•  27
    Causal Essentialism versus the Zombie Worlds
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (1): 93-112. 2009.
    David Chalmers claims that the logical possibility of ‘zombie worlds’ — worlds physically indiscernible from the actual world, but that lack consciousness — reveal that consciousness is a distinct fact, or property, in addition to the physical facts or properties.The ‘existence’ or possibility of Zombie worlds violates the physicalist demand that consciousness logically supervene upon the physical. On the assumption that the logical supervenience of consciousness upon the physical is, indeed, a …Read more
  •  7
    Defending Non‐Epiphenomenal Event Dualism 1
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (3): 393-412. 2000.
  •  11
    What the History of Vitalism Teaches Us About Consciousness and the "Hard Problem"
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3): 576-588. 2006.
    Daniel Dennett has claimed that if Chalmers' argument for the irreducibility of consciousness were to succeed, an analogous argument would establish the truth of Vitalism. Chalmers denies that there is such an analogy. I argue that the analogy does have merit and that skepticism is called for
  •  1
    Personal Identity
    Dissertation, University of Oxford (United Kingdom). 1988.
    Available from UMI in association with The British Library. Requires signed TDF. ;In this thesis I argue that we ought to accept some version of the Analysis view--the view that the identity of a person over time can be analysed in terms of physical and/or psychological continuities. I also argue that there is no sense in which we ought to be ontological reductionists about persons--a person is an essentially embodied, irreducible, entity whose identity over time is analysable in terms of physic…Read more
  • John Haugeland, Having Thought (review)
    Philosophy in Review 19 188-190. 1999.
  • William J. Fitzpatrick, Teleology and the Norms of Nature (review)
    Philosophy in Review 21 419-422. 2001.
  •  3
    John Haugeland, Having Thought Reviewed by
    Philosophy in Review 19 (3): 188-190. 1999.
  •  3
  •  7
    Causal relevance and the mental : towards a non-reductive metaphysics
    Dissertation, Mcgill University (Canada). 1996.
    My aim in this thesis is to explain how a non-reductionist metaphysics can accommodate the causal relevance of the psychological and of the special sciences generally. According to physicalism, all behavior is caused by brain-states; given "folk-psychology", behavior is caused by some psychological state. If psychological states are distinct from brain states, then our behavior is overdetermined and this, it is claimed, is unacceptable. I argue that this consequence is not unacceptable. I claim …Read more
  •  14
    Lampert on the Fixity of the Past
    Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 31 (1): 90-93. 2024.
  •  3
    Anscombe On ‘I’
    Philosophical Quarterly 47 (189): 507-511. 1997.
    I examine the main arguments of Elizabeth Anscombe’s difficult but fecund paper ‘The First Person’. Anscombe argues that the first‐person singular is not a device of reference, and, in particular, that it is not a device of indexical reference. Both arguments fail, but in ways that we can learn from.
  •  15
    _Personal Identity and Self-Consciousness_ is about persons and personal identity. What are we? And why does personal identity matter? Brian Garrett, using jargon-free language, addresses questions in the metaphysics of personal identity, questions in value theory, and discusses questions about the first person singular. Brian Garrett makes an important contribution to the philosophy of personal identity and mind, and to epistemology
  •  9
    Santayana’s Treatment of Teleology
    Overheard in Seville 28 (28): 1-10. 2010.
    Santayana's epiphenomenalism is best understood as part of his thinking about teleology and final causes. Santayana makes a distinction between final causes, which he rejects, and teleology, which he finds ubiquitous. Mental causation is identified with a doctrine of final causes which he argues is an absurd form of causation. Thus mental causes are rejected and Santayana embraces epiphenomenalism.
  •  6
    Response to Goldstein
    Analysis 72 (4): 742-744. 2012.
    In ‘The Sorites is disguised nonsense’ Analysis (2012) 77: 61–5 L Goldstein attempts to show that some of the conditionals in any Sorites argument are nonsensical, and hence no Sorites argument can be sound. I give four reasons why this is not the case
  •  144
    Non-reductionism and John Searle’s The Rediscovery of the Mind
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1): 209. 1995.
  •  74
    Farts have not received the metaphysical attention they deserve. Bill Capra has opened the batting in his recent study of this ubiquitous rectal phenomenon. Spurred on by his sterling effort, JJ and I have added our own two bob's worth, disagreeing with much of what Bill says, and defending the buttocks-first conception of farts.
  •  6
    Héritabilité causale et propriétés émergentes
    Philosophiques 27 (1): 139-159. 2000.
    Sur la base de ce qu’il a appelé « le principe d’héritabilité causale », Jaegwon Kim a soutenu que les propriétés réalisables de façons multiples ne constituent pas des sortes causales scientifiques. Mon principal objectif est de répondre aux arguments de Kim contre le physicalisme non réductionniste. Je défends l’idée qu’il existe plus de pouvoirs causaux que les seuls pouvoirs causaux physiques. Cela n’a rien de surprenant puisqu’il existe plus de particuliers que le nombre total de particules…Read more
  •  20
    Davidson on causal relevance
    Ratio 12 (1): 14-33. 1999.
    Davidson argues that mental properties are causally relevant properties. I argue that Davidson cannot appeal to ceteris paribus causal laws to ensure that these properties are causally relevant, if he wishes to retain his argument for anomalous monism. Second, I argue that the appeal to supervenience cannot, by itself, give us an account of the causal relevancy of mental properties. I argue that, while mental properties may indeed 'make a difference' to the causally efficacious properties of eve…Read more
  •  10
    Constitution, Over Determination and Causal Power
    Ratio 26 (2): 162-178. 2013.
    Kim's exclusion argument threatens to show that irreducible constituted objects are epiphenomenal. Kim's arguments are examined and found to be unconvincing; that a constituted cause requires its constituent to be a cause is not an adequate reason to reject the causation of the constituted object (event or property-instance). However, I introduce and argue for, the Causal Power Uniqueness Condition (CPUC). I argue that CPUC and the causal closure of the physical, implies that constituted objects…Read more
  •  11
    Best‐candidate theories and identity: Reply to Brennan
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 31 (1). 1988.
    This note criticizes Andrew Brennan's attempt to defend best?candidate theories of the identity of artefacts over time against certain now familiar objections. Adoption of a mereological conception of individuals does not, in itself, provide the means for a satisfactory response to objections of Wiggins and Noonan (some of which are anyway ill?focused). The way forward consists in recognizing that the consequences of best?candidate theories which have been thought objectionable (in particular, c…Read more
  •  2
    Bermúdez on Self–Consciousness
    Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210): 96-101. 2003.
    I argue that José Luis Bermúdez has not shown that there is a paradox in our concept of self–consciousness. The deflationary theory is not a plausible theory of self–consciousness, so its paradoxicality is irrelevant. A more plausible theory, ‘the simple theory’, is not paradoxical. However, I do think there is a puzzle about the connection between self–consciousness and ‘I’–thoughts.