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460Personal Identity and Self-ConsciousnessRoutledge. 1998._Personal Identity and Self-Consciousness_ is about persons and personal identity. What are we? And why does personal identity matter? Brian Garrett, using jargon-free language, addresses questions in the metaphysics of personal identity, questions in value theory, and discusses questions about the first person singular. Brian Garrett makes an important contribution to the philosophy of personal identity and mind, and to epistemology
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362Anscombe on `I'Philosophical Quarterly 47 (189): 507-511. 1997.I examine the main arguments of Elizabeth Anscombe’s difficult but fecund paper ‘The First Person’. Anscombe argues that the first‐person singular is not a device of reference, and, in particular, that it is not a device of indexical reference. Both arguments fail, but in ways that we can learn from
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183What is This Thing Called Metaphysics?Routledge. 2003.Why is there something rather than nothing? Does God exist? Does time flow? What are we? Do we have free will? What is truth? Metaphysics is concerned with ourselves and reality, and the most fundamental questions regarding existence. This clear and accessible introduction covers the central topics in metaphysics in a concise but comprehensive way. Brian Garrett discusses the crucial concepts in a highly readable manner, easing the reader in with a look at some important philosophical problems. …Read more
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181Vagueness and identityAnalysis 48 (3): 130. 1988.The thesis that there can be vague objects is the thesis that there can be identity statements which are indeterminate in truth-value (i.e., neither true nor false) as a result of vagueness (as opposed, e.g., to reference-failure), "the singular terms of which do not have their references fixed by vague descriptive means". (if this is "not" what is meant by the thesis that there can be vague objects, it is not clear what "is" meant by it.) the possibility of vague objects should not be taken, in…Read more
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174Bermudez on self-consciousnessPhilosophical Quarterly 53 (210): 96-101. 2003.I argue that José Luis Bermúdez has not shown that there is a paradox in our concept of self-consciousness. The deflationary theory is not a plausible theory of self-consciousness, so its paradoxicality is irrelevant. A more plausible theory, 'the simple theory', is not paradoxical. However, I do think there is a puzzle about the connection between self-consciousness and 'I'-thoughts
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162Personal identity and reductionismPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (June): 361-373. 1991.
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143Non-reductionism and John Searle’s The Rediscovery of the MindPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1): 209. 1995.
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114Response to GoldsteinAnalysis 72 (4): 742-744. 2012.In ‘The Sorites is disguised nonsense’ Analysis (2012) 77: 61–5 L Goldstein attempts to show that some of the conditionals in any Sorites argument are nonsensical, and hence no Sorites argument can be sound. I give four reasons why this is not the case
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113Tim, Tom, Time and Fate: Lewis on Time TravelAnalytic Philosophy 57 (3): 247-252. 2016.In his well-known time travel story, David Lewis claims that there is a sense in which Tim can go back in time and kill his Grandfather and a (more inclusive) sense in which he cannot. Lewis describes Tim’s predicament as semi-fatalist, but holds that this does not compromise Tim’s freedom or his ability to kill Grandfather. I argue that if semi-fatalism is true of Tim, it is true of everyone, and that this is a troubling conclusion.
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107Black on Backwards CausationThought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (3): 230-233. 2014.In this discussion paper I argue that Max Black's well-known bilking argument does not succeed in showing the impossibility of backwards causation
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97Santayana’s Treatment of TeleologyOverheard in Seville 28 (28): 1-10. 2010.Santayana's epiphenomenalism is best understood as part of his thinking about teleology and final causes. Santayana makes a distinction between final causes, which he rejects, and teleology, which he finds ubiquitous. Mental causation is identified with a doctrine of final causes which he argues is an absurd form of causation. Thus mental causes are rejected and Santayana embraces epiphenomenalism.
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95On the Epistemic Bilking ArgumentThought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (3): 139-140. 2015.The standard bilking argument is well-known and attempts to prove the impossibility of backwards causation. In this discussion note, I identify an epistemic bilking argument, which has not received sufficient attention in the literature, and indicate how best to respond to it. This response involves a parity argument based on a forwards causation case
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88Davidson on causal relevanceRatio 12 (1): 14-33. 1999.Davidson argues that mental properties are causally relevant properties. I argue that Davidson cannot appeal to ceteris paribus causal laws to ensure that these properties are causally relevant, if he wishes to retain his argument for anomalous monism. Second, I argue that the appeal to supervenience cannot, by itself, give us an account of the causal relevancy of mental properties. I argue that, while mental properties may indeed 'make a difference' to the causally efficacious properties of eve…Read more
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76Dummett on Bringing About the PastPhilosophia 44 (1): 113-115. 2016.In ‘Bringing about the Past’ Michael Dummett attempted to defend the coherence of the idea of bringing about the past. I agree that bringing about the past is conceptually no more problematic than bringing about the future, but argue, against Dummett, that there is no need to restrict the scope of an agent’s knowledge in order to make sense of intentionally bringing about past events
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69Constitution, Over Determination and Causal PowerRatio 26 (2): 162-178. 2013.Kim's exclusion argument threatens to show that irreducible constituted objects are epiphenomenal. Kim's arguments are examined and found to be unconvincing; that a constituted cause requires its constituent to be a cause is not an adequate reason to reject the causation of the constituted object (event or property-instance). However, I introduce and argue for, the Causal Power Uniqueness Condition (CPUC). I argue that CPUC and the causal closure of the physical, implies that constituted objects…Read more
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59Letting Rip: Rebutting Capra on the metaphysics of fartsThink 21 (62): 19-22. 2022.Farts have not received the metaphysical attention they deserve. Bill Capra has opened the batting in his recent study of this ubiquitous rectal phenomenon. Spurred on by his sterling effort, JJ and I have added our own two bob's worth, disagreeing with much of what Bill says, and defending the buttocks-first conception of farts.
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37Ismael on the Paradox of PredictabilityPhilosophia 49 (5): 2081-2084. 2021.In this discussion note we argue, contrary to the thrust of a recent article by Jenann Ismael, that resolving the paradox of predictability does not require denying the possibility of a natural oracle, and thus stands in no need of the response that she proposes.
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36Best‐candidate theories and identity: Reply to BrennanInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 31 (1). 1988.This note criticizes Andrew Brennan's attempt to defend best?candidate theories of the identity of artefacts over time against certain now familiar objections. Adoption of a mereological conception of individuals does not, in itself, provide the means for a satisfactory response to objections of Wiggins and Noonan (some of which are anyway ill?focused). The way forward consists in recognizing that the consequences of best?candidate theories which have been thought objectionable (in particular, c…Read more
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36Some Remarks on Backwards CausationRevista Portuguesa de Filosofia 71 (4): 695-704. 2015.Resumo Neste texto, o autor concentra-se em dois artigos históricos: o de Max Black “Why cannot an effect precede its cause”? e o de Michael Dummett “Bringing about the Past”. O autor irá mostrar onde falha o “bilking argument” de Black, contra a possibilidade da causalidade invertida. Por conseguinte, o autor irá concordar com Dummett, na possibilidade de um agente actuar a fim de que algo possa ocorrer no passado, contudo, discordando da argumentação de Dummett face a um desafio céptico, que t…Read more