Björn Freter

In the so-called modern age, a transition can be observed in Western thought regarding this issue of tolerance. A perceptible shift can be seen in the understanding of tolerance as mere endurance to attempts to conceive of tolerance as a kind of well-grounded acceptance. It is regrettable, however, that this change in thinking has often remained hypothetical rather than heuristic. This certainly has to do with the fact that most of the time only large-scale theological, philosophical, or political projects were negotiated. In this case, as is often happens, the directly concerned individual, the concrete person in the course of the demonstration efforts, was lost. We want to counter this loss with our study. In our investigation, which is based on a phenomenological reflection, we want to examine tolerance and respect as an existential problem couched within an individual. We wish to consider a person who desires to be tolerant and respectful; a person who accepts tolerance and respect as an existential task.

There is a fundamental flaw in the Eurocentric epistemological foundation. Counter to the overwhelming ethos of the Enlightenment this epistemological bedrock shockingly does not seem to be an epistemology of the human being, but only of the white human being. I, as Western scholar, have to relativize my epistemological heritage, because it does not take into account the diversity of the human being. I will briefly explore the racist views of Voltaire, Hume and Kant and I will argue that Western philosophy needs to (re)analyze its epistemological tradition with regards to the way the racist views of its protagonists corrupted their philosophical work. I suggest contextualization of the philosophical tradition and its desuperiorisation in order to foster ethical philosophical dialogue amongst global scholars.

Through the vehicle of Nicolas Sarkozy’s so-called “Dakar Address” we will analyse the West’s persisting lack of insight into the need for a Western decolonization. We will try to identify the dangers that come from this refusal, such as the abidance in colonial patterns, the enduring self-understanding as superior com-pared to Africa, and the persisting unwillingness to accept the colonial guilt. Decolonization has to be understood as a two-fold business. Decolonization is over-coming endured and perpetrated violence. It is not only important that the colonial oppressed regain strength, it is equally important that the perpetrator of colonial violence understand their excess of violence and work on effecting its return impossible. We explain how Western thinking remains dangerous and untrustwor-thy if it refuses its own decolonization. Finally, we will draw attention to a fundamental pattern of Western thought that clashes with the fundamental values of the West: contempt. In a final step we suggest how this contempt can be overcome through desuperiorisation and the establishment of elative ethics.

According to Democritus' anthropogeny is a microcosmic consequence within the process of cosmogony. However, the case of man is a peculiarity: man, this atom complex, is well aware of himself, yet is not aware of what he must do. Man does not naturally do that which promotes the harmonious ordering of his atoms. We must create a second nature. Now it becomes possible for us to be as we must be according to our first nature. Democritus is the is first thinker who explains to us what our nature is and who, from our being, derives an ought: he who wishes to do the right thing for both himself and others finds himself subject to the ought requirement to do that which brings the most calm to the atoms. This is a direct connection between being and ought, an extravagant mechanical existentialism.

This Handbook provides in one volume rich, comprehensive and rigorous coverage of specific subject areas and thematic concerns in the ever-evolving academic discipline of African philosophy. This Handbook is unique in its focus on central and emerging areas within African philosophy such as Afro-communitarian philosophy, ethics, epistemology, social and political philosophy, existentialism, philosophy of religion, gender philosophy, philosophy of education, phenomenology, transhumanism, African philosophy futures, and philosophy of the non-human. The thirty-two chapters in this Handbook explore the rich textual and non-textual forms of philosophical knowledge in Africa and adequately represent the broad and diverse scope of African philosophy, showing the richness and depth of the philosophical tradition. This reference work is indispensable to students and researchers in African philosophy, comparative philosophy and world philosophies.

