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3Johnston on fissionSorites 15 (December): 87-93. 2004.In this discussion paper, I evaluate some arguments of Mark Johnston's which appear in his articles «Fission and the Facts» and «Reasons and Reductionism» . My primary concern is with his description of fission cases, and his assessment of the implications of such cases for value theory. In particular, Johnston advances the following three claims:Rejecting the intrinsicness of identity is an arbitrary response to the paradox of fission;Fission cases involve indeterminate identity;Contra Parfit, …Read more
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1Personal IdentityDissertation, University of Oxford (United Kingdom). 1988.Available from UMI in association with The British Library. Requires signed TDF. ;In this thesis I argue that we ought to accept some version of the Analysis view--the view that the identity of a person over time can be analysed in terms of physical and/or psychological continuities. I also argue that there is no sense in which we ought to be ontological reductionists about persons--a person is an essentially embodied, irreducible, entity whose identity over time is analysable in terms of physic…Read more
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Peter Carruthers and Peter K. Smith, eds., Theories of Theories of Mind (review)Philosophy in Review 16 319-322. 1996.
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William J. Fitzpatrick, Teleology and the Norms of Nature (review)Philosophy in Review 21 419-422. 2001.
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1Cartesianism and the Private Language ArgumentSorites 14 57-62. 2002.In this paper, I argue that neither the #257 argument nor the #258 argument in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations undermines the coherence of the Cartesian Model, according to which a sensation word, such as `headache' or `tickle', gets its meaning in virtue of an act of `inner' association or ostensive definition. In addition, I argue against the standard assumption that the diarist's language of #258 is logically private
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21Neil Levy , Consciousness and Moral Responsibility . Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 34 (5): 240-242. 2014.
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1Persons and human beingsLogos. Anales Del Seminario de Metafísica [Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España]. forthcoming.
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1Peter Carruthers and Peter K. Smith, eds., Theories of Theories of Mind Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 16 (5): 319-322. 1996.
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3William J. Fitzpatrick, Teleology and the Norms of Nature Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 21 (6): 419-422. 2001.
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Jens Harbecke, Mental Causation: Investigating the Mind's Powers in a Natural WorldPhilosophy in Review 29 (6): 415. 2009.
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255Jens Harbecke, Mental Causation: Investigating the Mind's Powers in a Natural World Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 29 (6): 415-418. 2009.
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16John Foster , A World For Us: The Case for Phenomenalistic Idealism . Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 30 (6): 397-399. 2010.
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70Douglas Ehring , Tropes: Properties, Objects and Mental Causation . Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 33 (4): 279-281. 2013.
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56Neil Levy , Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free Will and Moral Responsibility . Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 33 (3). 2013.
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33Dana Kay Nelkin , Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility . Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 33 (1): 60-62. 2013.
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31Causal relevance and the mental : towards a non-reductive metaphysicsDissertation, Mcgill University (Canada). 1996.My aim in this thesis is to explain how a non-reductionist metaphysics can accommodate the causal relevance of the psychological and of the special sciences generally. According to physicalism, all behavior is caused by brain-states; given "folk-psychology", behavior is caused by some psychological state. If psychological states are distinct from brain states, then our behavior is overdetermined and this, it is claimed, is unacceptable. I argue that this consequence is not unacceptable. I claim …Read more
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18Lampert on the Fixity of the PastOrganon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 31 (1): 90-93. 2024.
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11Anscombe On ‘I’Philosophical Quarterly 47 (189): 507-511. 1997.I examine the main arguments of Elizabeth Anscombe’s difficult but fecund paper ‘The First Person’. Anscombe argues that the first‐person singular is not a device of reference, and, in particular, that it is not a device of indexical reference. Both arguments fail, but in ways that we can learn from.
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115Response to GoldsteinAnalysis 72 (4): 742-744. 2012.In ‘The Sorites is disguised nonsense’ Analysis (2012) 77: 61–5 L Goldstein attempts to show that some of the conditionals in any Sorites argument are nonsensical, and hence no Sorites argument can be sound. I give four reasons why this is not the case
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53Vagueness and identityAnalysis 48 (3): 130. 1988.The thesis that there can be vague objects is the thesis that there can be identity statements which are indeterminate in truth-value (i.e., neither true nor false) as a result of vagueness (as opposed, e.g., to reference-failure), "the singular terms of which do not have their references fixed by vague descriptive means". (if this is "not" what is meant by the thesis that there can be vague objects, it is not clear what "is" meant by it.) the possibility of vague objects should not be taken, in…Read more
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12Some Thoughts on AnimalismIn Klaus Petrus (ed.), On Human Persons, Heusenstamm Nr Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag. pp. 41-46. 2003.