•  3
    Avicenna on the Ontology of Pure Quiddity
    Philosophical Quarterly 71 (4). 2021.
    Avicenna on the Ontology of Pure Quiddity. By Janos Damien.
  •  4
    Meta Logou in Plato’s Theaetetus
    Apeiron 54 (1): 109-128. 2020.
    The account of knowledge in Plato’s Theaetetus, as true belief meta logou, seems to lead to a regress, which may be avoided by defining one kind of knowledge as true belief that rests on a different kind of knowledge. I explore a specific version of this move: to define knowledge as true belief that results from a successful and proper exercise of a rational capacity.
  •  12
    Form and Function in Aristotle
    History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 23 (2): 317-337. 2020.
    On the one hand, Aristotle claims that the matter of a material thing is not part of its form. On the other hand, he suggests that the proper account of a natural thing must include a specification of the kind of matter in which it is realized. There are three possible strategies for dealing with this apparent tension. First, there may be two kinds of definition, so that the definition of the form of a thing does not include any specification of its matter, whereas the definition of a compound d…Read more
  •  5
    Teleonomy
    History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 14 (1): 185-202. 2011.
    The distinction between teleology and teleonomy that biologists sometimes refer to seems to be helpful in certain contexts, but it is used in several different ways and has rarely been clearly drawn. This paper discusses three prominent uses of the term “teleonomy” and traces its history back to what seems to be its first use. This use is examined in detail and then justified and refined on the basis of elements found in the philosophy of Aristotle, Kant, Anscombe and others. In the course of th…Read more
  •  20
    This is a discussion of self-knowledge in Hugh of St. Victor. It will yield the following three systematic results. First, it will be shown that there is a clear sense in which human self-knowledge is knowledge of one’s own rationality, and therefore knowledge of the proper object of one’s rational capacities (dunameis meta logou). Second, a distinction will be drawn between perfect and imperfect self-knowledge. Third, it will turn out that under conditions of perfect self-knowledge, all our rat…Read more
  •  35
    Knowledge and Truth in Plato: Stepping Past the Shadow of Socrates
    Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276): 638-641. 2019.
    Review of Catherine Rowett's Knowledge and Truth in Plato
  •  29
    Lichtenberg’s Point
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (2): 265-286. 2018.
    _ Source: _Volume 95, Issue 2, pp 265 - 286 The author argues that when Lichtenberg recommends saying “It is thinking” instead of “I am thinking”, he is not suggesting that thought might be a subjectless occurrence. Lichtenberg’s point is, rather, that we are often the _passive_ subject or medium of our thoughts. The author further argues that Descartes’ _cogito_ argument is not affected by this point, because Descartes does not claim that we must be the active subject of all our thoughts. Moreo…Read more
  •  116
  •  57
    Socrates and Self-Knowledge
    Philosophical Quarterly 68 (271): 421-424. 2018.
    © The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Scots Philosophical Association and the University of St Andrews. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: [email protected] idea of this book is to closely examine all passages where Socrates talks about the Delphic precept, ‘Know Thyself’, and see what picture of self-knowledge emerges. Given that Socrates is a key figure in the transmission of this precept, it is very likely that such a proje…Read more
  •  22
    Schuld und Gewissen bei Abelard
    Dialektik (1): 129-143. 2003.
    In Abelards Kommentar zum Römerbrief erscheint das Handeln contra conscientiam als eines gegen das eigene Urteil über andere. Abelard bezieht sich hier vor allem auf eine frühere Stelle im selben Brief, wo Paulus schreibt, jeder werde nach dem Gesetz gerichtet, das er sich selbst gibt (Rom 2,1). Was wir an Anderen verur- teilen, erläutert er, stehe dadurch auch unserer eigenen conscientia entgegen, und nur ein Handeln gegen die conscientia sei Sünde. Damit wird die goldene Regel, auf die Abelard…Read more
  •  24
    Tugenden und Absichten
    Philosophisches Jahrbuch 115 (1): 165-182. 2008.
