Anton Luis Sevilla

This review highlights The Bloomsbury Research Handbook of Contemporary Japanese Philosophy’s focus on “departures from nothingness.” These departures are seen in four themes: the definition of tetsugaku, interpersonal relationships, culture, and the socio-political sphere. In the first theme, I examine the dialogical character of nothingness and how it might relate with being. In the second, I show how this engagement with being connects to how we relate with the Thou, and examine its particulars in a unique spiritual form of Japanese feminism. In the third, I examine how this relational nothingness connects to society, social imaginaries, and aesthetics. And in the fourth, I delve into the complex interrelationship of nothingness and politics. I end with a note on the philosophical relevance of Yusa’s ordering of these chapters, and the potential of both departing from and returning to nothingness.

This article is a comparative study of bell hooks’s “engaged pedagogy” with Watsuji Tetsurô’s systematic ethics. The purpose of this comparison is twofold. The first reason is to examine the relational view of ethics that underlies hooks’s thought in order to explore her deliberately “un-academic” work in a philosophically rigorous way. The second reason is to examine the fundamental connections of Watsuji’s ethics of human existenceto an education for human becoming. This comparison will be carried out in two stages. First, I will examine the connections of hooks and Watsuji on the level of society and relational structures. Second, I will delve deeper into the existential/spiritual level in the ethics/education of emptiness.

In this book, Sueki discusses the difficult relationship between religion and ethics. He understands ethics as something fundamentally tied to inter-human relationships, which presumes mutual intelligibility. How then do we relate to the "other"—that which cannot be reduced to our comprehension? How do we relate to other cultures, other genders, or even ourselves as unintelligible others? How do we relate with the kami, buddhas, and the dead? Sueki refers to this as the problem of "trans-ethics." He argues that it is religion that has constantly tried to focus on this relationship with the other. In the case of Buddhism, this involves attempts to construct ethics, difficulties with ethics, and transcendence beyond ethics.In particular, he highlights the possible role of the much maligned "funeral Buddhism" in such a Buddhist counter-position to ethics.

Watsuji Tetsuro-’s ethics is founded on the idea of the dual structure of human beings: that we are both individual and communal at the same time, and that these two elements constantly negate each other. But the interpretation of this structure shifts over the prewar, wartime, and postwar volumes. In the first volume, double negation is ambigu­ously explained as either an endless cycle that balances individuality and totality or a three-stage dialectic that privileges totality. Also, total­ity is seen as shaping a largely obedient but self-aware individual, with no real sense of social change worked in. In the second volume, the individual is largely subsumed beneath finite and exclusive totalities, and social change is restricted to advances in culture. But in the third volume, individuality is reinstated as that which guides social change by intuiting how the totality ought to be. Also, double negation is rein­terpreted as heading toward unity-in-difference. These changes can be interpreted historically, with the emphasis on totality rising with the wartime pressures, and the emphasis on individuality rising in postwar occupied Japan. Finally, a historically nuanced and balanced interpretation of Watsuji’s ethics can have contemporary relevance, for instance by contributing to the liberal-communitarian debates.

This paper hopes to contribute to the contemporary East-West and Buddhist-Christian dialogues through a comparative examination of how ethics is founded upon the notion of emptiness and its analogues in the thought of two Japanese thinkers, Nishitani Keiji (1900-1990) of the Kyoto School of Philosophy, Watsuji Tetsuro (1889-1960), and the Russian Christian existentialist Ni-kolai Berdyaev (1874-1948). By comparing and contrasting Nishitani's notion of double-negation (from the standpoint of being to the standpoint of nihility and to the standpoint of emptiness) and how it forms a basis for an ethics of circuminsessional interpenetration, with Watsuji's notion of the double-negation of the individual and society in ethics, and with Berdyaev's double-negation in his three forms of ethics (ethics of law, ethics of redemption, ethics of creativeness) we shall examine the structural similarities and points of non-exclusion of "Eastern" Buddhist philosophy and "Western" Christian philosophy.

Watsuji Tetsurô’s Ethics is one of the most important works in Japanese ethical thought. But scholarly research in English has largely focused on the first of three volumes of Ethics, leaving the latter two oft-neglected. In order to balance out the views of Watsuji’s ethics, this paper focuses on the contributions of the second and third volumes of Ethics. These volumes are essential for any concrete understanding of Watsuji’s ‘ethics of emptiness’. The second volume develops the ideas of the first, particularly how the dual-structure is concretely realized through the various stages of ethical organization. The third volume develops the notions of space and time from the first volume into a theory of climate and history. By analyzing these, we can understand Watsuji’s system as a whole and clarify Watsuji’s unique contribution to ethical theory.

