• This dissertation develops an account of moral perception rooted in the writings of Aristotle and Iris Murdoch. The concept of moral perception has been offered in recent years as an alternative to principle-centered accounts of virtue and practical reason. In this context, moral perception designates a reliable sensitivity to moral considerations that is practical and world-guided, yet not reducible to readily applicable principles of conduct. The account I develop makes perspicuous the role no…Read more
  • Form and Persuasion in Descartes' Meditations
    Acta Philosophica Fennica 79 155. 2006.
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    Sabina Lovibond , Iris Murdoch, Gender and Philosophy . Reviewed by
    Philosophy in Review 32 (5): 391-393. 2012.
  •  34
    William Ransome, Moral Reflection (review)
    Philosophical Quarterly 60 (239): 434-436. 2010.
    No Abstract
  •  58
    Genevieve Lloyd, Providence Lost (review)
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (3). 2011.
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 89, Issue 3, Page 557-559, September 2011
  •  103
    Virtue and Disagreement
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (3): 273-291. 2010.
    One of the most prominent strands in contemporary work on the virtues consists in the attempt to develop a distinctive—and compelling—account of practical reason on the basis of Aristotle’s ethics. In response to this project, several eminent critics have argued that the Aristotelian account encourages a dismissive attitude toward moral disagreement. Given the importance of developing a mature response to disagreement, the criticism is devastating if true. I examine this line of criticism closel…Read more
  •  6
    Providence Lost
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (3): 557-559. 2011.
    No abstract
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