Arvi Särkelä

ABSTRACT There are two traditions of immanent social critique. One of them, prominent in contemporary Frankfurt school critical theory, regards the immanence of critique as a quality of the standard employed. Such a conception of immanent critique needs to show, prior to the concrete practice of critique, how the standard is immanent in the object of critique. Showing this is the task of a “model of immanent critique.” The other tradition, going back to Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit and practiced in particular by Dewey in his later works, regards the immanence of critique as the form of critical practice itself. Because such a conception of immanent critique does not, at the outset, ask how the standard is immanent to its object, it also does not need a model licensing critical practice. Indeed, it must be inherently hostile to any attempt at modeling immanent critique because the immanence lies in the power of critical practice to transform any models it applies.

In this paper we elucidate the notion of ‘social wrongs’. It differs from moral wrongness, and is broader than narrowly political wrongs. We distinguish conceptually monadic wrongness (1.1), dyadic wronging (1.2), and the idea of there being something ‘wrong with’ an entity (1.3). We argue that social and political wrongs share a feature with natural badness or wrongness (illnesses of organisms) as well as malfunctioning artifacts or dysfunctional organizations: they violate so called ought-to-be norms; they are not as they ought to be; there is something wrong with them. In contrast, moral wrongs are violations of ought-to-do norms. Social wrongs typically, but not invariably, include dyadic wronging. We examine who or what can wrong whom or what, and by what means: we can be wronged by individuals and groups, as well as by practices, institutions or structures (2.1–2.3). The notion of structural injustice is compared to the notion of social wrongs in 2.4. Social wrongs are defined as there being something wrong with the social reality (3.3), in comparison to there being something wrong with an organism or a system (3.1), including the narrowly political wrongs of systems of governance (3.2).

This paper is an introduction to the special issue on Pathologies of Recognition. The first subsection briefly introduces the notion of recognition and trace its development from Fichte and Hegel to Honneth and his critics, and the second subsection turns to the concept of a social pathology. The third section provides a brief look at the individual papers. The special issue focuses on two central concepts in contemporary critical social theory: namely ‘recognition’ and ‘social pathology’. For defenders of a theory of recognition, adequate recognition is itself a key normative criterion for analysing social wrongs and pathologies which fall short of the ideal. For critics, the focus on recognition – even at its best – rather conceals social wrongs. While the contributors in this collection represent slightly different approaches, the general consensus amongst them is that recognition as such is a good ideal but like all good ideals it can go wrong in various ways and take pathological forms itself. In this introduction we focus first briefly on the concepts of recognition and social pathology, and finally present the papers of this special issue.

The Critical Naturalism Manifesto is a common platform put forward as a basis for broad discussions around the problems faced by critical theory today. We are living in a time, e.g. a pandemic time, when present-day challenges exert immense pressure on social critique. This means that models of social critique should not be discussed from the point of view of their normative justification or political effects alone, but also with reference to their ability to tackle contemporary problematic issues (like the dismantlement of the welfare state, the environmental catastrophe, and the sanitary crisis). With this manifesto, we invite varying practices of philosophical, artistic and scientific social critique to take seriously the enormous challenges our societies face with regard to inner and outer nature. We first identity eleven theses of critical naturalism which contemporary critical theory should take into consideration. We then identify the historical crises and catastrophes that critical naturalism seeks to respond to, dispelling the prejudices against naturalism in contemporary critical thought, and considering alternative answers to these questions such as social constructivism, accelerationism, xenofeminism, flat ontologism, and monist world ecology. By sketching the notions of nature and naturalism, we anchor critical naturalism in the history of materialism and critical theory, understood initially as that of the Frankfurt School, but expanded and enriched by other approaches to social critique. Finally, we sketch models and projects of critical naturalism, which are exemplary fragments of varying ways to practice naturalist social critique.

This article starts with the idea that the task of social philosophy can be defined as the diagnosis and therapy of social pathologies. It discusses four conceptions of social pathology. The first two conceptions are ‘normativist’ and hold that something is a social pathology if it is socially wrong. On the first view, there is no encompassing characterization of social pathologies available: it is a cluster concept of family resemblances. On the second view, social pathologies share a structure (e.g. second-order disorder). The last two conceptions are ‘naturalist’ and hold that something is wrong because it is pathological. The third view takes it that society is the kind of substance that can fall ill – an organism. The fourth view operates with the notion of a social life that can degenerate. The four conceptions are compared along six criteria: (1) is the view plausible?; (2) is it informative (if true)?; (3) does it help define the task of social philosophy?; (4) does it take naturalistic vocabulary seriously?; (5) does it hold that pathologies share a structure?; and (6) how does it see the primacy of being wrong and being pathological?

