Benoit Guilielmo

What kind of mental state is suspension, according to Sextus Empiricus? Recently, this question has been addressed by attributing to Sextus a metacognitive account of suspension (Dunphy 2023). Roughly, this means that, for Sextus, suspension constitutively involves a particular attitude – namely, a higher-order belief about one’s own epistemic standing. This reading clashes with the standard view, on which Sextan suspension is not a distinctive doxastic attitude. In this paper I challenge that revisionary interpretation and use it as a springboard to argue that Sextan suspension should instead be understood as a kind of affective state.

Are doubt and suspension of judgment similar attitudes? In the burgeoning literature on suspension of judgment, the notion of doubt is curiously absent. This paper aims to argue for the plausibility of an identity claim, which I term the “No-Difference View.” This view suggests that there is no substantial difference between being in doubt and suspending judgment. The argument will draw on historical and systematic considerations that support the No-Difference View as a plausible view within the logical space of positions.

This article aims to contribute to the elucidation of the nature of inquiry. I start with some common desiderata for any theory of inquiry. I then categorize inquiry as a structured process. By focusing on its essential components, I advance a new characterization of inquiry as a combination of questioning attitudes guiding actions. Finally, I turn to the recent objection that questioning attitudes are not necessary for inquiry. I argue that inquiry is a structured process essentially constituted by questioning attitudes having two precise functional roles, initiating and guiding the deployment of cognitive capacities towards an epistemic goal.