Beliefs seem to be more significantly constrained by some norms than others e.g. one should only believe what they have sufficient evidence for, a belief that p is correct iff p is true etc. I call these norms, doxastic norms. Constitutivism is the view that doxastic norms are a constitutive feature of belief. I argue that this view is mistaken. In making this case, I come to defend views about the semantics of doxastic norms, the nature of belief, and the value of truth. Doxastic norms are natu…
Read moreBeliefs seem to be more significantly constrained by some norms than others e.g. one should only believe what they have sufficient evidence for, a belief that p is correct iff p is true etc. I call these norms, doxastic norms. Constitutivism is the view that doxastic norms are a constitutive feature of belief. I argue that this view is mistaken. In making this case, I come to defend views about the semantics of doxastic norms, the nature of belief, and the value of truth. Doxastic norms are naturally stated in deontic terms. In the first chapter, I consider how we should best understand these statements, given that we likely don't control our beliefs in the same way that we do our actions. In the second chapter, I consider whether the account of religious belief given by either Ludwig Wittgenstein or Søren Kierkegaard provide a counterexample to constitutivism. In the third chapter, I argue that constitutivism can't account for certain intuitions about our reasons for belief. In the fourth chapter, I defend a descriptive account of belief in terms of the appearance of truth. In the fifth chapter, I show how my view can better account for the data which is thought by some to support constitutivism. In the final chapter, I describe how our reasons for belief might arise from our goals.
