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Don’t Look NowBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (2): 327-350. 2019.
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Evidential Decision TheoryCambridge University Press. 2021.
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Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology, Bob Hale and Aviv Hoffmann (eds) (review)Mind 121 (483): 817-822. 2012.
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The Meaning of Belief: Religion from an Atheist’s Point of View, by Tim Crane (review)Mind 127 (508): 1261-1270. 2018.
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Saul KripkeBloomsbury Academic. 2007.Saul Kripke is one of the most important and original post-war analytic philosophers. His work has undeniably had a profound impact on the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind. Yet his ideas are amongst the most challenging frequently encountered by students of philosophy. In this informative and accessible book, Arif Ahmed provides a clear and thorough account of Kripke's philosophy, his major works and ideas, providing an ideal guide to the important and complex thought of this ke…Read more
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Evidence, Decision and CausalityCambridge University Press. 2014.Most philosophers agree that causal knowledge is essential to decision-making: agents should choose from the available options those that probably cause the outcomes that they want. This book argues against this theory and in favour of evidential or Bayesian decision theory, which emphasises the symptomatic value of options over their causal role. It examines a variety of settings, including economic theory, quantum mechanics and philosophical thought-experiments, where causal knowledge seems to…Read more
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Modern and Medieval Modal SpacesAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 94 (1): 255-273. 2020.The interesting question about modality is not about its extension, but about its point. Everyone can agree (for instance) that the past is necessary in the Ockhamist sense but not in some ‘modern’ senses, and that the present is necessary in the Ockhamist sense but not in the Scotist sense. But why should it matter? These comments on Pasnau (2020) first set out a simple-minded explication in modern terms of some of these fourteenth-century ideas. Then I take issue with (a) Pasnau’s claim that t…Read more
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Frankfurt cases and the Newcomb ProblemPhilosophical Studies 177 (11): 3391-3408. 2020.A standard argument for one-boxing in Newcomb’s Problem is ‘Why Ain’cha Rich?’, which emphasizes that one-boxers typically make a million dollars compared to the thousand dollars that two-boxers can expect. A standard reply is the ‘opportunity defence’: the two-boxers who made a thousand never had an opportunity to make more. The paper argues that the opportunity defence is unavailable to anyone who grants that in another case—a Frankfurt case—the agent is deprived of opportunities in the way th…Read more
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Dicing with deathAnalysis 74 (4): 587-592. 2014.
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Hume and the Independent WitnessesMind 124 (496): 1013-1044. 2015.The Humean argument concerning miracles says that one should always think it more likely that anyone who testifies to a miracle is lying or deluded than that the alleged miracle actually occurred, and so should always reject any single report of it. A longstanding and widely accepted objection is that even if this is right, the concurring and non-collusive testimony of many witnesses should make it rational to believe in whatever miracle they all report. I argue that on the contrary, even multip…Read more
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Objective Value Is Always NewcombizableMind 129 (516): 1157-1192. 2020.This paper argues that evidential decision theory is incompatible with options having objective values. If options have objective values, then it should always be rationally permissible for an agent to choose an option if they are certain that the option uniquely maximizes objective value. But, as we show, if options have objective values and evidential decision theory is true, then it is not always rationally permissible for an agent to choose an option if they are certain that the option uniqu…Read more
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Equal Opportunities in Newcomb’s Problem and ElsewhereMind 129 (515): 867-886. 2020.The paper discusses Ian Wells’s recent argument that there is a decision problem in which followers of Evidential Decision Theory end up poorer than followers of Causal Decision Theory despite having the same opportunities for money. It defends Evidential Decision Theory against Wells’s argument, on the following grounds. Wells's has not presented a decision problem in which his main claim is true. Four possible decision problems can be generated from his central example, in each of which follow…Read more
Cambridge, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Specialization
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |
Philosophy of Probability |
Ludwig Wittgenstein |
Decision Theory |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Religion |
PhilPapers Editorships
Religious Skepticism |