•  102
    Furthering the Case for Anti-natalism: Seana Shiffrin and the Limits of Permissible Harm
    South African Journal of Philosophy 31 (1): 104-116. 2012.
    Anti-natalism is the view that it is (almost) always wrong to bring people (and perhaps all sentient beings) into existence. This view is most famously defended by David Benatar (1997, 2006). There are, however, other routes to an anti-natal conclusion. In this respect, Seana Shiffrin’s paper, “Wrongful Life, Procreative Responsibility, and the Significance of Harm” (1999), has been rather neglected in the natal debate. Though she appears unwilling to conclude that procreation is always wrong, I…Read more
  •  86
    The Hypothetical Consent Objection to Anti-Natalism
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (5): 1135-1150. 2018.
    A very common but untested assumption is that potential children would consent to be exposed to the harms of existence in order to experience its benefits. And so, would-be parents might appeal to the following view: Procreation is all-things-considered permissible, as it is morally acceptable for one to knowingly harm an unconsenting patient if one has good reasons for assuming her hypothetical consent—and procreators can indeed reasonably rely on some notion of hypothetical consent. I argue th…Read more