Athanasia Giasoumi

At the beginning of the "Phaedrus", Socrates distinguishes between two kinds of people: those who are more complex, violent and hybristic than the monster Typhon, and those who are simpler, calmer and tamer (230a). I argue that there are also two distinct types of Eros (Love) that correlate to Socrates’s two kinds of people. In the first case, lovers cannot attain recollection because their souls are disordered in the absence of self-knowledge. For the latter, the self-knowledge of self-disciplined lovers renders them capable of recollecting the Forms by ordering their souls naturally.

This paper challenges the prevailing interpretations about the role and function of recollection in Plato’s Meno by suggesting that recollection is a cognitive process inaugurated by a myth. This process sets out the methodological and epistemological context within which two transitions are attainable: on the one hand, the methodological transition from the elenchus to the method of hypothesis, and on the other hand, the cognitive upshift from opinion(s) to knowledge. This paper argues, furthermore, that Socrates uses the myth of recollection just when Meno begins to object and tries to give up on their inquiry. Socrates’ myth accordingly imprints on Meno’s soul a true belief that facilitates the process of recollection by emboldening Meno to continue the inquiry.

Η παρούσα διατριβή πραγματεύεται τη σχέση που συνδέει την μυθική σύνθεση και την διαλεκτική μέθοδο στο πλατωνικό έργο. Οι περισσότεροι μελετητές, βασιζόμενοι στις ποιητικές κριτικές του Πλάτωνος στην Πολιτεία, υποστηρίζουν ότι ο φιλόσοφος εξορίζει την ποίηση και την τέχνη εν γένει, από την ιδανική πολιτεία του, και, κατά συνέπεια, δεν θα έπρεπε ο ίδιος να συνθέτει και να χρησιμοποιεί μύθους. Ενάντια σε αυτή τη θεώρηση, επιχειρώ να δείξω, αφενός, ότι ο Πλάτων διακρίνει δύο είδη ποιήσεως· το ένα το υιοθετεί, το άλλο το εξορίζει. Στην πρώτη περίπτωση, η ποίηση είναι ωφέλιμη, διότι καθιστά αρμονικές και ενάρετες τις ψυχές των πολιτών, τρέφοντας στον κατάλληλο βαθμό το ενδιάμεσο ψυχικό τμήμα, δηλαδή το θυμοειδές, και συναρμόζοντας το με το ανώτερο, ήτοι το λογιστικό. Στη δεύτερη, είναι επιβλαβής, επειδή ενσπείρει σε αυτές τη δυσαρμονία και τη διαφθορά, ενδυναμώνοντας υπερβολικά την υποδεέστερη ψυχική δύναμη, που είναι το επιθυμητικό. Βάσει της ανωτέρω διάκρισης, υποστηρίζω ότι τα πλατωνικά μυθολογήματα συνιστούν πρότυπα της απλής και ωφέλιμης μυθολογίας και ότι η χρήση τους αποσκοπεί στην εγχάραξη της αρετής στις ψυχές των αναγνωστών/ακροατών τους. Εισηγούμαι, επιπλέον, ότι ο μύθος, ως πλατωνική σύνθεση, εμφανίζεται μετά την εισαγωγή της θεωρίας της ανάμνησης και της υποθετικής μεθόδου στον Μένωνα, γεγονός που καταδεικνύει ότι η λειτουργία του πλατωνικού μύθου είναι, θεμελιωδώς, συνυφασμένη με την πλατωνική μέθοδο.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:From Death to Life: Key Themes in Plato’s Phaedo by Franco TRABATTONIAthanasia A. GiasoumiTRABATTONI, Franco. From Death to Life: Key Themes in Plato’s Phaedo. Boston: Brill, 2023. 190 pp. Cloth, $143.00In his comprehensive study of the Phaedo, Franco Trabattoni challenges the conventional interpretation of Plato’s thought by denying that Plato was ever a dogmatist or a skeptic. The opening chapter proposes that Plato employs a “third way” standing on the Parmenidean distinction between dôxa (belief) and epistēme (knowledge). According to Trabattoni, the Phaedo (together with all other dialogues dealing with the distinction between sensible and intelligible reality) implies that knowledge of the forms can be obtained only after the separation of body and soul and only without the assistance of intermediaries. He contends that humans have no better instrument than lôgos to discover the intelligible realities (forms) that philosophy seeks. However, because lôgos serves as an intermediary, he believes that the mediation of lôgos introduces an unavoidable fault into the cognitive process, which is directly linked to the concept of dôxa. He maintains that this hypothesis is essential for the arguments presented in the Phaedo’s first part to make sense.Trabattoni delves into the Phaedo not just philosophically but also linguistically, particularly in passage 60c, where Cebes brings up the question of suicide. Notably, in chapter 2, Trabattoni provides a new translation of this passage that contrasts with the readings supplied by Dorter, Gallop, and Boter. Trabattoni claims that Plato responds to the problem of suicide by adhering to the eudaemonistic stance that no obligation that goes against the happiness of the individual subject to it is of any value.Chapter 3 features a counterargument to the predominant viewpoint positing an inconsistency between the Phaedo and the Republic. Trabattoni asserts that these dialogues agree in maintaining that true virtue can be ascribed only to those who believe in metaphysical realities and possess an exclusive desire to acquire knowledge of them. He posits that the disparities between the two dialogues can be attributed primarily to differing perspectives rather than a significant theoretical divide.In my opinion, chapter 4 is the book’s most interesting and original portion. Here, Trabattoni argues that Plato’s contrast in the Phaedo between genuine and false philosophers is directed at Antisthenes, specifically, that Plato opposes his Socratism to Antisthenes’ by depicting the Platonic Socrates as a genuine philosopher (philōsophos) in contrast to Antisthenes’ Socrates, who is portrayed as a false one (philōdoxos). According to Trabattoni, Plato endeavors to provide what Antisthenes’ portrayal of Socrates does not, namely, a metaphysical perspective that differentiates between opinion and truth. Though novel and charming, Trabattoni’s interpretation is not supported by the text since the Phaedo makes no direct allusion to Antisthenes’ Socrates, mentioning Antisthenes only at the beginning (58b) as someone present at Socrates’ last moments. Thus, the book’s strongest section could also be considered its weakest.Chapter 5 argues that the recollection theory is not intended to establish the possibility of a complete retrieval of the knowledge of the forms. [End Page 163] Trabattoni disagrees with Scott’s and others’ assertion that recollection is a method of inquiry on the grounds that Socrates never explains how the alleged “method” of recollection should be applied. Rather, Trabattoni contends, the function of recollection is to explain why human intellective knowledge cannot exceed the boundary of dôxa. Trabattoni argues further that the recollection theory indicates that only when the soul is separated from the body, that is, when a person dies, is it possible to gain knowledge of the forms.Chapters 6 and 7 examine in depth the philosophical, methodological, and linguistic aspects of the objections raised by Cebes and Simmias as well as Socrates’ ensuing arguments regarding the immortality of the soul. Additionally, Trabattoni explores the historical background of Plato’s Phaedo and the impact on it of Pythagoreanism, Orphism, and Eleatic philosophy.Chapter 8 is another particularly captivating section. It offers a fresh perspective on the concept of the “second voyage” (deũteros ploũs), challenging the prevailing interpretation, on which the second voyage signifies the triumph of the...