This article attempts to present the unity as well as the difference between Hegel’s and Dewey’s social philosophical approaches to struggles for recognition. It argues that interpreting Dewey’s Lectures in China as a commentary on Hegel sheds new light on Dewey’s social philosophy as a recognition theoretical whole. Furthermore, the resulting “experimentalist” account of recognitive relations, norms and values might turn out to present a fruitful perspective in contemporary discussions on recognition

A striking feature of John Dewey’s philosophical attitude in his later period is that for self-description, he did not prefer the term “pragmatism.” Instead, he employed such isms as “experimentalism” and “naturalism.” In the period in which he moved towards developing his own original philosophy, he even stated that “I reject root and branch to the term ‘pragmatism.’”1 As he was at the time drawn to naturalism, it might be revealing indeed that he rejects “root and branch” to “pragmatism.” Also in the newly released notes for his lectures on social philosophy in China 1919, the word “pragmatism” goes without a single mention.2 The reader does not encounter the creed for a “pragmatist social...

Critical social theories are generally understood to be distinct from other normative theories by their explicit orientation toward emancipation: they not only present normative criteria for assessing the legitimacy or justification of social institutions or merely inquire into the actualized freedom of a given form of social life but claim to point toward a “freedom in view”—an end that might aid those participating in social struggles to overcome the pathological, alienated, or ideological social order of the present. John Dewey’s social theory clearly cherishes this ideal of social criticism. It contributes to a critical social inquiry in a variety of ways, some of which, so we believe, are still to be...

At the centre of Adorno’s critical theory of society lies the problem of Bann or Bannkreis: why do individuals systematically act in ways that reinforce conditions that are obviously incompatible with their freedom and pursuit of happiness? Despite criticism of Dewey’s experimentalism by several Frankfurt School critical theorists claiming that the American pragmatist fails to account for systematic blockages to critique, Dewey does in fact formulate his approach to social critique as a response to the problem that social life might be made immune to transformative claims. In Human Nature and Conduct, thirty years prior to Adorno’s Bannkreis, he conceptualizes a ‘vicious circle’ in which attempts to transform social life seem to be caught and points to a way out. This article shows that Adorno and Dewey share in a project at the heart of critical theory, the project of a disclosing critique of society. In different and mutually completing ways, the Frankfurt School critical theorist and the American pragmatist point out the extent to which their contemporary societies are caught in antagonistic and painful vicious circles and thereby point to the objective possibility of another form of social life. The article is historical, but it is animated by the intent to brush a fruitful path for disclosing critique today. From Adorno, this critical practice gains the idea that theory of society can be a disclosing gesture, which presents an important corrective to Dewey’s failure to trace the eclipse of the public. From Dewey, it gets a reminder that these theories must find ways to continue into ordinary life experience through group action for their disclosure to come full circle.

At the centre of Adorno’s critical theory of society lies the problem of Bann or Bannkreis: why do individuals systematically act in ways that reinforce conditions that are obviously incompatible with their freedom and pursuit of happiness? Despite criticism of Dewey’s experimentalism by several Frankfurt School critical theorists claiming that the American pragmatist fails to account for systematic blockages to critique, Dewey does in fact formulate his approach to social critique as a response to the problem that social life might be made immune to transformative claims. In Human Nature and Conduct, thirty years prior to Adorno’s Bannkreis, he conceptualizes a ‘vicious circle’ in which attempts to transform social life seem to be caught and points to a way out. This article shows that Adorno and Dewey share in a project at the heart of critical theory, the project of a disclosing critique of society. In different and mutually completing ways, the Frankfurt School critical theorist and the American pragmatist point out the extent to which their contemporary societies are caught in antagonistic and painful vicious circles and thereby point to the objective possibility of another form of social life. The article is historical, but it is animated by the intent to brush a fruitful path for disclosing critique today. From Adorno, this critical practice gains the idea that theory of society can be a disclosing gesture, which presents an important corrective to Dewey’s failure to trace the eclipse of the public. From Dewey, it gets a reminder that these theories must find ways to continue into ordinary life experience through group action for their disclosure to come full circle.

