•  217
    Who Is I?
    with Eros Corazza and Jonathan Gorvett
    Philosophical Studies 107 (1): 1-21. 2002.
    Whilst it may seem strange to ask to whom "I" refers, we show that there are occasions when it is not always obvious. In demonstrating this we challenge Kaplan's assumption that the utterer, agent and referent of "I" are always the same person. We begin by presenting what we regard to be the received view about indexical reference popularized by David Kaplan in his influential 1972 "Demonstratives" before going on, in section 2, to discuss Sidelle's answering machine paradox which may be thought…Read more
  •  171
  •  30
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3). 2004.
    Book Information Perception. Perception Barry Maund , Chesham : Acumen Publishing , 2003 , 240 , £12.95 ( paper ) By Barry Maund. Acumen Publishing. Chesham. Pp. 240. £12.95 (paper:).
  •  15
    Disjunctivism and Non-Disjunctivism: Making Sense of the Debate
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (1): 119-127. 2004.
  •  1179
    Relationalism and the problems of consciousness
    Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 28 (3): 167-80. 2008.
    Recent attempts to show that functional processing entails the presence of phenomenal consciousness have failed to deliver the kind of answers to the “problems of consciousness” that anti-materialists insist the functionalist must provide. I will illustrate this by focusing on the claims that there is a special “Hard Problem” of consciousness and an “explanatory gap” between functional and phenomenal facts. I then argue that if we supplement the functionalist stories with a relationalist concept…Read more
  •  179
    Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion
    Oxford University Press. 2009.
    In the first monograph in this exciting area since then, William Fish develops a comprehensive disjunctive theory, incorporating detailed accounts of the three ...
  •  1322
    Disjunctivism, indistinguishability, and the nature of hallucination
    In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, Oxford University Press. pp. 144--167. 2008.
    In the eyes of some of its critics, disjunctivism fails to support adequately the key claim that a particular hallucination might be indistinguishable from a certain kind of veridical perception despite the two states having nothing other than this in common. Scott Sturgeon, for example, has complained that disjunctivism ‘‘offers no positive story about hallucination at all’’ (2000: 11) and therefore ‘‘simply takes [indistinguishability] for granted’’ (2000: 12). So according to Sturgeon, what t…Read more
  •  43
    'New Essays on Singular Thought', edited by Robin Jeshion
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3). 2012.
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 90, Issue 3, Page 617-618, September 2012
  •  87
    Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2009.
    Disjunctivism, as a theory of visual experience, claims that the mental states involved in a “good case” experience of veridical perception and a “bad case” experience of hallucination differ, even in those cases in which the two experiences are indistinguishable for their subject. Consider the veridical perception of a bar stool and an indistinguishable hallucination; both of these experiences might be classed together as experiences (as) of a bar stool or experiences of seeming to see a bar st…Read more
  •  135
    Perception, hallucination, and illusion: reply to my critics (review)
    Philosophical Studies 163 (1): 57-66. 2013.
    This book provides the first full-length treatment of disjunctivism about visual experiences in the service of defending a naive realist theory of veridical visual perception. It includes detailed theories of hallucination and illusion that show how such states can be indistinguishable from veridical experiences without sharing any common character
  •  1266
    Under the general heading of what we might loosely call emotional states, a familiar distinction can be drawn between emotions (strictly so-called) and moods. In order to judge under which of these headings a subject’s emotional episode falls, we advance a question of the form: What is the subject’s emotion of or about? In some cases (for example fear, sadness, and anger) the provision of an answer is straightforward: the subject is afraid of the loose tiger, or sad about England’s poor performa…Read more
  •  125
    In ‘On McDowell's identity conception of truth’ , we suggested that McDowell's Identity Theory, according to which a proposition is true if and only if it is identical with a fact, is only fully understood when we realize that there are two identity claims involved. The first is that, when one thinks truly, the content of a whole thought is identical with a Tractarian Tatsachen – a complex fact constituted by simple Sachverhalte – and the second is that these simple Sachverhalte are in turn iden…Read more
  •  139
    Disjunctivism and non-disjunctivism: Making sense of the debate
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (1): 119-127. 2005.
    During the 'What is Realism?' symposium at the 2001 Joint Session, Professor Ayers raised a number of objections to the disjunctive theory of perception. However in his reply, Professor Snowdon protested that Ayers had failed to adequately engage with the disjunctivist's position. This apparent lack of engagement suggests that the terms of this debate are not as clear as they might be. In the light of this, the current paper offers a way in which we might shed light on the underlying nature of t…Read more
  •  235
    Introduction: Three key principles -- Sense datum theories -- Adverbial theories -- Belief acquisition theories -- Intentional theories -- Disjunctive theories -- Perception and causation -- Perception and the sciences of the mind -- Perception and other sense modalities.