Care, we suspect, is initiated with an appeal. Something appeals to us which becomes a matter of concern. In accordance with this concern, we develop a volition: we want that which promotes the thriving – even to the smallest extent – of that which has appealed to us, regardless of how we may establish what that entails. Eventually we take practical action: we act according to our volition. Immediately after this has taken effect, as the case may be, we release the source of the appeal from our care. As far as we can see, this quartet – appeal, concern, volition and practice – covers the four constitutive moments of care, although these moments are only theoretically separable from one another. The practice, as we have said, follows the volition. The volition, however, has arisen because we wanted to foster the wellbeing, however we may have recognised this, of the subject from which the initial appeal came. We have thus placed our volition in the service of this wellbeing, that is to say: we have subjected ourselves to an ought which we instantiated ourselves with the acceptance of the appeal. This seems to us to be the decisive point: in the act of caring, we instantiate an ought, a regulative element, which we then willingly follow. In the process of caring, we thus bring forth an ought, from our own being as it were – and as short-lived as this may be – to which we subject ourselves: in the process of caring, normativity only appears at all because we produce a will in the interest of the subject of the initial appeal to which we then dedicate ourselves, as if this were not our own will. Normativity is thus, as we further suspect, to be understood as a descriptive term of a phenomenology of care, or indeed a phenomenology of normativity. The phenomenon of caring provides the first indication that the ought arises directly from the practical experience of our lives. The phenomenology of care seems to us to be of eminent importance for health care ethics. To denote professional caring, we use the term nursing. The professional caregiver purposefully exposes him/herself to appeals, making him/herself receptive to such an appeal and reliably allowing the appeal to become a concern. The first fundamental principle of nursing ethics thus appears to us to be: to make known one’s receptiveness to an appeal – in a particular situation at a particular time – and to process this appeal reliably such that it becomes a concern. This encompasses the professionalism of care at its initiation. We believe that a precise phenomenology of care will provide, on the one hand, an exact understanding of the genesis of normativity, and on the other hand, in its practical application, a definition of the professional care that is nursing and an ethics of nursing for the care-giving professions.

Man suffers from a very particular fate, namely that of being besieged by questions which he cannot answer and cannot ignore either. The ability to pose questions like these is a key characteristic of the fundamental existential situation of mankind. Every person must find his or her own particular method of coping with such questions. This makes up a significant part of the human maturing process. People with dementia, having already found their personal solution to cope with the problem of these unanswerable questions, radically stumble into this existential situation once again. The problem of this repetition is that the people with dementia can only make limited use, if indeed any use at all, of their previously successful biographical strategies. The drama of human existence as such thus repeats itself within a person with dementia. We must recognise the seriousness of this task. We thus must support people with dementia in coping existentially with this renewed task in the best possible way. The existential dignity of this task is no different from that of a young person. This insight is very important for the care of patients: people with dementia should be recognised as a people in an existential situation.

PEGIDA befürchtet die Abschaffung des deutschen Volkes. Getreu dem Thema unserer Ausgabe wollen wir ›hinter die Kulissen‹ dieser Befürchtung blicken und einen ernsthaften Versuch unternehmen, PEGIDA zu verstehen. Wir werden dabei – zumindest ausgehend von unserer Interpretationsgrundlage – allerdings nicht die um poli-tische deutsche Identität besorgten Bürger finden, sondern einen Bürger, den es schlicht an Bereitschaft fehlt, ihre Werte zu verteidigen. Das Paradoxon, politisch aktiv zu sein, und Politik im Gleichen zu boykottieren, ruht auf einer – absichtlichen? – Verwechslung von Freiheit des Handelns und Freiheit des Denkens.

Goethe’s religiousness is characterised by a plethora of critically and productively adopted elements. Our study will concentrate on the adopted elements from the field of philosophy and from the “New Testament”. Goethe is most of all concerned with the sacred that is present in the origin of all things, and with the continual celebration of this sanctity. Goethe's Religiosität zeichnet sich durch eine Vielzahl von kritischen und produktiven Aneignungen aus. Unsere Studie konzentriert sich auf die Aneignungen aus der Philosophie und dem "Neuen Testament". Es geht Goethe um das Heilige, das im Ursprung aller Dinge liegt und um die andauernde Feier dieses Heiligen.

Vermutlich ist nahezu jeder Tierethiker schon aufgefordert worden, sich nicht darüber mitzuteilen, wie es in moderner Massentierhaltung zugeht, denn das verdürbe doch die Möglichkeit, Fleisch weiterhin zu genießen. Diese Aufforderung ist reichlich merkwürdig. Denn sie kommt eigentlich zu spät. Der Mensch, der nicht mehr weiter über die Massentierhaltung hören will, hat offenkundig schon genug gehört, um zu wissen, dass eine erneute, eine tiefere Vergegenwärtigung eine ihm liebgewonnene Praxis verderben würde: Es ist mithin die (durch den Tierethiker nur bemerkbar gemachte) höchste eigene Erkenntnis, die seinen Fleischgenuss bedroht. Es scheint als versuche hier ein Mensch, eine Erkenntnis und das dieser Erkenntnis nachlaufende Drängen in ihrem Sinne praktisch zu werden, wieder unerkannt zu machen. Mit diesem Ansinnen will ein Mensch, der eine Grenze überschritten hat, die er, wie er selbst erkannt hat, nicht hätte überschreiten sollen – woher auch immer diese Erkenntnis stammt – dennoch überschreitbar machen will. Dieser Mensch will den Zwang, der doch aus ihm selbst herauskommt, nicht kennen, nicht begreifen. Das Begriffene und das aus dem Begriffenen den Menschen selbst unmittelbar ergreifende Tunwollen wird zu annihilieren versucht. Das ist im wörtlichen Sinne ein Nihilismus, eine Selbstverstümmelung des eigenen Denkens und des eigenen Herzens. Gegen diesen Nihilismus möchten wir für den Veganismus argumentieren als (eine mögliche) praktische Konsequenz, die höchste eigene Abscheu gegen das Töten und zugleich sich selbst ernst zu nehmen; der Veganismus wird damit als ein Anti-Nihilismus begriffen