    Psychological experiments show that human behavior is often determined by features of the situation rather than general and persistent character traits of the agent. Therefore, it may seem naive to suppose that someone with a virtuous character will in general act virtuously. This is at least true if a character trait is taken to be a persistent characteristic or property that reliably causes certain behavior. On the basis of the conception of agency developed by Anscombe in Intention, I will ar…Read more
  • Kants Modell kausaler Verhältnisse
    Kant-Studien. forthcoming.
    Eric Watkins argues that according to Kant, causation is not a relation between two events, but a relation between the “causality” of a substance and an event. It is shown that his arguments are partly based on a confusion between causation and interaction. Further, Watkins claims that for Kant, causes cannot be temporally determined. If this were true, it would follow that there can be no causal chains, and that all factors that determine the time when an effect occurs do not belong to its caus…Read more
  •  66
    The man without properties
    Synthese 194 (6). 2017.
    Contemporary philosophical logic rests on a distinction between things and properties. Properties are thought to differ from things in that their proper expression is incomplete or unsaturated. In this paper, I will argue that Aristotle did not distinguish between things and properties in this way. I will show, first, that Aristotle’s essences are not properties, and that certain passages in Aristotle make sense only if we do not take accidents to be properties either. The notion of a property i…Read more
  •  12
    Documents: Fillers of Informational Gaps
    The Monist 97 (2): 246-255. 2014.
    Something is a document insofar as its official function is to compensate for the impossibility of immediately acquiring information that has a function (= plays a role in a practice).
  • Virtues and intentions-Approach to learn a virtuous concept from Anscombe
    Philosophisches Jahrbuch 115 (1): 165-183. 2008.
    Intentions are not events that cause an action, but that in terms of which we describe and action when we describe it as intentionally. Likewise, virtues are not character traits that reliably cause certain behaviour, but that in terms of which we describe certain generic behaviour.
  •  26
    Science, conscience, consciousness
    History of the Human Sciences 23 (3): 15-28. 2010.
    Descartes’ metaphysics lays the foundation for the special sciences, and the notion of consciousness (conscientia) belongs to metaphysics rather than to psychology. I argue that as a metaphysical notion, ‘consciousness’ refers to an epistemic version of moral conscience. As a consequence, the activity on which science is based turns out to be conscientious thought. The consciousness that makes science possible is a double awareness: the awareness of what one is thinking, of what one should be do…Read more
  •  30
    Luhmann und die formale mathematik
    In Peter-Ulrich Merz-Benz & Gerhard Wagner (eds.), Die Logik Der Systeme, Universitätsverlag Konstanz. 2000.
    Niklas Luhmann verwendet in seiner soziologischen Systemtheorie offenbar etwas, das er den Büchern des englischen Mathematikers George Spencer Brown entnimmt. Dessen Formenkalkül ist für Luhmann, wie Günther Schulte treffend bemerkt, “Mädchen für alles, mit dem er nicht nur in der Lage ist Teezukochen, sondern auch Auto oder Straßenbahn zu fahren”. Der erste Blick in Spencer Browns Laws of Form vermittelt einen anderen Eindruck: nichts scheinen sie mit soziologischer Systemtheorie zu tun zu habe…Read more
  •  33
    Getting Causes from Powers
    Philosophical Quarterly 66 (263): 414-417. 2016.
  •  1
    The classifications of living beings
    with Peter Heuer
    Smith and Munn 197--217. 2008.
    This chapter proceeds in five steps. First, we will describe and justify the structure of the traditional system of species classification. Second, we will discuss three formal principles governing the development of taxonomies in general. It will emerge that, in addition to these formal principles, a division of living beings must meet certain empirical constraints. In the third section, we will show that the traditional division of living beings into species best meets these constraints. Fourt…Read more
  •  11
    Constituent Functions Boris Hennig
    In Christer Svennerlind, Jan Almäng & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Johanssonian Investigations. Essays in Honour of Ingvar Johansson on His Seventieth Birthday, Ontos Verlag. pp. 5--259. 2013.
