tudo, uma espécie de arena competitiva em que se expressam impulsos antagonistas.: The second Untimely Meditation is usually regarded by philosophers and historians for its critique of what Nietzsche labels ‘historische Krankheit’. This is for good reason, as Nietzsche’s critique not only targets the famous triad of Monumental, Antiquarian, and Critical historians, but also his contemporary fashions in scientific historiography and teleology as well. What is too often overlooked is that also Nietzsche exposits -- albeit in highly-stylized rhetoric -- an affirmative vision of history. This vision, I argue, returns the reader to the opening sentence of the book, namely, the Ceterum Censeo from Goethe. Nietzsche’s demand that history serve life is a novel application of Goethe’s theory of morphological growth as a consequence of polar competing forces to the realm of history. As Goethe thought living organisms grow by means of intrinsic competitive forces, so Nietzsche thought individuals and cultures grow by means of a history that is, above all, considered as a sort of competitive arena in which to express antagonistic drives.

The Schopenhauer-Schule was a group of original and diverse thinkers working in the wake of a common inspiration. This paper elucidates Nietzsche’s relationship with these thinkers specifically as concerns their intertwined theories of will. It shows that despite his efforts to suppress and ridicule them, Nietzsche was influenced by the Schopenhauer-Schule and adopted several of their alterations to Schopenhauer. But it will also show that Nietzsche was a heretical member of this school in the sense that his theory of will was not only different from theirs but also subversive. Whereas each member of the Schopenhauer-Schule posits a realist ontology of will, Nietzsche’s perspectivism undercuts the possibility of their ontological realism and puts in its place a semiotical system of expression. As a result of this contextualized framework, Nietzsche’s will to power is revealed, not as an intended reference to a real “thing” in the world, but as a symbol that expresses his perspective about an unknowable reality.

This article traces the evolution of a single concept—Anschauung—in Nietzsche's thinking. It shows that Nietzsche relies to a great extent in his early epistemology on Schopenhauer's romantic notion of Anschauung as a way of apprehending timeless and universal ideas. After The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche begins to use the term to designate the mental process of transference by which stimulation becomes a choate representation. In a third phase of development, Nietzsche abandons any positive use of the term and employs Anschauung instead as a sarcastic watchword for essentialist epistemologies generally. Although it has been nearly ignored in anglophone literature, the changing context of its employment is an essential aspect of Nietzsche's development as a thinker.

Twenty years after the appearance of the first of his three-volume One and Many in Aristotle's Metaphysics, Edward Halper has produced his much anticipated prequel commentary on the opening books of the Metaphysics. Readers of the chronologically prior Central Books will not be disappointed here. The analytic detail, the remarkably comprehensive yet deftly critical attention to the vast history of Aristotle scholarship, the clarity and precision of compositional style—all hallmarks of Halper's earlier work—are here in abundance as he works through his singularly sweeping vision of the unity of Aristotle's book.Halper's central argument is that the problem of the One and the Many is Aristotle's most crucial and pervasive concern in the Metaphysics. While Aristotle himself never declares this—not even in those passages on the Presocratic philosophers where this problem features most prominently—Halper argues convincingly that Aristotle's conviction about the possibility of a science as determined by a necessary degree of unity among the objects it studies must itself assume the solvability of the One and Many problem. As explicated in the