Adorno’s reading of Hegel’s theory of civil society shapes his way of addressing the core question of his critical theory of society: “Why do social crises not lead to social transformation?” Our chapter investigates the philosophical innovations at the heart of Hegel’s and Adorno’s respective approaches to the problems revealed by the antagonisms of civil society. We will do this by asking the questions: 1. How does Hegel conceive of the antagonistic structure of civil society? 2. How does Hegel conceive of the way civil society addresses crises of legitimacy? 3. How does Adorno think of the way modern welfare states silence crises of legitimacy? 4. How does Adorno’s conception of Bannkreis aim to illuminate the root structure of how all antagonistic societies silence crises of legitimacy? We will thereby focus on the basic antagonism at work in both Adorno’s and Hegel’s theories of society: the antagonism between the overwhelming power of social orders over individuals, and the fragile power of individuals to demand legitimacy from their social orders. First, we will briefly sketch Adorno’s surprisingly affirmative reading of Hegel’s theory of civil society. We then go on to assess what role antagonism plays in the latter. We will argue that Hegel sees education (Bildung) as the central operator in reconciling the antagonisms of civil society. This will allow us to take a new look at Adorno’s social theory as tracing Bannkreis through a plurality of models, which discloses the reproduction of the social totality as a form of counter-education (Halbbildung). We ultimately argue that Adorno conceptualises Bannkreis as an answer to the question of Hegel’s account of world-spirit that revives the insights of Hegel’s conception of civil society. We conclude by taking a closer look at how Bildung turns into the counter-education of Bannkreis, and what potential for socially transformative practice this dialogue between Adorno and Hegel uncovers.

ABSTRACT This article articulates the idea of a disclosing critique of society. It starts from the assumption that the curiously organicistic undertones of Adorno’s negative social ontology is part and parcel of a disclosing gesture in his social criticism. It then traces Adorno’s debate with social organicists to the point where the critical theorist’s own concept of society emerges with a claim to be critical in itself. It is argued that this critical claim is enforced by a disclosing gesture. To articulate what is at stake in this gesture of critical disclosure a parallel is drawn, and contrast made, to Emerson’s conception of disclosure as “drawing a circle around a circle”. The relationship between Adorno’s and Emerson’s conceptions of critical disclosure is complex. However, their juxtaposition allows for a distinction between two directions of critical disclosure. It will be argued that disclosing critique of society can be understood as an exemplary dissociation from alienated society by means of a creative association of empirical knowledge, poetic description and philosophical speculation by a critic standing, as it were, with one foot inside and the other outside our form of life.

Anhand einer textnahen Auseinandersetzung mit den Werken Hegels, Deweys und der Kritischen Theorie wird in diesem Buch der Begriff einer immanent-kritisch verfahrenden, naturalistischen Sozialphilosophie entwickelt. In einem ersten Schritt skizziert der Autor eine Konzeption der immanenten Kritik als einer selbsttransformativen sozialen Praxis, die in einem Dialog zwischen dem Philosophen und den alltäglichen Kritikern besteht. Darauf folgt eine Kartographie der ontologischen Voraussetzungen und metaphysischen Implikationen, die eine erfolgreiche philosophische Gesellschaftskritik nach Hegel und Dewey machen muss. Es wird ein Begriff des Sozialen entwickelt, der nicht rein normativ ist; das Soziale wird nicht vom Rest der Natur abgekoppelt, sondern als ein eigentümlicher Lebensprozess artikuliert. Schliesslich wird Gesellschaftskritik als eine Kunst dargestellt, die dieses soziale Leben umgestaltet. "Wie aus einem Guss ist [...] das Programm, das Arvi Särkelä hier mit rhetorischem Geschick, theoretischem Scharfsinn und philosophischer Umsicht entfaltet, und es bedarf sicherlich keiner grossen Fantasie, um sich klarzumachen, dass sein Buch die Diskussionen innerhalb der Sozialphilosophie nachhaltig beeinflussen wird." Axel Honneth.

John Dewey entwickelt eine naturalistische Sozialontologie. Dieser geht es allerdings nicht nur darum, eine regionale Ontologie der sozialen Realität zu erarbeiten, sondern stets auch darum, die Realität selbst als sozial zu begreifen. Das Soziale stellt für ihn sowohl ein Prinzip der ganzen Realität, als auch einer besonderen Existenzweise dieser Realität unter anderen dar, nämlich derjenigen der menschlichen Sozialität im engeren Sinn, wie in einem ersten Schritt gezeigt wird. Im weiteren Verlauf dieses Beitrags wird Deweys Auffassung des Sozialen im engeren Sinn der menschlichen Sozialität konturiert, indem seine Vorwegnahme vieler Debatten der gegenwärtigen Sozialontologie aber auch die Originalität seines Ansatzes gewürdigt werden: Dewey diskutiert nämlich in seinem Spätwerk die ontologische Konstitution von sozialen Gruppen, Personen, Gewohnheiten, Sitten und Institutionen sowie die Funktion, die sozialontologische Überlegungen in der Gesellschaftskritik ausüben können.