    Starting from the idea that functions are formally similar to actions in that they are described and explained in a similar way, so that both admit of an accordion effect, I turn to Anscombe’s insight that the point of practical reasoning is to render explicit the relation between the different descriptions of an action generated by the accordion effect. The upshot is, roughly, that an item has a function if what it does can be accounted for by functional reasoning. Put differently, a part of a …Read more
  •  15
    Supstancija, stvarnost i odjelitost
    Prolegomena 7 (1): 5-20. 2008.
    Descartes claims that God is a substance and that mind and body are two different and separable substances. This paper provides some background that renders these claims intelligible.
  •  20
    Plato’s Ingredient Principle: Phaedo 105a2-5
    Ancient Philosophy 35 (2): 303-316. 2015.
    We can accept Plato's "ingredient principle" when we replace the distinction between things and properties with a slightly different one.
  •  41
    Instance Is the Converse of Aspect
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (1): 3-20. 2015.
    According to the aspect theory of instantiation, a particular A instantiates a universal B if and only if an aspect of A is cross-count identical with an aspect of B. This involves the assumption that both particulars and universals have aspects, and that aspects can mediate between different ways of counting things. I will ask what is new about this account of instantiation and, more importantly, whether it is an improvement on its older relatives. It will turn out that the part of it that is n…Read more
  • Der fortbestand Von lebewesen
    Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie 32 (1): 81-91. 2007.
    In this essay I defend the claim that the life of a living being is not one of its properties but something different: a mode of being. It follows from this that living beings should not be taken to be things that possess the property of being alive. Second, I argue that living beings are essentially involved in ongoing activities as long as they exist. Life cannot only be a disposition to be active, but must itself be an ongoing activity. Third, I suggest that for something to be a living being…Read more
  •  34
    Conscientia bei Descartes
    Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 60 (1): 21-36. 2006.
    Obwohl ‚conscientia’ ein zentraler Grundbegriff der cartesischen Metaphysik ist, sagt Descartes nirgends explizit, was er damit meint. Auch aus der Art und Weise, in der er das Wort verwendet, lässt sich dessen Bedeutung nicht vollends erschließen. Insbesondere handelt es sich nicht um einen reflexiven Denkakt (cogitatio), nicht um eine Disposition zum Haben solcher cogitationes und nicht um eine Art Aufmerksamkeit. Um die Bedeutung des Begriffes zu klären, schlage ich vor, auf klassische Texte …Read more
  •  32
    Was bedeutet ‚Conscientia' bei Descartes
    Dissertation, Universität Leipzig. 2004.
    Obwohl 'conscientia' ein zentraler Grundbegriff der cartesischen Metaphysik ist, sagt Descartes nirgends explizit, was er damit meint. Auch aus der Art und Weise, in der er das Wort verwendet, lässt sich dessen Bedeutung nicht vollends erschließen. Insbesondere handelt es sich nicht um einen reflexiven Denkakt (cogitatio), nicht um eine Disposition zum Haben solcher cogitationes und nicht um eine Art Aufmerksamkeit. Um die Bedeutung des Begriffes zu klären, schlage ich vor, auf klassische Texte…Read more
  •  38
    Social facts explained and presupposed
    In Nikos Psarros & Katinka Schulte-Ostermann (eds.), Facets of Sociality, Ontos Verlag. 2006.
    Attempts are often made to explain collective action in terms of the interaction of individuals. A common objection to such attempts is that they are circular: Since every interaction presupposes the existence of common practices and common practices involve collective action, no analysis of collective agency in terms of interaction can reduce collectivity away. In this essay I will argue that this does not constitute a real circularity. It is true that common practices are presupposed in every …Read more
  •  76
    Matter in Z3
    Foundations of Science 13 (3-4): 199-215. 2008.
    In this paper, I will discuss a certain conception of matter that Aristotle introduces in Metaphysics Z3. It is often assumed that Aristotle came to distinguish between matter and form only in his physical writings, and that this lead to a conflict with the doctrine of primary substances in the Categories that he tries to resolve in Z3. I will argue that there is no such conflict. In Z3, Aristotle seems to suggest that matter is what is left over when we strip a thing of all its properties. I ta…Read more