The dyadic relation between a person in need and a person who provides help is one of the core elements of care. Nonetheless, identifying core elements of care alone cannot supply simple solutions to the challenges that are rooted in the ambivalences and tensions of the notion of care in healthcare. Care practices are extensive, situated, and complex. Questions concerning ambivalences and tensions within care include: Can care practices include coercion? Is care compatible with exclusion? Can it be passive or invisible? Can it be incorporated into standardised and regulated routines? Can care and its vocabulary be adjusted to clinical procedures and medical terminology?

The violence which colonialism brought into reality must not only be processed by those who suffered from it, but also by those who committed it. We claim that this process of becoming decolonial has two parts: Africans can engage in continued adseredition – derived from the Latin expression, reditio ad se, to come back to oneself – and the Western world has to desuperiorize its self-understanding and actions. To demonstrate this, this chapter juxtaposes two texts: the 1956 Congolese Manifesto of Conscience Africaine and, 2017 The New European Consensus on Development. The Manifesto exemplifies the African commitment to its own liberation, while the superioristic understanding of development permeates the neo-liberal solutions which the New Consensus offers. Philosophically speaking, development is a non-issue in its superiorist understanding for African philosophers. It is a philosophical issue solely because the Western world continues to impose itself on Africa. The author argues that for the West, it is time to write a Manifesto of the Western Conscience in which the West studies itself and initiates a new philosophical Enlightenment that would force its praxis to adhere to its moral theories and foster an Africa-centric approach to development.

We attempt to determine friendship as a normative practice. At its inception stands the twofold positing of an ought-to-be and an ought-to-do. In the normative practice of friendship, our heightened vitality manifests itself: we understand normativity in general as wanting more than simply to be there. Friendship is a normative positing and thus belongs to the metaphysical sphere of reality. With friendship, by freely taking practical action, we initiate something and connect that which had previously been unconnected. Within this connection we can find relief from our existential strain, and, furthermore, we can enjoy the normative ecstasy of being.

Care, I suspect, is initiated with an appeal. Something appeals to me which becomes a matter of concern. In accordance with this concern, I develop a volition: I want that which promotes the thriving—even to the smallest extent—of that which has appealed to us, regardless of how I may establish what that entails. Eventually I take practical action: I act according to my volition. Immediately after this has taken effect, as the case may be, I release the source of the appeal from my care.The phenomenology of care seems to us to be of eminent importance for health care ethics. To denote professional caring, the term nursing is used. The professional care-giver purposefully exposes him/herself to an appeal, making him/herself receptive to such an appeal and reliably allowing the appeal to become a concern. A fundamental principle of nursing ethics thus appears to us to be: to make known one’s receptiveness to an appeal—in a particular situation at a particular time—and to process this appeal reliably such that it becomes a concern. This encompasses the professionalism of care at its initiation.I believe that a precise phenomenology of care will provide a definition of the professional care that is nursing and an ethics of nursing for the care-giving professions.

In this contribution, we will analyse the inquiry (ሐተታ, ḥāteta), written by Ethiopian scholar, Zera Yaqob, ዘርአ፡ያዕቆብ, Seed of Jacob (Sumner, 1976: 4, I). His philosophy resists a division into the basic disciplines customary in Western philosophy, his arguments, as we wish to propose with caution, combine metaphysics, ethics, and epistemology in a way that is almost impossible to separate. We will thus not be able to identify purely epistemological principles in his philosophy. However, since Zera Yaqob is deeply concerned about truth, we still find profound philosophical insights about knowledge and being and their relationship to one another. We will finish our reconstruction of some of the main ideas of the inquiry, (ሐተታ, ḥāteta), with some rather critical notes on some of the hidden premises and their seemingly superioristic implications.