This essay examines how the standpoint of the gaijin (foreigner) shapes and challenges the act of philosophizing, through the experience of overwhelming cultural difference. I examine three challenges the foreigner faces—the need to understand a foreign culture, the need to contribute to a foreign culture, and the need for caution and self-awareness vis-à-vis the excesses and dangers of this attempt. First, through a reading of Thomas Kasulis’ Intimacy or Integrity: Philosophy and Cultural Difference (2002), I take the reader through the experience of trying to understand a foreign culture by examining the kind of relationships that are prioritized in a particular culture. Kasulis discusses intimacy-oriented cultures as those that stress internal relationships between interdependent individuals, and integrity-oriented cultures as those that stress external relationships between autonomous individuals. He then shows how this affects the way this influences the worldview and norms of a particular culture. Next, through a reading of various writings of Watsuji Tetsurô on culture and ethics, I explore the attempt to go beyond cultural difference—seeking a universal standpoint from which one can contribute to or criticize another culture despite cultural difference. I discuss the relationship Watsuji presents between universal ethics and national morality in his “Theory of National Morals” (1932), and connect it with his project in Ethics (1937, 1942/46, 1949) that tries to resolve the contradiction between individuality (integrity) and totality (intimacy) through a “dual-negative structure.” Finally, through an examination of Sakai Naoki’s Translation and Subjectivity: On “Japan” and Cultural Nationalism (1997), I explore the dangers latent in Kasulis’ and Watsuji’s approach. I delve into the danger of schematizing “us vs. them” or “gaijin vs. nihonjin,” which can be present in the attempt to understand cultures. Then I examine Sakai’s warning as to the danger of trying to have a universal standpoint and its tendency to deny the embeddedness of one’s position. Through a dialogue with these three thinkers, I thus attempt to explore in a relatable but nuanced way, what it might mean for the foreigner to confront cultural difference in a manner that both respects cultural difference but transcends it.

This article builds on the growing literature on the Kyoto School of Philosophy and its influences on the field of Education. First, I argue that the influence of the Kyoto School of Philosophy is historically significant in Japan, and that the connection between this philosophical school and the philosophy of education is by no means superficial. Second, I suggest that this school contributes a unique view of ‘negative education’ founded in the philosophical idea of ‘nothingness’. I examine how this negative education is manifest both in religious cultivation and in more general views of education, and I develop these ideas through the models of self-negation proposed by Nishitani Keiji and Hisamatsu Shin'ichi. Third, taking up the Herbartian idea of ‘pedagogical tact’, I analyse the characteristics of the I-Thou relationship, in the vector of nothingness, implicit in the above-mentioned view of education. I examine two approaches to this relationship—one of ‘sharing in nothingness’ as found in Nishitani and Hisamatsu, and one that goes beyond the idea of ‘sharing’ and accommodates alterity, as found in Nishida Kitarô and Nishihira Tadashi. By threshing out these three points, I hope to highlight the continued pedagogical relevance of the philosophical ideas of the Kyoto School.

This paper is an analysis of one theoretical facet of the problem of Buddhist participation in closed nationalist discourses: the essential relationship between the dislocation of subjectivity (or the emptying of ego) and the formation of communities (such as a nation-state or a Volk). Through this, I hope to explore the effects disciplines of subjectivity (including Buddhism) might have on socio-political formations (such as closed nationalism or imperialism). In order to do so, I will compare two key works in which the existential structure of ethical community is examined: Watsuji Tetsurō's Ethics (Rinrigaku jōkan 倫理学 上巻 1937) and Jean-Luc Nancy's The Inoperative Community (La Communauté désœuvrée 1983). In the first section, after briefly introducing the two thinkers, I will examine their views on the basic structure of the individual and community and how it leads to a sense of ethics. In the second section, I will delve into the essential differences between Watsuji and Nancy, beginning with their differing responses to Heidegger's notion of being-toward-death. I will then proceed to a critical re-reading of Watsuji's ethics possible from Nancy's thought. I will end by connecting the results of this comparative study to the problem of Buddhist involvement in immanent nationalism, in hopes of shedding light on one key theoretical aspect of this multi-faceted problem.

Watsuji Tetsurô is famous for having constructed a systematic socio-political ethics on the basis of the idea of emptiness. This essay examines his 1938 essay “The Concept of ‘Dharma’ and the Dialectics of Emptiness in Buddhist Philosophy” and the posthumously published The History of Buddhist Ethical Thought, in order to clarify the Buddhist roots of his ethics. It aims to answer two main questions which are fundamentally linked: “Which way does Watsuji's legacy turn: toward totalitarianism or toward a balanced theory of selflessness?” and “Is Watsuji's systematic ethics Buddhist?” In order to answer these questions, this essay discusses Watsuji's view of dharma, dependent arising, and morality in Hīnayāna Buddhism. It then proceeds to Watsuji's fine-tuning of the concept of emptiness in Mādhyamika and Yogācāra Buddhism. Finally, this essay shows how Watsuji's modernist Buddhist theory connects to his own systematic ethical theory. These two theories share a focus on non-duality, negation, and emptiness. But they differ in their accounts of the relations between the individual and the community, between the “is” and the “ought,” and between hermeneutics and transcendence. These findings give us hints as to Watsuji's origins, pitfalls, and possibilities.